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Articles 
Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini: 
Presidential Transitions and 
Intemational Law 
by 
NANCY AMOURY COMBS* 
Introduction 
Marbury v. Madison1 is justifiably famous for establishing judicial 
review; however, the case also provides the first glimpse in American 
political history of the power struggle between a lame-duck President 
who hurriedly advances the goals of his administration during the 
waning hours of his presidency and an incoming President who is just 
as intent on reversing his predecessor's eleventh-hour deeds. After 
the Republicans swept the elections of 1800,2 President John Adams, 
along with the outgoing Federalists in the lame-duck Congress, 
enraged President-elect Thomas Jefferson by expanding the federal 
judiciary and packing it with loyal Federalists.3 After the 
* Legal Adviser, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
J.D., University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall, 1994. I am grateful to George H. 
Aldrich, Warren Christopher, Bruce Combs, Heather Gerken, Thomas Ginsburg, Jack 
Goldsmith, Sam Hirsch, Roberts Owen, and Olivia Swaak-Goldman for their helpful 
comments. The opinions expressed and any resulting errors are those of the author. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2. The Republican presidential candidate Thomas Jefferson defeated the incumbent, 
Federalist John Adams, and the Republicans won a majority of the seats in Congress. See 
GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815, at 
138-39 (1981); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: 
THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS 243-49 (1993). 
3. During the two weeks before incoming President Jefferson's inauguration, Adams 
and the lame-duck Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1801, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 
[303] 
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Inauguration, Jefferson and his Republican Congress set about to 
reverse course,4 repealing the Judiciary Act of 1801,5 which had 
created numerous new judgeships, and abolishing the 1802 Term of 
the Supreme Court6 to prevent a constitutional challenge to that 
repeal.7 At the same time, they unsheathed impeachment as an even 
more potent weapon to rid the judiciary of Federalists.8 The House 
impeached Federalist District Judge John Pickering in early 1802,9 
and the Senate removed him.l0 The House then turned its attention 
2 Stat. 89, 90, 98 (repealed 1802), which created circuit courts and thereby created 
numerous new federal judgeships and minor magistrate positions, and the Organic Act for 
the District of Columbia, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103 (1801); ch. 24, 2 Stat. 115 (1801) (supplement 
to the Act), which authorized the President to name justices of the peace for the District 
of Columbia. President Adams allegedly stayed up until midnight the night before 
Jefferson's inauguration signing commissions for these new judicial officials, who, as a 
result, were pejoratively known as "midnight judges." See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra 
note 2, at 134-35; William H. Rehnquist, Thomas Jefferson and His Contemporaries, 9 J. 
LAW & POL. 595, 600 (1993). Adams signed and sealed the commissions of the petitioners 
in Marbury v. Madison, but the commissions were not delivered by the end of the day. and 
the newly inaugurated President Jefferson refused to deliver the commissions. 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) at 155. It was this refusal that gave rise to Marbury v. Madison. 
4. As Jefferson wrote to a friend, the Federalists "have retired into the judiciary as a 
stronghold ... and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down 
and erased." Letter to John Dickinson, December 19, 1801, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (Memorial ed. 1903); see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 
108. 
5. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. See also III ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE 
LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 57-92 (1919) (describing the lengthy Senate and House 
debates); HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 163-64 (noting that the repeal passed 
both Houses of Congress "on almost strictly partisan lines"); FELIX FRANKFURTER & 
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 24-30 (1928); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most 
Endangered Branch 1801-1805,33 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 219,222-33 {1998). 
6. Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States. Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 1, 2 
Stat. 156. The Court eventually upheld the repeal in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. {1 Cranch) 299 
(1803). 
7. See III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at 94-97; Currie, supra note 5, at 233-34. 
8. See III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at 157-60. 
9. See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 641-42 (1803). 
10. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 367-68 {1803). See generally III BEVERIDGE, supra 
note 5, at 164-67; Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HIST. 
REV. 485 (1949). 
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to the Supreme Court, impeaching Associate Justice Samuel Chase,ll 
but the Senate acquitted Chase on all eight articles of impeachment.12 
Subsequent changes of administration have by and large proved 
less acrimonious; yet, during the many intervening years, it has been 
by no means rare for lame-duck officeholders to push through 
partisan laws and policies only to see them limited or eliminated by 
their successors.B What has been rare, however, has been for this 
phenomenon to occur in the realm of foreign affairs. Political 
weakness typically characterizes an administration's final year in 
office, and by the time the election has passed and the President has 
become a lame duck,14 his ability to conduct foreign affairs in 
particular is at its lowest ebb.15 Consequently, lame-duck Presidents 
usually steer clear of significant or controversial international issues; 
or, at the least, they seek their successors' concurrence or 
commitment as to the course to pursue.16 
11. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 272 (1804); see also III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at 
169-74. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC 
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 15-
134 (1992). Chase's impeachment was widely viewed as a precursor to that of Chief 
Justice John Marshall. III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at 160-63. 
12. REHNQUIST, supra note 11, at 104-05; see also III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at 
171,174-219. 
13. As Alexander Hamilton said, "To reverse and undo what has been done by a 
predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his 
own capacity and desert .... " LAURIN L. HENRY, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS 125 
(1960). 
14. Office holders who are serving their final terms in office are also known as "lame 
ducks," but for purposes of this article, the term "lame duck" describes an office holder's 
status during the period between the election and the inauguration of his successor. 
15. FREDERICK C. MOSHER ET AL., PRESIDENTIAL TRANSmONS AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 132 (1987); HENRY, supra note 13, at 457. 
16. For example, when the repayment of European war debts to the United States 
became a critical issue soon after the 1932 election, lame-duck President Hoover 
repeatedly sought consultations with President-elect Roosevelt. HENRY, supra note 13, at 
284-310. Likewise, lame-duck President Truman sought President-elect Eisenhower's 
commitment to support Truman's position on the forced repatriation of prisoners in the 
ongoing Korean War armistice negotiations. Id. at 480-86. Lame-duck President Johnson 
and President-elect Nixon also consulted on pending Vietnam War issues. CARL M. 
BRAUER, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSmONS: EISENHOWER THROUGH REAGAN 152-53 
(1986); see also MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 131-32. In December 1992, lame-duck 
President George Bush committed United States ground troops as part of a multinational 
force to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid to war-tom Somalia, see Michael R. Gordon, 
U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees Longer Stay, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at A1, an action that incoming President Bill Clinton approved and 
expanded, see John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1673, 1673 (2000). 
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This Article examines one of those very rare instances in which a 
lame-duck President was able and chose, during the final hours of his 
Administration, to bind the United States to significant international 
commitments without the concurrence of the President-elect. The 
lame duck was Jimmy Carter; the President-elect was Ronald Reagan; 
and the issue was the most dramatic foreign policy controversy since 
the end of the Vietnam War. 
On November 4, 1979, militant Iranian students seized the 
United States Embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American 
citizens hostage. Despite the Carter Administration's extraordinary 
diplomatic efforts, it was unable to secure the hostages' release until 
President Carter's last full day in office. On that day, the United 
States, pursuant to President Carter's orders, adhered to the Algiers 
Declarations,17 an international treaty18 that secured the release of the 
hostages while committing the United States and Iran to numerous 
obligations designed to resolve the issues that had arisen as a 
consequence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the hostage-
taking. Throughout the United States' presidential campaign and 
17. The Algiers Declarations comprise the following five documents: The Declaration 
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 81 
DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047 1. 1 (1981) [hereinafter General Declaration], reprinted in 1 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Jan. 
19, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047, at 3 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration], 
reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to 
the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 
19 Jan. 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047, at 4 [hereinafter Undertakings], reprinted in 1 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow Agreement Among the United States, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (as fiscal agent of the United States), Bank Markazi Iran, and 
the Banque Centrale d'Algerie (escrow agent) Jan. 20, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 
2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and the Technical Arrangement 
Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Jan. 20, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., 
No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20. For purposes of this article, 
however, the term "Algiers Declarations" will refer to the General Declaration and the 
Claims Settlement Declaration. 
18. The Algiers Declarations constitute a treaty for purposes of international law, see 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333, 
but in American law parlance, they are termed an "executive agreement" because they 
were not submitted to the Senate for consent. An international agreement can be termed 
a "treaty" for purposes of American law only if a two-thirds' majority of the Senate has 
given advice and consent for ratification. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OPTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 303 (1986); see 
also infra note 160. 
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transition, Reagan had made clear his opposition to negotiating with 
terrorists19 and to many of the treaty terms then under 
consideration.20 Not surprisingly, then, upon taking office, he 
considered repudiating the Declarations to the extent they had not 
already been performed; in the end, however, he decided to 
implement them, but only "in strict accordance with the[ir] terms."21 
It soon became clear that the Reagan Administration's interpretation 
of the Declarations' terms differed in certain key respects from that of 
the Carter Administration. Thus, at first glance, the Algiers 
Declarations, as applied by the new Administration, appear to be just 
one more example of lame-duck lawmaking that met subsequent 
limitation. 
It became much more than that, however, because the 
"lawmaking" occurred in the international realm. Had President 
Reagan been confronted with a piece of unwanted domestic 
legislation, he would have had to consider only the domestic political 
ramifications of the course he took. By contrast, in adhering to the 
Algiers Declarations, President Carter had bound the United States 
to international obligations that thereby rendered the United States 
19. See The Iran Agreements: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Foreign Relations, 
97th Cong. 182 (1981) [hereinafter Senate Foreign Relations Hearings] (testimony of 
Walter Stoessel, Reagan Administration's Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) 
(stating that not negotiating for the release of the hostages "is a strongly held view of the 
President; that is, that it was a mistake to become involved in such prolonged 
negotiations; ... we should insist, rather on the release of hostages taken and should use 
the full range of instruments available to us to effect that result"); Frank J. Smist, Jr. & 
John P. Meiers, Ronald Reagan and Iran-Contra: The Consequences of Breaking 
Campaign Promises, in PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE WORLD 301, 302-03 (Eric J. 
Schmertz et al. eds., 1997) (reporting on candidate Reagan's pledge of a "get tough" policy 
concerning terrorists: "During the presidential debate between Carter and Reagan on 
October 28, 1980, Reagan stated, 'There will be no negotiation with terrorists of any 
kind."'); Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS: THE IRAN 
HOSTAGE CRISIS AND THE HAGUE CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: A LOOK BACK 49, 59 (Andreas 
F. Lowenfeld et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARY DAYS] (comments of 
Roberts Owen) (describing Reagan's advisors' view that "just the act of talking or 
negotiating with a terrorist government was totally unacceptable"). 
20. See, e.g., Steven R. Weisman, Reagan Calls Iran's New Demands A 'Ransom' 
Sought by 'Barbarians', N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1980, at A1; see also David Newsom, 
Presidential Transitions and the Handling of Foreign Policy Crises: The Iranian Hostage 
Crisis from Carter to Reagan, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL TRANSmONS AND FOREIGN 
POLICY, VOL. II: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 121, 131 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1986) 
("Many in the transition team of the [Reagan] administration came to Washington largely 
convinced that in Algeria we were negotiating ransom for the hostages."). 
21. Implementation of Hostage Agreements the Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T ST. 
BULL. No. 2048, at 17 (1981). 
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accountable to the international community. Further, in contrast to 
many treaties which contain obligations but do not contain clear 
provisions as to remedies for violations of those obligations, the 
Algiers Declarations expressly created an enforcement mechanism: 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal ("Tribunal")-with the power 
to resolve disputes over the interpretation and performance of any 
provision of the Declarations.22 Thus, the Reagan Administration 
knew from the outset that its stringent implementation of the 
Declarations could be passed upon by an international tribunal. But 
the composition, rules, and substantive precedents of that tribunal 
were as yet unknown. 
In the intervening years, the United States has had the 
opportunity to learn more than it might have cared to about the 
Tribunal because Iran, unhappy with virtually every aspect of the 
Reagan Administration's implementation of the Declarations, has 
repeatedly hauled the United States before the Tribunal, claiming 
myriad treaty violations. The Tribunal has now passed judgment on 
virtually all of those claims,23 making this the first opportunity to take 
stock of the long-term consequences that flowed from the widely 
divergent treaty interpretations espoused by the Governments of 
Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini. This examination paints an 
informative picture of the varied, competing interests at the 
intersection of domestic law, international law, and partisan politics. 
This Article systematically examines the Reagan 
Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations against 
the background of the negotiations between the Carter 
Administration and the Ayatollah's Islamic Republic and in light of 
well-established rules of treaty interpretation. This examination 
reveals that the Reagan Administration's implementation of the 
22. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 17, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. at 8; see also Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. VI, para. 4, 
reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 11; id. at art. II, para. 3, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. 
Cl. Trib. Rep. at 10. 
23. Only one case involving the Reagan Administration's implementation of the 
Declarations remains to be decided: Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. 
B61 (including Case Nos. N3, N8, N9, and N14) (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.). The Tribunal has 
determined liability but not damages in the Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case 
Nos. A15 II:A and II:B, Award No. 529-A15-Ff, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112 (May 6, 
1992); Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case Nos. A15(IV) & A24, Award No. 
590-A15(IV)/A24-Ff, 1998 WL 930565 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Dec. 28, 1998); and Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. All, Award No. 597-All-Ff, 2000 WL 
394260 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Apr. 7, 2000). 
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Declarations was, in many respects, grudging, ideological, and, at 
times, very sloppy. Rather than conforming to the conventional 
norms of treaty interpretation which require states to interpret 
treaties "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its 
object and purpose,"24 the Reagan Administration called all doubtful 
issues and some not-so-doubtful issues in the United States' favor. Be 
that as it may, the Article seeks to enhance the understanding of the 
choices the Reagan Administration made by placing them in the 
context of the domestic-law constraints, the external political 
pressures, the internal Administration ideology, and the myriad 
uncertainties regarding the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the 
body that would ultimately pass on the treaty's interpretation. By 
analyzing as a whole the claims Iran brought and the conclusions the 
Tribunal reached, the Article also illuminates the consequences-
financial as well as diplomatic-of the Reagan Administration's 
narrow interpretation of certain provisions of the Declarations, and 
then evaluates those consequences in light of the domestic costs the 
Reagan Administration would likely have incurred had it adopted a 
more balanced interpretation. No similar analysis has ever been 
undertaken, and the conclusions that emerge about lame-duck 
lawmaking in international affairs provide much-needed insights into 
pressing current issues, such as President Clinton's recent attempts to 
amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and his signing of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court a few weeks before the 
end of his term.25 
Part I describes the events leading up to the hostage crisis and 
the Carter Administration's negotiation of the Algiers Declarations 
to resolve that crisis. It also provides a summary description of the 
obligations the United States assumed in adhering to the Algiers 
Declarations. Part IT presents an overview of lame-duck lawmaking 
and then describes the Reagan Administration's response to the 
Algiers Declarations, particularly highlighting the interaction 
24. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 340. The Vienna Convention is understood to have codified customary 
international law on treaty interpretation, see Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, 
International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 42 (1978), 
and the Tribunal has followed the Vienna Convention's rules in interpreting the Algiers 
Declarations. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A21, Decision No. 
62-A21-Fr, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 324,328 para. 8 (May 4, 1987). 
25. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Approves War Crimes Court, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, 
Jan. 2, 2001, at 1. 
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between the Reagan Administration and the United States nationals 
who had claims against Iran and who therefore pressed the 
Administration to interpret the Declarations in ways favorable to 
their interests. Although the Declarations can be said to follow in the 
long line of controversial actions taken by outgoing Presidents in their 
waning days in office, they also diverge markedly and for a variety of 
reasons, reasons which complicated the Reagan Administration's 
already-difficult task of implementing the Declarations. Part III 
examines Iran's claims before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's recent 
decisions with regard to those claims. It details the Reagan 
Administration's implementation of the specific provisions that gave 
rise to Iran's claims and, in particular, focuses on the context in which 
the Reagan Administration operated and the myriad pressures that it 
faced. Whatever weight those considerations might carry in other 
settings, they have done little to prevent the Tribunal, which operates 
in the realm of international law, from repeatedly finding the United 
States in breach of the Algiers Declarations. Part IV concludes by 
independently assessing the Reagan Administration's decisions in 
light of the above considerations and, retrospectively, in light of the 
long-term consequences. 
:n:. The Hostage Crisis and the Algiers Declarations 
During the years following World War II, Iran and the United 
States forged what was believed to be a stable and satisfying alliance. 
The United States recognized the strategic importance of Iran's 
location in the Persian Gulf26 and consequently sought to strengthen 
Iran after World War II as a means of preventing a Soviet takeover.27 
26. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 6 (prepared testimony of 
Edmund Muskie, Secretary of State, Carter Administration) ("American foreign policy 
since World War II has consistently recognized the strategic, political, and economic 
importance of Iran."). 
27. Harold H. Saunders, The Crisis Begins, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN 35, 54 
(Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985) [hereinafter Saunders, The Crisis Begins]; CHARLES-
PHILIPPE DAVID ET AL., FOREIGN POLICY FAILURE IN THE WHITE HOUSE: 
REAPPRAISING THE FALL OF THE SHAH AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 52 (1993). 
Iran itself was not unaware of its own geographical significance. As the Shah of Iran 
himself put it in a 1977 interview: 
If you didn't have ... a strong Iran capable of securing its own security and 
providing security in the region and eventually the Indian Ocean how will you 
replace that? With the presence of one million American troops? Do you want 
several more Vietnams? In Vietnam, you had only 550,000 American boys. But 
the Persian armed forces have more than that. And they are not smoking grass. 
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To that end, the United States for years supplied Iran with vast 
quantities of military equipment,28 and its willingness, indeed desire, 
to meet Iran's military needs only increased as the Cold War wore on. 
By 1972, the Nixon Administration was permitting the Shah of Iran to 
purchase virtually any non-nuclear armament he wanted from the 
United States' arsenal.29 
Iran's non-military economic ties with the United States also 
increased in the years following World War II and increased 
dramatically during the 1970s. During that decade, Iran's income 
from oil skyrocketed,30 so that at the same time the Shah was 
acquiring more and more American military equipment, he was also 
spending vast sums on domestic modernization.31 He seemed 
determined to transform Iran into an industrialized nation in short 
order,32 and as a result, he spent large portions of Iran's oil profits on 
Newsweek, Jan. 24, 1977, at 48, quoted in SANDRA MACKEY, THE IRANIANS: PERSIA, 
ISLAM AND THE SOUL OF A NATION 250 {1996). Concerns about a Soviet invasion also 
played a role in the decision not to close the American Embassy in Tehran during or after 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran which will be discussed infra. See Saunders, The Crisis 
Begins, supra, at 54. 
28. For instance, between 1953 and 1960, the United States provided Iran with $450 
million worth of military assistance and $1.3 billion in new weapons systems. See Philip F. 
Napoli, A Historical Overview, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, 1, 3. 
29. JOHN W. LIMBERT, IRAN: AT WAR WITH HISTORY 100 {1987); CYRUS VANCE, 
HARD CHOICES: CRITICAL YEARS IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY 315 {1983); see Philip 
F. Napoli, A Historical Overview, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 4; see also 
A Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate: United States Military Sales to Iran July 1976, in THE 
UNITED STATES AND IRAN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 406 {Y onah Alexander & Allan 
Nanes eds., 1980) [hereinafter A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (stating that "Iran is the 
largest single purchaser of U.S. military equipment . . . [and} an extremely important 
country to the U.S. and its allies because of its geographical location and oil"); MACKEY, 
supra note 27, at 244 {1996) (noting that in 1973 alone the Shah invested $3 billion in 
military hardware). 
30. LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 103 ("Between the beginning of 1971 and the end of 
1973, the average posted price for a barrel of crude rose from $1.79 to $11.65, and the 
government's oil revenues rose from $2.3 billion in 1972 to $18.5 billion in 1974."). 
31. Statement of State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs (Joseph J. 
Sisco) Before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on 
International Relations (June 10, 1975), in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 29, at 
400-01; ANDREAS F. LoWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLmCAL ENDS 542 {2d ed. 
1983) [hereinafter LoWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR PO LID CAL ENDS]. 
32 See DAVID D. CARON, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS 27-28 {1990). 
Still the Shah's ambitions multiplied. In successive interviews given at the time, 
Muhammad Reza Shah's imagination moved Iran from an industrialized country 
on par with Switzerland to competing with France economically and militarily by 
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infrastructure projects such as road construction, factory 
modernization, and communication systems.33 In these endeavors, he 
sought Western-particularly American- technology, equipment, 
advisers, and investment,34 so that by the late 1970s, Iran was home to 
a vast number of American business interests, ranging from large-
scale construction projects to offshore oil drilling to major product 
lines such as Pepsi-Cola and Revlon. Hundreds of American 
corporations were involved in these lucrative projects, and some 
45,000 American citizens were living in Iran.35 In all, between 1973 
and 1977, Iran signed agreements to purchase more than $12 billion 
of United States military and non-military goods and services.36 
A. The Islamic Revolution and the Hostage-Taking 
Much has been written about the causes and events leading to 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran,37 and that discussion need not be 
repeated here. Suffice it to say that most date the commencement of 
the Revolution to January 1978, when the publication of an anti-
clerical diatribe led to a demonstration and strike in the Holy City of 
the year 1993 to reaching parity with Germany in 1996 to becoming the second 
Japan by the end of the century. 
MACKEY, supra note 27, at 244; see also RYSZARD KAPUSCI:-ISKI, SHAH OF SHAHS 52-53 
(1982) (reporting on a 1973 press conference in which the Shah claimed that within one 
generation he would make Iran into the fifth greatest power on Earth and a Der Spiegel 
interview in which he claimed that within ten years Iran would have the same living 
standard as Germany, France, and England). 
33. See GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 2-3 (1996); LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, 
supra note 31, at 542; Philip F. Napoli, A Historical Overview, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, 
supra note 19, at 5. 
34. See Office of Legal Counsel, Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office 
of Legal Counsel Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
71, 72 (1984); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Law and the Hostage 
Agreement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1981, reprinted in Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 292, 293. 
35. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, supra note 31, at 542; 
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 
1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
2 (Comm. Print 1981); see also LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 104-05. 
36. LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 104. 
37. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 27, at 52-57; LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 103-14; 
MACKEY, supra note 27, at 271-93; VANCE, supra note 29, at 345-48; Daniel Barstow 
Magraw, The Tribunal in Jurisprudential Perspective, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 2-4, 
38-46 (Richard B. Lillich & Vance B. McGraw eds., 1998). See generally KAPUSCINSKI, 
supra note 32. 
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Qom.38 Riots followed in other cities throughout the spring and 
summer of 1978,39 and with them came a virulent strain of anti-
American rhetoric.40 By the end of 1978, the anti-American 
sentiment was so widespread that virtually all Americans living in 
Iran had left and had left rapidly.41 
January,1979 saw the departure of the Shah, while February 1 of 
that year brought the return from exile of the Ayatollah Khomeini42 
and with him the establishment of a new provisional government in 
Iran.43 During the spring and summer of 1979, the new government 
began instituting numerous "reforms" that would have severe 
consequences for the American companies that had been doing 
business in Iran. For instance, the new government nationalized the 
38. See LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 111-12; Philip F. Napoli, A Historical Overview, in 
REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 5; see also KAPUSCINSKI, supra note 32, at 106-
15. 
39. See DAVID ET AL., supra note 27, at 54-55; KAPUSCINSKI, supra note 32, at 114. 
40. CARON, supra note 32, at 29. For a good discussion of the background underlying 
Iranians' antipathy for the United States, see MACKEY, supra note 27, at 250-53. See also 
Iran's Seizure of the United States Embassy: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 97th Cong. 29 (1981) [hereinafter House Foreign Affairs Hearings] (statement of 
Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, Carter Administration) (Iran's new leaders "charged that the United States had 
imposed on Iran since 1953 a government that was oppressive and corrupt, that 
consistently violated human rights, and that was insensitive to the traditional values of 
Iran's Islamic society"); AMIR TAHERI, NEST OF SPIES: AMERICA'S JOURNEY TO 
DISASTER IN IRAN 73-91 (1988). 
41. CARON, supra note 32, at 29 (1990); See JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH 451 
(1982); LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLmCAL ENDS, supra note 31, at 543 
(reporting that "most American civilian employees and dependents of U.S. embassy 
personnel had been recalled in the period October 1978-January 1979, and soon after 
Khomeini returned, the U.S. Government recommended that all remaining Americans 
leave the country"). 
42 See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 2-3 (Comm. Print 1981); GADDIS SMITH, MORALITY, REASON AND 
POWER: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE CARTER YEARS 187-94 (1986). For a critical 
view of the United States' handling of the Iranian Revolution, see ZBIGNIEW 
BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER 
1977-81, at 354-98 (1983). 
43. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. All, Award No. 597-All-FT, 
para. 7, 2000 WL 394260 (Iran-U.S. 0. Trib. Apr. 7, 2000); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON 
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE 
FINANCIAL AsPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 2-3 (Comm. Print 
1981); see Philip F. Napoli, A Historical Overview, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 
19, at6. 
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bankingM and insurance industries45 and effected a de facto 
nationalization of the oil and gas industries.46 Further, in the spring 
of 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Courts began expropriating the 
property of American and other foreign corporations and of alleged 
supporters of the Shah.47 Several confiscatory laws were enacted 
during this period, including the "Law Concerning the Appointment 
of Provisional Managers," enacted in June 1979,48 and the "The Law 
on Protection and Development of Industries in Iran," enacted in 
July of that year.49 In addition, various Iranian governmental 
agencies cancelled their contracts with American companies.50 
44. See Khosrowshahi v. Islamic Republic oflran, Case No.178, Award No. 558-178-2, 
para. 61, 1994 WL 1095557 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 30, 1994) ("On 7 June 1979, the 
Iranian Government passed the Banks Nationalization Law, which immediately 
nationalized all banks in Iran and authorized the Government to 'take steps to appoint 
directors of all banks."'). 
45. See American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic oflran, Case No.2, Award No. 93-2-
3, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96, 98 (Dec. 19, 1983) ("On 25 June 1979, all insurance 
companies operating in Iran . . . were proclaimed nationalized by the Law of 
Nationalization of Insurance Corporations."). 
46. See Amoco lnt'l Finance Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 56, Award 
No. 310-56-3, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 228-29 para. 131, 233-34 para. 146 (July 14, 
1987); ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 171. 
47. Roberts Owen, The Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers, in AMERICAN 
HOSTAGES IN IRAN 297, 299 (Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985); See Kate Gillespie, U.S. 
Corporations and Iran at The Hague, 44 MIDDLE EAST J. 18, 20 (1990) ("The government 
also admitted to confiscating shareholdings of Iranians closely tied to the Shah, which left 
Americans who were in joint-venture enterprises with such persons unclear as to their own 
standing."). See, e.g., Aram Sabet v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 593-815/816/817-
2, para. 95,2000 WL 1809124 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 30, 1999) (describing Decree of the 
Revolutionary Prosecutor, No. 203, Apr. 11, 1979). 
48. The law authorized the Iranian government to appoint directors, managers, and 
supervisors for companies whose owners had "deserted the [corporation] or [we]re not 
accessible for any reason whatsoever." Law Concerning the Appointment of Provisional 
Managers, No. 6738 (approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Council June 16, 1979 (26 
Khordad 1358)). At the same time, however, the law stripped the former directors of their 
competence and precluded shareholders from "appoint[ing] directors in their stead." /d.; 
see also Shahin Shaine Ebrahimi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos. 44, 46, and 47, 
Award No. 560-44/46/47-3, para. 62, 1994 WL 1095559 (Iran-U.S. Cl Trib. Oct. 12, 1994). 
Thus, the law authorized the Iranian government effectively to seize control of companies 
owned by foreigners who had been forced to leave Iran. 
49. The "Law on Protection and Development of Industries in Iran" confiscated the 
companies and assets of fifty-one persons who allegedly had attained enormous wealth 
through their "illegal relationship with the past regime, illegitimate use of facilities, and 
violation of public rights." The Law on Protection and Development of Iranian 
Industries, approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Council. July 1, 1979, published in 
Official Gazette No. 10031-9/5/1358. The law also confiscated companies that were 
heavily indebted to the newly nationalized Iranian banks. Id. See also Carlson v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Case No. 248, Award No. 509-248-1, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 216,222 
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The final blow, however, came on November 4, 1979, when 
militant Iranian students stormed the United States Embassy in 
Tehran and held hostage the American nationals there present.51 
Nine months earlier, the Embassy had been seized and occupied, but 
at that time Iran's Revolutionary Guards had immediately obtained 
the release of the Embassy personnel.52 After the November 4th 
seizure, the United States expected the Revolutionary Guards to 
again come to the rescue, but it soon became apparent that no help 
would be forthcoming and that, to the contrary, the Ayatollah and the 
Iranian government supported the hostages' detention. 53 
para. 13 (May 1, 1991) (Holtzmann, J., dissenting) (noting the effect of the law on the 
Itvani family); Peter D. Trooboff, Implementation of the Iranian Settlement Agreements-
Status, Issues, and Lessons: View from the Private Sector's Perspective, in PRIVATE 
INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 1N INTERNATIONAL BUSlNESS 1N 
1981103, 113 (Martha L. Landwehr ed., 1981). 
50. Owen, supra note 47, at 297, 299. See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 87 (prepared testimony of Richard D. Harza, President of Harza 
Engineering Co.) (describing $10 million in unpaid invoices due to Harza Engineering 
Company and "equipment and other property seized or detained in Iran"); id. at 224-25 
(prepared statement of John F. Olson, lawyer for claimants against Iran) (describing the 
breached contracts and expropriated properties giving rise to claims against Iran); Robert 
Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 247, 256 (1981) 
(describing disputes between United States corporations and Iran regarding "incomplete 
construction projects, expropriation or nationalization of oil, gas and mineral properties, 
seizure of equipment and plants, and uncompleted contracts for both military and civilian 
goods"); Gillespie, supra note 47, at 18 ("The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and its 
aftermath were credited-through expropriations, nonpayment of goods delivered, and 
breaches of contracts-with causing U.S. business losses totaling billions of dollars."). 
51. See Saunders, The Crisis Begins, supra note 27, at 35. The United States had 
permitted the former Shah to come to New York for medical treatment in October 1979, 
see CARTER, supra note 41, at 456, and it was widely believed that his arrival in the United 
States had precipitated the hostage taking, see Saunders, The Crisis Begins, supra note 27, 
at 58-60. See also House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 230 (statement of 
Bruce Laingen, Charge D'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Tehran) ("We did counsel in 
messages, both in July and in the latter days of September, against admission of the Shah 
at that time . . . . [I]t was my view, that until we had a regular government in place, a 
constitution adopted, the provisional government no longer provisional ... that it would 
be unwise to admit the Shah."); BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 471-75 (discussing Carter 
Administration's decision to admit the Shah). 
52 Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 7 (prepared testimony of 
Edmund Muskie); Saunders, The Crisis Begins, supra note 27, at 41; VANCE, supra note 
29, at 342. See also House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 10-11 (statement of 
Harold H. Saunders) (explaining United States' decision to maintain skeletal embassy 
force in Iran after the February 1979 takeover); SMTIH, supra note 42, at 194. 
53. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. 
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 33-34, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 553, 569; CARON, supra note 32, at 33; 
CARTER, supra note 41, at 457-58; Harold H. Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure, 
November 1979-May 1980, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES 1N IRAN, supra note 27, at 72, 72 
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Once President Carter recognized that the hostages would not be 
quickly released, he began imposing economic sanctions on Iran. On 
November 8, the United States halted shipments of military spare 
parts ordered by Iran, and on November 12, President Carter blocked 
all oil purchases from Iran for delivery in the United States.54 But the 
most important action, and the one that eventually proved the key to 
resolving the crisis,55 occurred on November 14 when President 
Carter-responding to an Iranian threat to withdraw assets from 
United States banks-signed an order blocking the transfer of all 
Iranian funds in American banks, both in the United States and 
abroad. 56 
President Carter's action blocked more than $12 billion,57 money 
that Iran would later desperately need to finance its war with Iraq.58 
[hereinafter Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure]; Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra 
note 19, at 9 (prepared testimony of Edmund Muskie) ("Ayatollah Khomeini ... endorsed 
the taking of the Embassy by the militants."). 
Very soon after the taking of the embassy, the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a 
statement saying: "Today's move by a group of our compatriots is a natural reaction to the 
U.S. Government's indifference to the hurt feelings of the Iranian people about the 
presence of the deposed Shah, who is in the United States under the pretext of illness." 
Teheran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and Hold Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1979, at A1 
(quoting the official Pars News Agency). 
54. Office of Legal Counsel, Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office of 
Legal Counsel Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 71, 
74 (1984); CARTER, supra note 41, at 457-58; see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 12 (prepared testimony of Edmund Muskie); Saunders, Diplomacy and 
Pressure, supra note 53, at 93 (describing steps taken to systematize pressure on Iran). 
55. Carswell, supra note 50, at 259; Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze Iranian 
Assets, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 10,21 (comments of Lloyd Cutler, 
Counsel to President Carter). 
56. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980). The Treasury Department 
implemented the asset freeze by promulgating the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 
C.F.R. § 535 (1981). See also CARTER, supra note 41, at 462-64; Robert Carswell & 
Richard J. Davis, The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and Sanctions, in 
AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra note 27, at 173, 173-79. For a discussion of the 
dangers of an asset freeze, see Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY 
DAYS, supra note 19, at 84-85 (comments of Ernest T. Patrikis, officer of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York). 
57. See LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, supra note 31, at 548; 
Carswell, supra note 50, at 247-48. President Carter's freeze constituted "the largest 
blocking of assets in U.S. history, and by far the most successful." Carswell, supra note 50, 
at 248. 
58. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 20 (prepared testimony of 
Edmund Muskie). By August 1980, one month before the outbreak of hostilities between 
Iran and Iraq, Iran's President Bani-Sadr acknowledged that the United States assets 
freeze, along with its other sanctions, had added 25% or more to Iran's high rate of 
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The freeze also led to numerous financial complexities59-interrupted 
commercial transactions, banks seeking set-offs, and, as will be 
discussed in more detail below, numerous problems associated with 
standby letters of credit.60 
Although most American citizens and companies involved in 
Iran had suffered the deleterious effects of the Revolution before 
November 1979, it was not until President Carter froze Iran's assets 
that many of these Americans began bringing to the courts their 
breach-of-contract and expropriation claims and seeking attachment 
of Iran's frozen assets.61 Concerned that these lawsuits might 
antagonize Iran, and thereby jeopardize the tenuous negotiations 
then underway, the Carter Administration considered barring all 
litigation against Iran; however, the Administration decided instead 
to issue a regulation authorizing preliminary litigation-including the 
filing of prejudgment attachments-but prohibiting the entry of final 
judgments.62 By the time the hostage crisis was finally resolved, more 
inflation and had contributed to a 30% drop in Iran's industrial output. I d. at 19; see also 
Carswell, supra note 50, at 247. 
59. See John E. Hoffman, Jr., The Iranian Asset Negotiations, 17 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 47, 49 {1984) (President Carter's asset freeze "led to an immediate 
disruption of the immense financial and commercial relationships between Iran and the 
rest of the world"); Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra 
note 19, at 83 (comments of James H. Oltman, officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York). 
60. See carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 182-89. 
61. See Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze Iranian Assets, in REVOLUTIONARY 
DAYS, supra note 19, at 29-30 (comments by Thomas Shack, Jr., a lawyer who represented 
Iran in U.S. litigation during the hostage crisis); Lawrence W. Newman, A Personal 
History of Claims Arising out of the Iranian Revolution, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 631, 
633 {1995) ("In the wake of the executive order [freezing Iranian assets], there ensued a 
flood of lawsuits against Iran in the New York courts."); The U.S./Iranian Hostage 
Settlement, Remarks by Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 236, 239 
{1981) {describing "an almost 'obscene' rush to the courthouse between November 14 and 
Thanksgiving Day, 1979"). See also Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 205-06 {listing 
blocked assets relating to claims). 
62. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203{e) {1980) {declaring "null and void" "any attachment, 
judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process" that had not 
been licensed by the Secretary); 31 C.F.R. § 535.504{a), {b) {1980) (codifying 44 Fed. Reg. 
67,617 {1979)) (authorizing certain judicial proceedings with respect to property in which 
Iran has an interest, but prohibiting "[t]he entry of any judgment" or "the payment or 
delivery out of a blocked account based upon a judicial proceeding"). See also Iranian 
Asset Settlement: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 [hereinafter Senate Banking Comm. Hearing] (statement 
of Robert Carswell, Deputy Treasury Secretary, Carter Administration); Carswell & 
Davis, supra note 56, at 185-86 {describing policy behind regulations); Davis, supra note 
61, at 16-17; Trooboff, supra note 49, at 147 (arguing that the decision to permit claimants 
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than 400 suits against Iran were pending in American courts,63 with 
approximately $4 billion of Iranian assets the subject of pre-judgment 
attachments.64 It is from these early actions that the resolution of the 
crisis eventually ensued. 
B. The Negotiations and the Algiers Declarations 
Matters changed little over the next twelve months, despite the 
Carter Administration's ardent attempts to negotiate a settlement. 
President Carter imposed more economic sanctions against Iran in 
April of 198065 when negotiations appeared to be at a standstill, but 
to proceed with litigation and obtain attachments enhanced the United States' bargaining 
power). 
Despite this authorization, in the summer of 1980 the United States filed Suggestions 
of Interest in hundreds of pending cases, asking the courts to stay all further proceedings 
involving Iranian entities. See, e.g., Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office 
of Legal Counsel Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
71, 93 (1984). These requests were accompanied by affidavits from State and Treasury 
Department officials, which warned that court judgments could send Iran unintended 
signals and jeopardize ongoing negotiations for the release of the hostages. While a 
number of those requests were granted, a significant number were also denied. Compare 
In re Related Iranian Cases, No. C-79-3542-RFP (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 1980) (granting stays 
in 20 cases after viewing classified affidavits of Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher), with New England Merch. Nat'] Bank v. 
Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(confirming plaintiffs' attachments and denying United States requests for stays in 96 
consolidated cases). 
63. See Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel 
Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 71, 92 (1984); 
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 
1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECfS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
57 (Comm. Print 1981); Statement of Interest of the United States, reprinted in 
Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. Al09, Alll n.3 (1981). 
64. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 88 (prepared testimony of 
Richard D. Harza); see also Iranian Asset Controls: Hearing Before the House Subcomms. 
on Europe and the Middle East and on International Economic Policy and Trade, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980) (testimony of Richard J. Davis, Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Enforcement and Operations, Carter Administration) (supplying 
information that by May 30, 1980, attachments totalled approximately $2.6 billion). 
65. On April 7, 1980, President Carter banned all exports to Iran by any person 
subject to United States jurisdiction and banned new service contracts and certain 
financial transactions. Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24099 (Apr. 9, 1980), 
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1981). He also announced that the United States 
was breaking diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. See Saunders, Diplomacy 
and Pressure, supra note 53, at 140-41. Among other things, President Carter informed 
Iran that its embassy and consulates in the United States were to be closed immediately; 
he declared all Iranian diplomatic and consular officials to be persona non grata; and he 
required those officials to leave the country by midnight the following day. Id. On April 
17, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (1980), reprinted 
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these were not expected to, nor did they, have considerable effect. 
Despair over the fruitlessness of those negotiations also led the 
United States in April 1980 to launch a military rescue attempt in 
which eight Americans died.66 The break in the crisis did not occur 
until a new government in Iran was established in the late summer of 
1980. On September 12, 1980, the Ayatollah Khomeini publicly 
announced four conditions for releasing the hostages.67 Negotiating 
channels were established at that time, but negotiations did not begin 
in earnest until November 1980, when Ronald Reagan defeated 
Jimmy Carter in the presidential election. 
During the campaign, Reagan had repeatedly ridiculed Carter 
for his inability to bring the hostages home. Reagan accused Carter 
of coddling Iran and made clear that he-Reagan-would be less 
reluctant to use military force.68 These comments were not lost on 
in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp. V 1981), which amended the export ban issued 10 days 
earlier to ban Iranian imports. For more details as to these and other sanctions, see Senate 
Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 16-17 (prepared testimony of Edmund 
Muskie ); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH 
CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECfS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 16 (Comm. Print 1981). See also CARTER, supra note 41, at 505-06 
(describing events surrounding the sanctions); Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 195-99 
(describing the policy issues behind the sanctions). 
66. See generally PAUL B. RYAN, THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION: WHY IT FAILED 
(1985); Gary Sick, Military Options and Constraints, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN 
supra note 27, at 144, 151-164 (describing military options available in policymaking 
process). See also BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 487-500 (describing the rescue mission); 
CARTER, supra note 41, at 506-19 (relating Carter's views on negotiations and the 
military). 
67. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 70 (testimony of Harold H. 
Saunders); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 20 (prepared testimony of 
Edmund Muskie). 
68. As a candidate, Reagan "repeatedly criticized the Carter administration's handling 
of the Iranian hostage taking, using the incident as a symbol of all that had gone wrong 
with American foreign relations. Reagan appealed to battered American pride as he 
insisted upon a more forceful, unyielding response to terrorism such as Iran's." DAVID E. 
KYVIG, REAGAN AND THE WORLD 5 (1990); see also id. at 70 ("Reagan had devoted a 
good portion of his 1980 election campaign to attacking Carter's failure to secure the 
release of the American hostages .... "); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, 
at 182 (testimony of Walter Stoessel, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
Reagan Administration) ("During the campaign, [Reagan] expressed the view that our 
policy should have been that we would not negotiate until our citizens are released."); 
GARLAND A. HAAS, JIMMY CARTER AND THE POLITICS OF FRUSTRATION 155 (1992) 
(Reagan "pointed to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage 
situation to criticize the foreign policy of the Carter administration and to urge greater 
expenditures for defense"); Douglas E. Kneeland, Reagan and Carter Attack Each Other 
over the Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1980, at Al (Reagan charged that the long 
imprisonment of hostages was "'a humiliation and a disgrace"' to the United States). 
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Iran. As early as June 5, 1980, one of Iran's lawyers predicted that 
most, if not all, of the hostages would be released before the United 
States elections because "Iran did not want to see a change of 
administration in the U.S. government."69 While that prediction was 
not to be realized, Iranian leaders spoke in more positive terms of the 
hostages' release with increasing frequency as the United States 
elections drew near.7° Indeed, they engaged in what has been 
described as an "almost frantic rush" to have Iran's parliament-the 
Majlis-complete formal action to restart the negotiations before 
Election Day_7I 
Reagan's hard-line rhetoric continued after the election. For 
instance, upon learning certain details of the negotiations in late 
December 1980, he labeled Iran's leaders as "barbarians" and 
characterized Iran's negotiating position as a demand for "ransom."72 
Statements such as these caused Iran justifiable concern73 and, 
consequently, enabled the Carter Administration to impose a credible 
deadline on negotiations and to wring concessions from Iran.74 The 
69. John E. Hoffman, Jr., The Bankers' Channel, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, 
supra note 27, at 250. See also Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY 
DAYS, supra note 19, at 75 (comments of John Hoffman) (because "[t]he Reagan 
campaign was making noises that [the Iranians] didn't like," the Iranians were anxious to 
bring the crisis to resolution). 
70. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 21 (prepared testimony of 
Edmund Muskie). 
71. Sick, supra note 66, at 170. 
72. Steven R. Weisman, Reagan Calls Iran's New Demands a 'Ransom' Sought by 
'Barbarians', N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1980, at A1; Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 215; 
See also Carswell, supra note 50, at 248. In a statement a few days earlier, Reagan 
described the Iranians as "nothing better than criminals and kidnappers." Steven R. 
Weisman, Reagan is Angered at Teheran's Stand in Hostage Release, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 
1980, at AL In a like vein, Edwin Meese III, the head of Reagan's transition team, 
warned Iran "that Mr. Reagan might take a tougher line in his dealings on the captives" 
and that "a delay in releasing the hostages would lead to the new President's 'taking 
appropriate action when the time comes."' Reagan Aide Warns Iranians, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 1980, at AlL 
73. Iran also worried about statements that President-elect Reagan may not have 
made. For example, a Tehran radio commentator reported on January 2, 1981 that 
"President-elect Reagan stated that he would give Iran 72 hours after his inauguration to 
free the hostages or Reagan would launch a military attack against Iran," though the 
report also stated that "Reagan later retracted the remark." FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS: A CHRONOLOGY OF 
DAILY DEVELOPMENTS, JANUARY 1-25, 19811 (Comm. Print 1981). 
74. According to the Carter Administration's Deputy Secretary of State and lead 
negotiator, Warren Christopher, the Iranians "plainly wanted to resolve the crisis prior to 
the change in administrations." Warren Christopher, Introduction to AMERICAN 
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Carter Administration's Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Carswell 
described one of the final American responses to Iranian demands by 
noting that "perhaps more important than any of the details, the 
response made it clear that unless there was an acceptance by January 
16, 1981, the whole proposal was withdrawn, and Iran could deal with 
President-elect Reagan."75 Thus, it was no coincidence that the 
governments reached agreement and adhered to the Algiers 
Declarations on President Carter's last full day in office. 
Turning back to the negotiations, on November 2, 1980, the 
Iranian Majlis confirmed and elaborated on the Ayatollah 
Khomeini's four conditions for releasing the hostages.76 Further, 
because Iran refused to negotiate with the United States directly, the 
Majlis designated the government of Algeria as the official 
intermediary through which all further negotiations would be 
conducted.77 There followed a series of responses and counter-
responses, all channelled through the Algerian intermediaries. 
Because Iran would not sign an "agreement" with "the Great Satan," 
the United States negotiators drafted two "declarations," to be issued 
HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra note 27, at 1, 4. "President-elect Ronald Reagan had used 
some blunt language in referring to the crisis, which we did not hesitate to highlight as an 
added incentive for the Iranians to come to terms." Id. at 6. Such tactics have been 
described as "playing ... the so-called Reagan Card." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON 
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE 
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT vi (Comm. Print 
1981). See also House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 79 (statement of Harold 
H. Saunders) (noting that "[t]he Iranians made very plain their desire to end the crisis 
before the expiration of President Carter's term of office by proposing on January 12 to 
the Parliament on an urgent basis a bill" authorizing certain actions necessary to conclude 
agreement with the United States. The consideration of a second bill that was not 
essential to conclude the agreement was deferred); JOHN ORMAN, COMPARING 
PRESIDENTIAL BEHAVIOR: CARTER, REAGAN AND THE MACHO PRESIDENTIAL STYLE 
104-05 (1987) ("With the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980, the negotiations 
began to get back on track presumably because the Iranian militants worried about what 
kind of rescue attempts the macho Reagan would attempt."); Symposium, The Settlement 
with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1981) (statement of Robert Mundheim, the 
Carter Administration's Treasury Department General Counsel, that January 20, 1981 
provided Iran with a "real deadline" because no one "would have been sufficiently bold to 
say that the Reagan Administration would pick up the negotiations and carry them 
through. Nor is it clear that without the deadline the Iranians would have been moved to 
negotiate and to conclude a settlement in a short period of time."). 
75. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 215. See also, CARTER, supra note 41, at 581 
("[W]e decided to let the Iranians know that this was our last proposal, and that if they 
rejected it, they would have to start all over again with the new administration sometime 
next year."). 
76. Owen, supra note 47, at 307. 
77. Id. 
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by the government of Algeria and to be "adhered to" by both Iran 
and the United States.78 The United States negotiators conveyed 
drafts of these Declarations to the Algerian intermediaries, who then 
conveyed them to the Iranian negotiators. The Iranian negotiators 
would respond with various comments and demands, and the United 
States negotiators would revise the Declarations in light of those 
demands.79 
The result-the Algiers Declarations-consists of the 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria ("General Declaration")80 and the Declaration of 
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran ("Claims Settlement Declaration").81 The brevity 
and simplicity of these documents is striking and did not result from 
careless drafting. Rather, the United States negotiators began by 
drafting more lengthy, technical documents but quickly learned that 
they needed to resolve the very complex issues that had arisen 
between the two countries in terms sufficiently simple to allow the 
documents to survive translation into French (for the Algerians) and 
Persian and to be clearly understood by lay people and others who 
are not well-versed m the Anglo-American legal system.82 
78. !d. at 311. 
79. !d. at314-15. 
80. General Declaration, supra note 17. 
81. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17. 
82. Owen, supra note 47, at 312. As Roberts Owen, one of the lead negotiators, 
described it: 
(I]t became apparent to us over time that some of the decision-makers in Tehran 
were fairly primitive in their understanding of these issues. . . . Here we were 
trying to deal with a host of extremely complicated problems, including the lifting 
of the President's freeze on a wide variety of assets in the U.S. and abroad, the 
lifting of judicial attachments, the suspension of litigation in the U.S. courts, the 
whole question of managing litigation relating to the assets of the Shah, the 
entire problem of setting up a claims program for U.S. nationals, and so on and 
so on. I think it would have been simply hopeless to try to deal with them 
through the kind of elaborate sort of fine print documentation which is usually 
generated by sophisticated U.S. transaction lawyers. 
Instead, we decided that we had to write the world's simplest papers, and ... we 
were able to put together a basic set of agreements and get them into eleven or 
twelve very short typewritten pages ... . (O]ne of the largest financial 
transactions in history was accomplished through some remarkably simple 
documentation. 
Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 61; see 
also id. at 99 (comments of Mark B. Feldman); Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 
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Consequently, they drafted what one negotiator described as "the 
world's simplest papers."83 The initial draft of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration, for instance, was twenty-five pages long, yet the United 
States negotiators eventually pared it down to about three-and-a-half 
pages.B4 This brevity, while necessary under the circumstances, would 
have important implications for the parties' and the Tribunal's 
subsequent interpretation of the Declarations. 
As to their substance, the Algiers Declarations responded to the 
Majlis' four conditions.85 In summary form, the Majlis demanded that 
the United States: (1) pledge not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs; 
(2) unfreeze Iranian assets and put all those assets at Iran's disposal; 
(3) cancel all legal claims against Iran, assume financial responsibility 
for those claims, and lift all economic sanctions against Iran; and ( 4) 
return to Iran the assets of the former Shah and his close relatives.s6 
The United States had no difficulty agreeing to the first 
condition,87 and Point I of the General Declaration bears the United 
States' pledge "not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or 
militarily, in Iran's internal affairs."88 By contrast, the remaining 
three conditions touched upon a multiplicity of interests and 
U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1981) (statement of Roberts Owen) (the Iranians "had a Jot of 
trouble, from both a technical and bureaucratic point of view, coping with the flood of 
paper we sent over there. They just wanted to have some very basic principles."). See also 
Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, supra at 79 (comments of John E. Hoffman); Hoffman, 
supra note 59, at 271 (as the bankers drafted the payment order, "the notion grew that this 
increasingly complicated legal document would be difficult, if not impossible, for the 
Iranians to understand and accept in the few hours remaining."). 
83. Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 
61 (comments of Roberts Owen). 
84. Owen, supra note 47, at 312. 
85. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. B1, Award No. 382-B1-Fr, 
19 Iran-U.S. 0. Trib. Rep. 273, 288 (Aug. 311988). 
86. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 72. 
87. Owen, supra note 47, at 302. 
88. General Declaration, supra note 17, para.1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
at 4. Interestingly, however, in 1996 Iran filed suit in the Tribunal claiming that the 
United States breached its obligation not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs by enacting 
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541, codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1701, which requires the President to impose sanctions on persons who make 
investments of $40 million or more in any 12-month period that directly or significantly 
contributed to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources in Iran 
and by, according to Iran, adopting "a covert operations act authorizing the spending of up 
to $20 million for secret operations against ... Iran" in the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense 
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186. Statement of Claim, Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A30, Doc. 1 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Aug. 12, 
1996) (on file with author). 
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therefore required careful negotiation.89 In the end, Iran was willing 
to accept far less than that which it had originally demanded on each 
of these points, as will be discussed in detail below. 
At the last minute, however, after the drafting of the Algiers 
Declarations was complete, Iran insisted on the inclusion of certain 
"General Principles" that would address in broad language Iran's 
demands for a return of its assets and for the cancellation of legal 
claims against it. The United States negotiators assumed that by 
seeking these General Principles, Iran wished to create the public 
impression within Iran that it had achieved its originally stated goals, 
even though it had actually achieved far less under the Declarations' 
specific provisions.90 The United States negotiators were concerned, 
however, that such General Principles could be interpreted so as to 
negate all of the concessions that Iran had made in the specific 
provisions.91 Consequently, according to Roberts Owen, the Carter 
Administration's Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State and a 
principal drafter of the Algiers Declarations, the United States 
negotiators quickly drafted General Principles A and B but stated 
them in such a way as to make clear that they were to be applied only 
"within the framework and pursuant to the provisions of the two" 
declarations.92 The Administration "thus provided the Iranians with 
some of the rhetoric they apparently thought they needed while at the 
same time making clear that no substantive change in the 
contemplated transaction was intended. "93 
General Principle A addresses the return of Iran's assets and 
provides that "[w]ithin the framework of and pursuant to the 
provisions of" the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement 
Declaration, "the United States will restore the financial position of 
Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 
1979." The General Declaration includes a detailed set of provisions 
directing the return of Iran's assets. The assets themselves fell into 
four groups: $2.5 billion in gold bullion and securities held in the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York; $5.5 billion in interest-bearing 
deposit accounts in overseas branches of United States banks; $2.2 
89. See generally Owen, supra note 47, at 297-324 (describing 4-month negotiation 
process). 
90. !d. at 318. 
91. !d. 
92. General Declaration, supra note 17, General Principal B, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. 
Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3. 
93. Owen, supra note 47, at 318. 
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billion in deposits and securities held in various United States 
branches of United States banks; and approximately $1 to $1.5 billion 
of other Iranian assets in the United States.94 The United States 
agreed in the General Declaration to transfer immediately into an 
escrow account the Iranian assets that had been held in the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and the overseas branches of United 
States banks.95 These assets totalled just under $8' billion. Of that 
almost $8 billion, Iran received only $2.88 billion, while $3.667 billion 
of the remainder was transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to pay the principle and interest on all of Iran's loans held 
by a syndicate of banking institutions of which a United States bank 
was a member, and $1.418 billion of the remainder was retained in the 
escrow account pending resolution of disputes about the settlement of 
these and other loans.96 Thus, the General Declaration provided 
payment in full to the United States banks that had made loans to 
Iran. 
The General Declaration further obliges the United States to 
transfer the Iranian assets located in United States banks within six 
months of the signing of the Declarations.97 But not all of the assets 
were to be transferred to Iran. As discussed below, the Claims 
Settlement Declaration established the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal to arbitrate, among other things, the claims of United States 
nationals against Iran, and the General Declaration requires that $1 
billion of the $2.2 billion located in the United States branches of 
United States banks be deposited into an interest-bearing Security 
94. Senate Banking Comm Hearing, supra note 62, at 12 (prepared statement of 
Harold Saunders); see also id. at 20-27 (prepared statement of Robert Carswell) 
(describing in more detail the four categories of assets and the complications involved in 
providing for their return to Iran). 
95. General Declaration, supra note 17, paras. 4-5, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. at 5; see Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.221-222 (1981). 
96. Undertakings, supra note 17, para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 13; 
Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 13 (prepared statement of Harold 
Saunders). 
97. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
at 5; see 31 C.F.R. § 535.213 (1981). These categories of assets could not be transferred 
immediately because they had been subject to judicial attachment. In executive orders 
which he issued simultaneously with his signing of the Algiers Declarations, President 
Carter voided the attachments, Exec. Order No. 12,279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (Jan. 19, 1981); 
Exec. Order No. 12,280, 46 Fed. Reg. 7921 (Jan. 19, 1981), but he recognized that 
continued judicial proceedings might delay transfer of the assets. President's Summary 
Statement to the Congress (Jan. 19, 1981), reprinted in Symposium, The Settlement with 
Iran, 13 U. MIAMIJ. INT'LL. A-56, A-58 (1981). 
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Account which would be used to fund the awards rendered against 
Iran by the Tribunal.9s 
Turning next to the legal claims against Iran, as noted above, 
Iran originally demanded that the United States cancel all claims 
pending against it in United States courts. The United States had 
refused,99 and instead agreed to terminate the claims only if the two 
countries would establish an international arbitral tribunal to hear 
them. Consequently, the Claims Settlement Declaration establishes 
the Tribunal100 and includes specific provisions as to the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction.l01 The Claims Settlement Declaration further provides 
that a third of the Tribunal's arbitrators would be appointed by Iran, 
another third would be appointed by the United States, and these 
party-appointed arbitrators would appoint the final third.l02 
General Principle B of the General Declaration addresses the 
claims pending in United States courts. It states that it is the purpose 
of both countries, within the framework of and pursuant to the 
98. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 7, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
at 5-6. Specifically, paragraph 7 provides that as assets are transferred from the United 
States branches of United States banks, one half of the funds would be deposited into the 
Security Account while the other half would be transferred to Iran. When the Security 
Account reached $1 billion, the balance of the bank deposits would then be transferred to 
Iran. 
99. The United States explained that its courts were not likely to lift their judicial 
attachments unless some alternative remedy had been provided for the claimants. Owen, 
supra note 47, at 303; see Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case Nos. A15(IV) & 
A24, Award No. 590-A15(IV)/A24-Ff, para. 24, 1998 WL 930565 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Dec. 
28, 1998). Even if the executive branch had possessed the power to effect a wholesale 
cancellation of claims, it would never have considered doing so "because cancellation of 
valuable commercial claims by the U.S. government would surely have been regarded as a 
payment of ransom, conferring a multimillion-dollar financial benefit on Iran at the 
expense of U.S. nationals." Owen, supra note 47, at 303; Negotiation of the Algiers 
Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 59 (comments of Roberts Owen). 
In addition, such a cancellation of claims might well have given rise to United States 
liability pursuant to the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See generally 
Symposium, The Settlement with lran,l3 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 94-137 (1981); Note, The 
U.S.-lran Accords and the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 68 VA. L. REV. 1537 
(1982). 
100. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. at 9-10. Specifically, the Claims Settlement Declaration obligates the two 
countries first to promote the settlement of claims and then provides for arbitration in the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal for those claims not settled within six months of the 
signing of the Declarations. I d. at arts. I and II, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9-
10. 
101. ld. at art. II, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9-10. 
102. ld. at art. III, para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 10. For an 
insightful, first-hand description of the appointment process, see ALDRICH, supra note 33, 
at 6-9. 
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provisions of the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement 
Declaration "to terminate all litigation as between the government of 
each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the 
settlement of all such claims through binding arbitration." In light of 
that purpose and through the procedures provided in the Claims 
Settlement Declaration, the United States agreed in General 
Principle B to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts 
involving claims of United States persons and institutions against 
Iran, "to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to 
prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about 
the termination of such claims through binding arbitration."l03 
Finally, the General Declaration includes four paragraphs 
responding to Iran's demand for the return of the assets of the former 
Shah and his relatives. Iran wanted the United States simply to 
confiscate the Shah's assets and return them to Iran. The United 
States could not agree to this demand because, among other reasons, 
the United States Constitution prohibits the government from 
confiscating property without providing due process of law.104 
However, recognizing the great political importance of the issue to 
Iran, the United States encouraged Iran to bring lawsuits in United 
States courts seeking the return of the relevant assets, and in the 
General Declaration, the United States promised, among other 
things, to assist Iran in that litigation by freezing the assets of persons 
served as defendants in such litigation and by requiring all persons 
within United States jurisdiction to report all information known to 
them about the defendants' assets, with such reports to be transferred 
to Iran.1°5 
In short, Iran asked the United States to return all of Iran's 
assets, to cancel all legal claims against Iran in United States courts, 
and to return the assets of the Shah and his family. Through hard and 
careful bargaining, however, the Carter Administration obligated the 
United States to do considerably less: (1) to transfer to Iran less than 
half of its assets, with the remainder to be used to pay Iran's loans 
and its liabilities to United States claimants; (2) to terminate claims 
against Iran in United States courts but only insofar as they would be 
103. General Declaration, supra note 17, at General Principle B, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 3. 
104. See Owen, supra note 47, at 304. 
105. General Declaration, supra note 17, paras. 12-13, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. at 7. See also id. paras. 14-15 for the additional obligations the United States 
undertook in regards to the assets of the Shah and his close relatives. 
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heard by an international arbitral Tribunal also established by the 
Algiers Declarations; and (3) to take certain, limited steps to help 
Iran recover, through litigation in United States courts, those assets of 
the former Shah and his close relatives located in the United States. 
For these reasons, among others, many commentators have 
labeled the Algiers Declarations a stunning negotiating success for 
the United States.106 However, regardless of how favorable the 
Algiers Declarations as a whole might have been to the United States, 
they nonetheless placed on the United States numerous obligations 
that had to be fulfilled in the coming months by a new administration. 
106. Many of these commentators, not surprisingly, are former Carter Administration 
officials, some of whom themselves participated in the negotiations. For example, Harold 
H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs for 
the Carter Administration noted that 
U.S. national interests were preserved, no ransom was paid, and most if not all 
U.S. economic interests were protected. In fact, at the time of the seizure, no 
Iranian assets in the United States were frozen and many U.S. citizens were 
facing potential economic losses with little prospect of being compensated. In 
contrast, today all U.S. personnel have been returned safely, some Iranian assets 
are still frozen, some U.S. economic interests have been fully paid, and the 
remaining claimants have the prospect of receiving recompense in the next year 
or so. 
House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 2; see also Carswell & Davis, supra note 
56, at 231 ("Our personal judgment then was and remains that the financial settlement 
overall, and in historical perspective, was favorable to U.S. claimants against Iran."); 
Christopher, supra note 74, at 13-14 (stating that Iran was made to suffer significant costs 
and indignities, yet "the professed aims of the embassy occupiers went unrealized. No one 
was tried. The United States made no apology and confessed to no crimes. Neither the 
Shah nor his assets were returned to Iran."); Lloyd Cutler, Address at the University of 
Miami School of Law, in 13 U. Miami J. Int'l L. xv, xix (1981) (opining that the Algiers 
Declarations will "be of net benefit to the American claimants"); Owen, supra note 47, at 
323-24 (arguing that the U.S. "achieved all of our negotiating objectives, over and above 
the basic threshold of achieving the hostages release" and "gave away nothing of value 
that was ours"). Even Iran's Lawyer agreed. See Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze 
Iranian Assets, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 32 (comments of Thomas 
Shack, lawyer representing Iran in U.S. litigation during the hostage crisis) ("The Algiers 
Accords were in our view as lawyers and also as participants, an extraordinarily successful 
agreement."). 
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ll. Lame-Duck Lawmaking and Foreign Affairs: President 
Reagan's Response 
A. Lame-Duck Lawmaking 
329 
Unlike many countries, where a change of executive 
administration is accomplished in a very short period of time,107 in the 
United States, more than two months elapse between the election of a 
new president and his actual taking of offi.ce.1os So, for a relatively 
lengthy period of time, the lame-duck president continues to exercise 
the powers of the presidency but in anticipation of a new, possibly 
very different, administration. The manner in which the lame duck is 
to conduct business during the transition is open to question. Some 
lame ducks, such as President Carter, announce their intention to 
carry out all the functions of the presidency until the very day the 
President-elect takes office,l09 While that might be their right, many 
107. See MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 38 (describing short transitions in the 
United Kingdom and France). See also William Bundy, The Postwar History of 
Transitions and Foreign Policy, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL TRANSmONS AND 
FOREIGN POLICY, VOL. I: HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 1, 3-4 (Kenneth W. 
Thompson ed., 1986) (noting that transitions in Britain are less dramatic than in the 
United States because Britain has an "extremely strong career service" such that "only a 
handful of people come in to new jobs in the administration" and as a result of "the 
practice of shadow cabinets" by which the opposition party designates in advance the 
holders of Cabinet positions who then serve as spokespeople for the party in House of 
Commons debates). 
108. The lame-duck period used to be even longer. Until the ratification of the 
1\ventieth Amendment in 1933, which set the Presidential inauguration date on January 
20, U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1, presidential inaugurations were held on March 4, 
approximately four months after the elections. See U.S. Const. amend. XII; John 
Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 470, 471 (1997) 
[hereinafter Nagle, Twentieth Amendment]. 
109. 1\vo weeks after President Carter lost the 1980 election he stated: "He [President-
elect Reagan] and I understand very well that I will be the President in the fullest sense of 
the word until Inauguration Day, and then instantly at the time he takes the oath of office, 
he will have the full responsibilities." MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 107. Outgoing 
President Clinton also made clear that he would "remain a vigorous president" until the 
day he left office. Tom Raum, Bush Team to Undo Late Changes (A.P. Jan. 5, 2001). See 
also GEORGE W. NORRIS, FIGHTING LmERAL 334 (1945) ("Under our Constitution, a 
member's right, if not his duty, to participate fully in all legislation up to the close of his 
constitutional term, cannot be questioned or denied."). Other lame-duck presidents, such 
as President Taft, attempt to leave consideration of all but the most urgent matters to their 
successors. See HENRY, supra note 13, at 41-42. Similarly, President Wilson, expecting to 
lose the 1916 election, commented on the role that he and his successor would play in 
foreign affairs: 
Four months would lapse before [the President-elect] could take charge of the 
affairs of the government, and during those four months I would be without such 
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voters and scholars nonetheless view the actions of a lame duck as 
being not entirely legitimate democratically. By electing his 
opponent, the voters can be understood to have repudiated the 
outgoing President and his agenda.110 Thus, the outgoing 
administration can no longer be said to represent the will of the 
people.l11 
For this reason, a democratic tension arises whenever a lame-
duck office-holder uses his remaining days in office to advance policy 
objectives that he believes his successor does not support. That 
tension, however, is manageable when the lame-duck's actions 
concern domestic affairs because the successor has a variety of means 
at his disposal to limit or wholly eliminate the eleventh-hour domestic 
deeds of his predecessor. Whether and how he uses those means will 
depend on a number of factors. For instance, although President 
Reagan reportedly opposed the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),112 the toxic 
waste legislation that lame-duck President Carter rushed through a 
lame-duck session of Congress,113 he did not seek its repeal 
moral backing from the nation as would be necessary to steady and control our 
relations with other governments. I would be known to be the rejected, not the 
accredited, spokesman of the country; and yet the accredited spokesman would 
be without legal authority to speak for the nation. The direction of the foreign 
policy of the government would in effect have been taken out of my hands and 
yet its new definition would be impossible until [the inauguration]. 
Id. at 136-37. 
110. Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 183, 183-85 (1995). 
111. See id. at 184-85. See also the debate concerning the Twentieth Amendment, 
which shortened the lame-duck period. 75 Cong. Rec. 3842 (1932) (statement of Rep. 
Black) ("The very presence [of lame ducks], after repudiation, is a denial of 
representation."); 74 Cong. Rec. 5886 (1931) (statement of Rep. Lozier) (contending that 
"it is un-American, undemocratic, unrepublican to allow [a lame duck] to remain in office 
two or three months following his defeat and after the repudiation of his policies by his 
constituents"); id. at 5881 (statement of Rep. Celler) (opining that members "who have 
been defeated at the polls are not really qualified to have a voice in our legislature after 
that defeat"); 75 Cong. Rec. 3824 (1932) (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (criticizing lame 
ducks as contrary to principles of representative government). 
112. 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
113. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
1,1-2 (1982); John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA'S Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 
1405-08, 1412 (1997). The hurry with which CERCLA was passed is evident in the law's 
many ambiguous provisions, see Nagle, supra at 1427-45, and drafting mistakes. Id. at 
1412-26; 126 CONG. REC. 31,969 (1980) (statement of Rep. Broyhill) (asserting that 
CERCLA "was hurriedly drafted without the use of legislative counsel and as the result 
contains a large but unknown number of drafting errors. In just one night of review, 
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presumably because the law had broad popular support.114 But he did 
implement the law only in a rather lackadaisical fashion.m By 
contrast, incoming governors George Voinovich and Lamar 
Alexander, of Ohio and Tennessee, respectively, filed lawsuits to 
invalidate their predecessors' lame-duck commutations of death 
sentences, commutations that the states' voters vehemently 
opposed.116 More extreme still was the hysteria that greeted lame-
duck President Grover Cleveland when he set aside twenty-one 
million acres of timber land as forest reserves to preserve it from 
logging.117 Goaded by incensed constituents,l18 the House of 
Representatives tried for two days to impeach Cleveland, and when 
that effort failed, the Senate attached to the Sundry Civil Bill a rider 
annulling Cleveland's reservations_119 Cleveland issued a pocket veto 
and left office.l2° Incoming President McKinley then convened a 
legislative counsel has identified more than 45 technical errors alone."); see also United 
States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-
deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, 
legislative history."). 
114. James R Buckley, Note, The Political Economy of Superfund Implementation, 59 
S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 880-81 (1986). 
115. I d. at 878-84 (describing the Reagan Administration's tepid implementation of 
CERCLA). 
116. On Ohio, see Maurer v. Steward, 644 N.E.2d 369, 370-71 (Ohio 1994); Daniel T. 
Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 655 (1991). On 
Tennessee, see Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a 
Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J .L. 
& POL 1, 51 (1994) (citing Larry Sabato, Gubernatorial Clemency: A Time of Trial?, 53 
STATE GOV'T 40,40-41 (1980)). 
117. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PuBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 569 (1968) 
(citing 29 Stat., Proclamations 19-31); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706 
(1978); J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 19 (Celia Campbell-Mohr et al. eds., 1993). President Cleveland 
had made forest protection one of the key aims of his administration, Futrell, supra at 19; 
GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 93-94 (Island Press 1987) (1947) 
(reporting that Cleveland advocated preservation in his first message to Congress); 
however, the issue was sufficiently controversial that he waited until he was a lame duck in 
February 1897 to set aside the reserves. See also PINCHOT, supra at 108 (commenting that 
the reservations placed Cleveland in the midst of "the most remarkable storm in the whole 
history or' the environmental movement). 
118. GATES, supra note 117, at 569 ("A storm of protest arose in the West, expressed in 
memorials ... , by letters from western public officials, angry editorials and vituperative 
denunciation of the President in both Houses of Congress that has rarely been equaled."); 
see also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706 (1978); THuRMAN WILKINS, 
JOHN MUIR: APOSTLE OF NATURE 196-97 (1995) (describing the effect of Cleveland's act 
on the public). 
119. WILKINS, supra note 118, at 198. 
120. I d. at 198; see STEW ART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 101 (1963). 
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Special Session of Congress to address the reservations,121 and it 
enacted the Organic Administration Act of 1897,122 which suspended 
the reservations and limited the purposes for which national forests 
could be reserved.123 
Most extreme perhaps was the response to President Warren 
Harding's support for ship subsidies in 1922, for it spawned a 
constitutional amendment that shortened the lame-duck period. The 
issue of ship subsidies had been central to the 1922 congressional 
campaigns, and the voters had defeated most members of Congress 
who supported the subsidy legislation.124 President Harding, still 
desirous of enacting the legislation, called a special lame-duck session 
of the Congress to consider the matter.125 This action so inflamed 
certain Senators that they drafted what later became the Twentieth 
Amendment to the Constitution. The Twentieth Amendment 
shortened the presidential lame-duck period from approximately four 
months to the current approximately two-and-a-half months, 126 and it 
was intended to abolish lame-duck sessions of Congress, by 
shortening the Congressional lame-duck period from approximately 
thirteen months127 to approximately two monthsP8 
121. Futrell, supra note 117, at 19. 
122. Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (codified as amended at 16 
u.s. c.§§ 473-482,551 {1994)). 
123. See id.; United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706-08 {1978); GATES, supra 
note 117, at 569. 
124. NORRIS, supra note 109, at 328. 
125. ld. at 328-29. See also HENRY, supra note 13, at 261 (noting statements in 
Congress and failure of session). 
126. The Twentieth Amendment replaced the March 4th presidential inauguration 
date, followed by long-standing practice and implicitly adopted by the Twelfth 
Amendment, with a January 20th inauguration date. Nagle, Twentieth Amendment supra 
note 108, at 471. 
127. I d. at 484-85. 
128. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT 3-4 
{1999). Nagle, Twentieth Amendment, supra note 108, at 478-80. Before the Twentieth 
Amendment, Congress convened for a long session, beginning in December and ending in 
the following spring or summer, and a shorter lame-duck session, beginning in the 
December after the election and continuing until March 4th. Nagle, supra note 108, at 
484-85. The Twentieth Amendment instructs Congress to begin its term on January 3rd, 
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 1-2, less than two months after the election, and it was 
assumed that that change would effectively abolish lame-duck sessions because no lame-
duck Congress would meet during the period between the election and the beginning of 
the new session. /d. at 485-86; ACKERMAN, supra at 17-33. In fact, lame-duck Congresses 
have met quite frequently, and the most recent-the lame-duck 105th House-voted to 
impeach President Bill Clinton. ACKERMAN, supra. Given the partisan nature of the 
voting, it is likely that at least one if not both of the articles of impeachment would not 
have gained majority support in the newly constituted 106th Congress. /d. at 7. 
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President George W. Bush's responses to outgoing President 
Clinton's "blizzard" of lame-duck lawmaking129 will also be 
influenced by a variety of political and legal factors. In his final 
weeks in office, President Clinton, among other things, signed an 
executive order protecting 58.5 million acres of timberland from road 
building and logging130 and issued regulations imposing new 
workplace safety rules, actions denounced by many Republicans.131 
In deciding whether to challenge some or all of Clinton's actions, 
Bush will have to consider not only the legal difficulties of doing so 
but also whether doing so will "risk blotting his own 'compassionate 
conservative' label."132 
While examples such as these abound in the domestic sphere, 
they are far more difficult to come by in the realm of foreign affairs. 
Indeed, as a theoretical matter, questions concerning the legitimacy 
of lame-duck lawmaking become especially pressing when that 
lawmaking occurs in the international realm because incoming 
Presidents, at least in theory, do not have the range of responses 
described above to limit or eliminate their predecessor's foreign 
affairs' commitments. This is because a President who enters into an 
international agreement obligates the United States to fulfill the 
duties contained in the agreement, and these obligations remain in 
effect throughout changes of administration.133 A subsequent 
129. Raum, supra note 109. 
130. Eric Pianin, Clinton Set To Protect Vast Areas of Forest, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2001, 
atAl. 
131. Raum, supra note 109 (noting Republican Representative Jim Henson's assertion 
that the new restrictions are "among 'the most egregious abuses by the Clinton 
administration."'); Douglas Jehl, Bush To Review Clinton's Environmental Blitz, INT'L 
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 8, 2001, at 3 (noting that Republicans and their allies "are drawing 
battle plans in the hopes of blunting or reversing much of what President Clinton has 
sought to accomplish in a blizzard of last-minute orders on environmental policy"). 
132. Raum, supra note 109. 
133. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (3d ed. 
1979) (noting that "a change of government is not as such a ground for noncompliance 
with obligations"); OJ. Lissitzyn, Editorial, Duration of Executive Agreements, 54 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 869, 873 (1960); see also Discussion of the Bundy Paper by the Commission, in 
PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL TRANSffiONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, VOL. II: PROBLEMS 
AND PROSPECTS 73, 79 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1986) (discussing whether a President 
legally binds his successor with "solely a private commitment"). By contrast, in the 
fifteenth through seventeenth centuries, states were regarded as the personal possessions 
of their rulers, so that treaties were considered private contracts, and no international 
agreement signed by one prince was binding on his successor. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 
15, at 10. Similarly today, very difficult questions arise when states dissolve and are 
replaced by new states or secede from existing states. See MALCOLM N. SHAw, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 439-57 (2d ed.1986). 
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President may choose to ignore the obligations but doing so will 
render the United States in breach of international law. Thus, a 
certain tension exists between democracy and international law 
regardless of whether the administration binding the state is a lame 
duck. Democracy requires deference to the right of the majority to 
change its mind, whereas international law, in its effort to attain the 
stability necessary to ensure the peace and security of states, requires 
states to honor their commitments until the other party or parties to 
the agreement consents to a change. In other words, "democracies 
institutionalize the principle that the people may change governments 
and thereby government policy, but the basic principle of 
international law is that commitments (including treaties, executive 
agreements, and some other pledges) bind the state which is to say 
that they do bind successor governments."134 
This tension between democracy and international law becomes 
even more acute when the administration binding the state has been 
voted out of office so that at the time that it binds the state, it no 
longer represents the will of the people. Historically, the problem has 
been more theoretical than real for several reasons. First, lame-duck 
administrations have typically attempted to defer controversial 
foreign affairs decisions until the new administration took power, or 
at the least, have attempted to consult with the President-elect to 
attain agreement as to the course to pursue. An example of the 
former strategy occurred in February 1913, when a revolution erupted 
in Mexico City and American business interests in Mexico looked to 
the lame-duck Taft Administration for protection. President Taft 
decided to "wait [the situation] out" as he was reportedly "'anxious to 
avoid taking any steps that would embarrass his successor,' regarding 
it 'unfair to commit the United States to a policy that President 
Wilson would be obliged to carry out for the sake of National honor 
or because he could not help hirnself."'135 Similarly, in 1920, the 
lame-duck Wilson Administration deliberately disengaged itself from 
negotiations with Mexico regarding diplomatic recognition "on the 
theory that such a controversial matter had best be left to the new 
134. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 81. Indeed, it has traditionally been assumed 
that democracies-which typically are characterized by frequent changes in leadership and 
are "dependent on the vagaries and passions of public opinion" -are less capable of 
making strong international commitments than are other forms of government. Kurt 
Taylor Gaubatz, Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations, 50 INT'L 
ORG. 109, 112-13 (1996). 
135. HENRY, supra note 13, at 65. 
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administration."136 By contrast, in 1932, lame-duck President Hoover 
did not believe that questions concerning the repayment of European 
war debts could be deferred until the inauguration, but he did seek 
several consultations with President-elect Roosevelt, believing that he 
should not proceed without Roosevelt's support.137 Similarly, lame-
duck President Truman sought President-elect Eisenhower's 
commitment to support Truman's position on the forced repatriation 
of prisoners in the ongoing Korean War armistice negotiations.138 
Some of this apparent caution on the part of lame-duck 
Presidents stems from the fact that lame ducks have typically 
commanded little ability to conduct foreign affairs even if they 
desired to_139 That is, once an administration has lost an election, 
foreign governments usually shift their focus to the incoming 
administration.140 Finally, up until the last few decades, politicians of 
both parties adhered to the maxim "politics stops at the water's 
edge."141 While vigorous partisan disagreement might characterize 
public debate on domestic policy, questions of foreign affairs 
commanded general agreement; party rancor challenging the 
consensus was not only considered inappropriate but potentially 
136. Id. at 178. 
137. See id. at 284-310. 
138. See id. at 480-86. 
139. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 5. 
140. Id. at 132. As Dean Acheson said, when he attended his last NATO Council 
Meeting in December 1952 after Eisenhower had been elected: "Our [foreign] colleagues 
treated us with the gentle and affectionate solicitude that one might show to the dying, but 
asked neither help nor advice nor commitment for a future we would not share with them. 
For this they were waiting for our successors." DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE 
CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 708 (1969). See also HENRY, supra 
note 13, at 104 (noting that after the election of 1912, negotiations with Colombia over 
long-standing grievances "broke down, as Colombia seemed to prefer to wait for the new 
administration"); id. at 512 (During the final weeks of President Truman's term, "foreign 
friends and enemies alike chose to await the installation of a new regime with the effective 
power to negotiate and make commitments."); id. at 708 (even before the old 
administration actually loses the election, "foreign nations may prefer to await the election 
results rather than deal with" the sitting President). 
141. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 17; see also HENRY, supra note 13, at 476 
(quoting letter from President Truman to President-elect Eisenhower in which Truman 
stated, "Partisan politics should stop at the boundaries of the United States"); id. at 473 
(noting that even before the 1952 conventions, President Truman desired "'to keep 
foreign policy out of partisan politics"'); id. at 177 (noting that the Wilson 
Administration's "conduct of foreign affairs in its final months was principally intended to 
preserve the status quo and avoid new commitments"). 
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dangerous.l42 For instance, although candidate Woodrow Wilson 
strongly opposed President Taft's conduct of foreign affairs, Wilson 
virtually ignored such issues during the campaign and prior to his 
inauguration.143 
By the 1980 Presidential election, however, these constraints no 
longer constrained. For one thing, any foreign policy consensus that 
might have existed in the decades following World War II had 
evaporated, as had the consensus against debating such matters.144 
Rather, during the 1980 campaign, issues of foreign affairs provided 
Ronald Reagan with a fertile field for partisan attack.l45 Reagan 
criticized President Carter's entire approach to foreign policy, 
maintaining, among other things, that Carter had no coherent 
strategy for confronting Soviet advances, that he had no clear sense of 
how his policies affected the American alliance system, and that he 
had exhibited patent ineptitude in his responses to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and in his attempted rescue of the hostages in Iran.146 
Reagan also criticized the Panama Canal Treaties, which had been 
negotiated under both Republican and Democratic Presidents,147 and 
made statements suggesting that he "might repudiate the 
142. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 17-18. Foreign policy stability during past 
changes of administration was also enhanced by a core of foreign affairs experts of both 
parties who shared general views on American objectives and enjoyed mutual respect and 
friendship. !d. at 67; Newsom, supra note 20, at 138. 
143. See HENRY, supra note 13, at 89; see also Bundy, supra note 107, at 6, 9 (describing 
general agreement on foreign affairs during the Truman-Eisenhower transition and the 
Eisenhower-Kennedy transition). 
144. Leslie Gelb, Reflections on the Carter Transition, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL 
TRANSITIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, VOL. 1: HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 69, 76 
(Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1986) (stating that "the way we make foreign policy is 
different now than in the twenty years after World War II, that there is much less sense of 
bipartisanship. People are much more ideological about it."); Bundy, supra note 107, at 19 
("There are, in the country ... , greater differences of view from one end of the foreign 
policy spectrum to another than existed in the periods when transitions were capable of 
being handled with relative ease by people who knew each other and respected each 
other's views and felt a high degree of compatibility."); William P. Bundy, Presidential 
Transition Problems, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, 
VOL. II: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 21,23 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1986) (opining 
that both the incoming Carter and Reagan Administrations had "been much more sharply 
critical of their predecessors, in the area of foreign policy than was the case in earlier 
transitions"). 
145. See KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5 ("Candidate Reagan was quite vocal about foreign 
policy matters."). 
146. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 224. 
147. !d. at 224-25; KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5 ("The Panama Canal, Reagan concluded, 
was a symbol of national power and prestige and, as such, ought to remain under U.S. 
-;ontrol."). 
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normalization of relations with Communist China, first undertaken by 
Nixon and continued by Carter."148 In this way, Reagan made clear 
that his victory would result in a profound re-examination of basic 
American foreign policy.149 
It was this aggressive rhetoric, and in particular, Reagan's vocal 
criticism of President Carter's handling of the hostage crisis, that had 
the atypical effect of empowering, rather than enfeebling, the Carter 
Administration once it became a lame duck.150 Reagan had 
repeatedly and vehemently stated his ideological opposition to 
negotiating with terrorists under any circumstances.151 Moreover, he 
148. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 224-25. 
149. I d. at 224; The Clinton Administration, Congress and International Law: Remarks 
by Stephen Rickard, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 354, 368 (1994) ("The Carter 
Administration was seen as having come to praise multilateralism-the Reagan 
Administration, to bury it"). As for the present day, the presidential candidates in the 
2000 election, like their 1980 counterparts, felt free to attack one another's views on 
foreign affairs. For instance, Governor Bush contended that President Clinton and Vice 
President Gore overextended United States military forces by intervening in places that 
are not linked to United States' strategic interests. The Gore campaign, for its part, 
sharply criticized Bush's plan for withdrawing from the Balkans. Steven Mufson & John 
Lancaster, Vietnam Era Shaped Two Different World Views, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2000, 
at A14. See also Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Crises Take Precedence with the 
Candidates, WASH. POST., Oct. 13, 2000, at A30 (noting that vice-presidential candidate 
Richard Cheney "used news about the terrorist attack" on the USS Cole "to criticize the 
Clinton-Gore administration for failing to maintain a strong military and for its energy 
policies"); John Lancaster, Foreign Policy Challenges To Command Bush's Attention, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at A26 (stating that during the campaign Bush "accused the 
Clinton Administration of neglecting key alliances with European allies and Japan); 
Roberto Suro, 2005 Missile Defense Inception Is at Risk, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2000, at A4 
(stating that Bush criticized the Clinton Administration "as weak on military matters"). 
150. See Gelb, supra note 144, at 79. Carter's empowerment extended only to the 
hostage crisis, however. Soon after the election, Carter met with Israel's Prime Minister 
Begin and learned first-hand that his "power as a defeated President was not equal to that 
of one who is expected to remain in office." CARTER, supra note 41, at 576. As Carter 
described the meeting: 
In spite of my best efforts, there would be little substance to my discussions with 
the Prime Minister. The Israelis preferred to await the new administration in 
order to continue any top-level negotiations. Before the election, [Egyptian 
President] Sadat had also expressed his preference to wait until the new year, and 
so it now seemed best to encourage Reagan to assume this responsibility after his 
inauguration. 
Id. at575-76. 
151. See Smist & Meiers, supra note 19, at 302 (reporting on candidate Reagan's pledge 
of a "get tough" policy concerning terrorists: "During the presidential debate between 
Carter and Reagan on October 28, 1980, Reagan stated ... 'There will be no negotiation 
with terrorists of any kind."'); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 182 
(testimony of Walter Stoessel) (stating that not negotiating for the release of the hostages 
"is a strongly held view of the President ... that is, that it was a mistake to become 
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appeared none-too-impressed with the content of those 
negotiations.l52 So, far from encouraging Iran to wait for the new 
Administration to continue its negotiations, as would have been 
typical, Reagan's statements motivated Iran hurriedly to consummate 
an agreement with the Carter Administration. The Carter 
Administration, for its part, wanted to forge ahead, for President 
Carter was convinced that negotiations with Iran provided the most 
likely means of securing the safe release of the hostages.153 Further, 
the hostages' release had become a matter of pride to the Carter 
Administration.154 Carter's inability to secure their release was 
widely believed to have substantially contributed to his electoral 
defeat;155 bringing the hostages home would at least vindicate the 
course Carter had so long pursued over so much criticism.l56 These 
involved in such prolonged negotiations; we should insist, rather on the release of hostages 
taken and should use the full range of instruments available to us to effect that result"); 
Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 59 
(comments of Roberts Owen) (describing Reagan's view that "just the act of talking, or 
negotiating with a terrorist government was totally unacceptable"). 
152. See Weisman, supra note 20; Newsom, supra note 20, at 131 ("Many in the 
transition team of the [Reagan] administration came to Washington largely convinced that 
in Algeria we were negotiating ransom for the hostages. Because there were those in the 
[Reagan] administration who felt that they had a very different view of the situation and 
would not support the negotiations as they understood them, they refused to be briefed on 
what was going on in Algiers."); see also Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 215. 
When President Reagan later welcomed the hostages at the White House, he 
contrasted himself with President Carter by announcing that in the future, he would deal 
swiftly and strongly with any similar terrorist act. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, 
supra note 62, at 59. 
153. CARTER, supra note 41, at 594. 
154. Id. ("The release of the American hostages had almost become an obsession with 
me."); BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 506 (resolving the hostage issue before leaving office 
was a "matter of personal pride for Carter"). 
155. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 506 ("The Iranian debacle was clearly one of the 
three major factors contributing to [Carter's] defeat .... "); SMITH, supra note 42, at 11 
("The fifty-two hostages held captive in Teheran seemed to symbolize the ineffectiveness 
of the President and of the United States under his leadership."); BRAUER, supra note 16, 
at 205 ("Carter met defeat in 1980 partly because of the reputation he acquired for 
vacillation, weakness, and frustration abroad, all symbolized by the Iranian revolution and 
the extended captivity of American diplomatic hostages in Teheran."); CARTER, supra 
note 41, at 594 ("It was very likely that I had been defeated and would soon leave office as 
President because I had kept these hostages and their fate at the forefront of the world's 
attention, and had clung to a cautious and prudent policy in order to protect their lives 
during the preceding fourteen months."). 
156. CARTER, supra note 41, at 594 ("I wanted to have my decisions [regarding the 
hostages] vindicated."); see also SMITH, supra note 42, at 207 ("Jimmy Carter stayed up all 
of his final night in office, hoping to hear that the hostages had been released while he was 
still President."). Cf MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at l07 (The "glue" that binds 
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factors converged to create strong incentives on both sides to 
conclude an important international agreement before the 
inauguration of a new United States President. 
Indeed, the frantic rush to conclude the Algiers Declarations 
before President Reagan's inauguration bears surface resemblance to 
the eleventh-hour death penalty commutations described above or 
the great hurry to enact CERCLA, but, in fact, the situation involving 
the Algiers Declarations was far more complex. First, the primary 
objective Carter sought-the safe release of the hostages-was one 
that everyone shared. Indeed, President Reagan was among those 
who would benefit most from Carter's success. During the campaign, 
Reagan had feared Carter's efforts to secure the release of the 
hostages because Carter's success might have gained for him the 
election;157 once Reagan won the presidency, however, the release of 
the hostages could only redound to Reagan's benefit. Because lame-
duck President Carter was able to execute an agreement with Iran, 
incoming President Reagan was free to begin his term without a 
devastating crisis sapping strength from his Administration and 
diverting attention from the domestic economic and social reforms 
that he had promised to carry out.l58 Further, although there is no 
reason to question that Reagan was sincere in his criticism of the 
Carter Administration for negotiating with Iran, at the same time, 
that criticism also unquestionably helped the Carter Administration 
to succeed in those very negotiations.159 
together members of the outgoing administration "is to defend and protect what they have 
wrought and to push forward with the unfinished enterprises they have begun."). 
157. See Sick, supra note 66, at 164; EDWIN MEESE III, WITII REAGAN: THE INSIDE 
STORY 55 (1992). 
158. See Cutler, supra note 106, at xviii-xix; BRAUER, supra note 16, at 237 ("It was in 
Reagan's interest that [the hostage] negotiations be successfully concluded before he took 
office."). 
159. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 41 (Senator Percy 
crediting President-elect Reagan's unequivocal, harsh, direct, and blunt statements as 
helping to bring this crisis to a head and former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie 
agreeing); see also Our People, Your Money, 1liE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1981, reprinted in 
id. at 290 ("President Reagan, hinting punishment to come by scorning Iran's 'barbarians' 
before his inauguration, helped by providing a deadline for agreement. In practice, he 
might not have been able to take violent action without getting the hostages killed. But 
Iran got the message: it could not expect better terms from Mr. Reagan ... than Mr. 
Carter was offering."). 
Once he decided to implement the Agreements, President Reagan and members of 
his Administration did not hesitate to take credit for Reagan's role in pressuring the 
Iranians. See Implementation of Hostage Agreements the Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T 
ST. BULL. No. 2048 at 17 (Iran "was ultimately forced to settle on terms that simply 
HeinOnline -- 52 Hastings L.J. 340 2000-2001
340 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
Finally, the most important complicating fact was that, regardless 
of President Reagan's views as to the desirability of the Algiers 
Declarations, they were and are a valid treaty legitimately entered 
into by the United States_16° For that reason, the Reagan 
restored the status quo ante because the advent of the new Administration finally 
confronted it with a serious deadline."); see also MEESE III, supra note 157, at 293 
(maintaining that "[t]hroughout the campaign, Reagan assumed a posture that was 
designed to accelerate [the hostages'] release" by, among other things, encouraging the 
Iranians to believe that Reagan "would have been much tougher to deal with than was 
Carter"); ALEXANDER M. HAIG, CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY 
69 {1984) {"The Iranians (and some others involved in the negotiations) feared that 
Reagan might avail himself of options that the forbearing Carter had eschewed. We did 
nothing to disabuse the parties of their anxiety; it could only speed the return of the 
captive Americans."). 
160. While clearly a valid treaty for purposes of international law, the Algiers 
Declarations are, in domestic law usage, a "sole executive agreement," which some believe 
to have questionable status under the United States Constitution. Article II, section 2 of 
the Constitution authorizes the President to enter into treaties with the consent of two-
thirds of the Senate; however, from the very beginning of our nation, Presidents have 
routinely bypassed the requirement of Senate consent by entering into international 
agreements that they termed "executive agreements" rather than "treaties." LOUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 215 (2d ed. 1996). Over the 
past two centuries, presidents have made many thousands of executive agreements, far 
surpassing the number of treaties they have entered into, and these executive agreements 
have been held constitutional. Id. at 173-87; see Michael D. Ramsey, Executive 
Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 134-41(1998); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
303(4) (1986). See generally WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE 
AGREEMENTS (1941) (arguing that through the widespread and continuous use of 
executive agreements, they have become "constitutional usage"). Not all commentators 
believe they should be held constitutional, however, see, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, 
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 140-62 (1974); Raoul Berger, The 
Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972), and many 
commentators have distinguished in particular between those executive agreements 
termed "congressional-executive agreements," which have in some fashion been approved 
by Congress and those termed "sole executive agreements" or "Presidential agreements," 
which are made by the President alone, without any referral or authorization by Congress. 
See Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or 
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 
181, 204-06, 307-08 (1945); Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the 
Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664,671-75 (1944); RESTATEMENT, supra,§ 302 & cmt. a. Because 
they do not have the benefit of congressional authorization, sole executive agreements are 
generally considered to be the least constitutionally justifiable executive agreements, and 
some have claimed that they can only be made with respect to certain subjects, 
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 302 & cmt. h; Ramsey, supra at 194-97; that they can never be 
self-executing, Ramsey supra at 218-35; or, that unlike treaties and Congressional-
Executive agreements, they do not supersede earlier inconsistent Congressional 
legislation, RESTATEMENT, supra,§ 115, cmt. d & rpt. n.5. 
The Office of Legal Counsel reviewed the Algiers Declarations pursuant to a request 
by President Reagan and concluded that President Carter had had the authority to adhere 
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Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations was, at 
least in theory, constrained not solely by domestic political and legal 
processes but by international law and the various interests that are 
implicated in international affairs. That point is particularly relevant 
with respect to the Algiers Declarations because the Declarations 
created the Tribunal to decide, among other things, disputes "as to 
the interpretation or performance of any provision" of the 
Declarations themselves.161 So, the lame-duck treaty confronting 
President Reagan would create the very institution that would 
subsequently pass on his implementation of that treaty. 
B. President Reagan's Response to the Algiers Declarations 
For all of the above reasons, the Algiers Declarations presented 
President Reagan with a knotty problem, and any qualms he might 
have had before the election increased once he took office as a result 
of the domestic political pressures that immediately confronted him. 
American companies that had claims against Iran banded together to 
form the United States Iranian Claimants Committee and petitioned 
President Reagan immediately after his inauguration to issue "no 
further orders or regulations" until the committee had had the 
opportunity to meet with Reagan Administration officials to discuss 
the committee's concerns.162 So, faced with political pressure over an 
agreement whose negotiation he had opposed all along, President 
Reagan declined immediately to endorse it or the various executive 
orders that President Carter had issued upon signing the Declarations 
in order to implement them.163 Instead, he commissioned the 
to them. Review of Domestic and International Legal Implications of Implementing the 
Agreement with Iran, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel314, 315-16 (1981}. The Supreme 
Court later confirmed this view in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981). 
161. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 17, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. at 8. See also Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. VI, para. 4, 
reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 11 ("Any question concerning the interpretation 
or application of this agreement shall be decided by the Tribunal upon the request of 
either Iran or the United States."); id. art. II, para. 3. 
162. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 75. See also id. at 77-78 (letter 
to President Reagan); Herman Nickel, The Iran Deal Doesn't Look Bad, FORTUNE, Feb. 
23, 1981, reprinted in id. at 289 ("By January 22, a group of 100 companies, including 
Xerox, Ingersoll-Rand, and Brown & Root, the huge construction contractor, were urging 
President Reagan to hold up the release of Iranian assets, mainly Iranian deposits in 
domestic branches of U.S. Banks, against which they have more than $1 billion in 
claims."). 
163. As Lawrence Newman, Chairman of United States Iranian Claimants Committee, 
put it, "[T]he Reagan administration apparently followed our suggestion and withheld 
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Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel to prepare a report 
detailing the domestic and international legal issues involved in 
implementing the Declarations.164 
The Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the presidential 
actions necessary to implement the Declarations were "well within 
the President's power under the Constitution and applicable statutes 
and treaties";165 however, it also opined that the United States might 
be considered entitled under international law to repudiate the 
Declarations on the ground that they were procured by the threat or 
use of force and thus were void ab initio under Article 52 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.166 The argument for 
repudiation subsequently received some scholarly support,167 but 
more important at the time was the advice President Reagan received 
from his advisers. The day after his inauguration, President Reagan 
met with top aides and members of his Cabinet to discuss the Algiers 
Declarations.168 According to then-Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig, everyone in the room was angry with the Iranian terrorists and 
the Ayatollah's regime and "[w]ithout preamble, it was suggested that 
the [Algiers Declarations] be abrogated."169 Consequently, in 
addition to raising the Vienna Convention argument, certain advisers 
also pointed out "that a gesture of this kind would have a huge 
release of further regulations pending its review of the agreements." Senate Foreign 
Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 75. 
164. Review of Domestic and International Legal Implications of Implementing the 
Agreement with Iran, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel314 (1981). 
165. /d. 
166. /d. at 321-26. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 
52, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 ("A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the 
threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations."). 
167. See Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 46-71 {1981); 
FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-22 
(1985); see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 99 (prepared 
statement of Thomas W. Luce III, counsel for Electronic Data Systems) ("When the 
accords with Iran were first made public, many people-including the Chairman of the 
Board of EDS, Ross Perot-publicly stated their view that the national interest of the 
United States lay in a renunciation of those accords by President Reagan. Proponents of 
this view maintain that the United States entered into those accords under duress, and, 
consequently, is not legally bound by them. They also argue that the United States has a 
unique opportunity by renouncing the accords to signal a new era of firmness in foreign 
policy by means of a nonmilitary message."); George W. Ball, Hostage Deal: "Crime 
Should Not Pay," WASH. POST., Jan. 26,1981, reprinted in id. at 286. 
168. HAIG, supra note 159, at 77-78. 
169. /d. at 78. 
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propaganda impact abroad and a salutary effect on public opinion at 
home."170 
In the end, though, President Reagan decided not to repudiate 
the Algiers Declarations. No doubt a number of factors contributed 
to this decision. Haig reports that he invoked the honor of the United 
States, reminding President Reagan that the United States had 
pledged its word, and "[n]o incoming Administration had the right to 
renounce lightly a solemn international contract entered into by its 
predecessor."171 Former Carter Administration officials expressed 
similar sentiments and also emphasized that a refusal to implement 
the Algiers Declarations "would have serious international 
consequences."172 It would not only "cast doubt on the readiness of 
the U.S. Government to honor its commitments,"173 it would also 
constitute an insult to the many governments-Algeria, in 
particular-that "gave their assistance on the premise that the United 
170. !d. See also Lawrence W. Newman, Litigation in the United States of Claims 
Against Iran, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 34, 43 (comments of Lloyd 
Cutler, Counsel to President Carter) (describing the difficulty of "persuading the Reagan 
Administration that it should support the accords" as a result of its concerns as to whether 
"the Accords amounted to the payment of ransom or whether they had been imposed on 
the United States, whether the United States had been coerced into them"); Newsom, 
supra note 20, at 132 (describing Reagan Administration officials as initially "convinced 
that the United States had paid substantial ransom for the release of the hostages. It was 
only after considerable discussion that they were convinced otherwise."). But see 
Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 88-89 
(comments of John M. Walker, Assistant Secretary of the Reagan Administration) 
(stating that the Reagan Administration State Department working group recognized that 
the Algiers Declarations were a great achievement). 
171. HAIG, supra note 159, at 78. 
172 See House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 8 (statement of Harold H. 
Saunders); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 32 (testimony of Warren 
Christopher) (stating that repudiation of the Algiers Declarations "would have, to 
understate the matter, a damaging effect on our international reputation, which would 
linger for long time and interfere with our capacity to carry out our foreign policy"). 
173. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 8 (statement of Harold H. 
Saunders); see also id. at 138 (statement of EdmundS. Muskie) ("We should fulfill the 
agreement because we are a great power with an interest in preserving our honor. We 
should do so, quite simply, because the terms are fair-and our word is good."); see also 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Law and the Hostage Agreement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
27, 1981, reprinted in Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 292, (arguing 
that the United States would "lose its credibility as a nation that bargains in good faith" if 
it repudiated the Algiers Declarations); BOYLE, supra note 167, at 222-23 ("The foremost 
consideration supporting adherence to the settlement was that the U.S. government had a 
critical long-term interest in demonstrating to all states of the world, and especially those 
of the Middle East and Southwest Asia, that it possessed a serious, sincere, and 
meaningful commitment to the peaceful settlement of its disputes with other countries, 
especially with minor powers, and even if its adversary was clearly in the wrong."). 
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States was acting in good faith."174 The Reagan Administration also 
considered "selective implementation" -that is, implementing only 
certain parts of the agreement-but the Office of Legal Counsel 
opined that such a course would be inconsistent with international 
law.t75 
While those considerations no doubt carried some weight, what 
likely clinched President Reagan's decision to implement the Algiers 
Declarations was the fact that doing so was clearly in the best 
financial interests of United States nationals. The United States had 
already unfrozen and transferred the bulk of Iran's assets 
immediately upon the hostages' releaseP6 What remained for the 
United States to do by the time President Reagan reviewed the 
Declarations was (1) to transfer certain additional categories of 
assets; (2) to take the limited steps set out in the Declarations to assist 
Iran in its litigation in United States courts to obtain the return of the 
assets of the former Shah and his family; and, most importantly, (3) to 
terminate lawsuits against Iran in United States courts, nullify the 
corresponding attachments, and create, along with Iran, the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal which would, among other things, 
arbitrate the claims of United States nationals against Iran. And this 
third obligation was less of an obligation than it was the reason to 
fulfill the other obligations. 
174. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 144 (statement of Warren M. 
Christopher); see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 57 (testimony 
of Edmund Muskie) (opining that repudiation would cause the Algerians to lose much of 
their respect and goodwill for the United States and could well "undercut [Algeria's] 
standing in the nonaligned world"); Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. 
INT'L L. 1, 51 (1981) (Professor Covey Oliver arguing that "[t]he major political trouble 
with anyone calling these Agreements void for duress or jus cogens is that these were not 
Agreements between the United States and Iran, but with a willing, helpful third party, 
Algeria. Thus, another key state in the Middle East was involved in the process"); Our 
People, Your Money, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1981, reprinted in Senate Foreign 
Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 290, ("But not to keep Mr. Carter's word to the 
admirable Algerian mediators of the deal would make America's name mud in the third 
world .... "). 
175. See Whether the Agreement with Iran Can Be Treated as Void in Part, 4A U.S. 
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 330, 330 (1981); see also Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra 
note 62, at 10 (testimony of Harold H. Saunders) (criticizing selective implementation as 
paving the way for Iran "to reject parts of the solution which serve Americans better than 
Iranians"); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 32 (testimony of Warren 
Christopher) (admonishing against "repudiation of the Declarations of Algiers, in whole 
or in part") (emphasis added). 
176. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 12-13 (prepared statement 
of Harold H. Saunders). 
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As noted above, after President Carter froze Iran's assets in 
November 1979, American nationals flocked to the courts to assert 
claims against Iran.177 The regulations then in effect allowed the 
preliminary phases of the lawsuits to proceed but prohibited final 
judgments.17B So, no suit filed after the hostage-taking had proceeded 
to a final judgment against Iran,179 and it looked as though few suits 
would because they would instead be barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity _180 Further, many feared that even if some suits 
did proceed to final judgment, Iran would have immunity from 
177. See supra text accompanying footnote 61; see also Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
United States, Case Nos. A15(IV) & A24, Award No. 590-A15(IV)/A24-Fr, paras. 21-22, 
1998 WL 930565 (Iran-U.S. a. Trib. (Dec. 28, 1998)). 
178. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e); 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(a)-(b) (1980). See also Carswell & 
Davis, supra note 56, at 185-86. 
179. One Claimant, Electronic Data Services ("EDS"), however, had filed its claim 
against Iran in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in 
February 1979 and had obtained a prejudgment attachment on Iranian assets by June 13, 
1979. After a two-week trial in January 1980, the court entered a final judgment for EDS 
for approximately $19 million in May 1980. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 
19, at 100-01 (prepared statement of Thomas W. Luce, III, counsel for EDS). See also 
Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Soc. Sec. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350, 
1351-52 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
180. Owen, supra note 47, at 303-04 ("The lawyers among us were very much aware 
that in the pending federal suits Iran was going to claim sovereign immunity under our 
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, which meant that, even without any cancellation of 
claims, our claimants were in a very vulnerable position."); Newman, supra note 61, at 637 
(lawyer for claimants against Iran explaining that the claimants had obtained judicial 
attachments on Iranian assets in Germany in 1980 "because we worried that U.S. courts 
might determine that they did not have jurisdiction over the various Iranian government 
entities under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act"); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 124 (prepared testimony of LeeR. Marks, lawyer for American claimants 
against Iran) (describing various jurisdictional problems, including sovereign immunity, 
that claimants faced); id. at 3 (testimony of Edmund Muskie) (stating that in U.S.litigation 
"many companies would face a serious obstacle because of Iran's sovereign immunity 
[whereas] the defense of sovereign immunity will not be available to Iran in proceedings 
before the International Tribunal"); House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 143 
(testimony of Warren M. Christopher) ("Prior to the crisis, most of the assets of Iran in 
the United States were protected by the doctrine of sovereignty, and by the sovereign 
immunity statute enacted by this Congress. For that reason, and other technical reasons, 
U.S. claimants would have faced very great difficulty in collecting their claims against 
Iran."); id. at 116 (testimony of Harold H. Saunders) ("Most of [the claimants'] cases 
would not have succeeded in court .... "); Cutler, supra note 106, at xix (describing 
obstacles facing United States claimants in United States courts); Symposium, The 
Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 97 (1981) (Mark Feldman, former 
Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser, setting forth the reasons why "most of the 
cases filed in the U.S. courts would not, in all events, succeed in coming to an execution of 
judgment"); id. at 67 (Lawrence Newman, lawyer for numerous U.S. claimants, 
acknowledging that some claimants would be better off in the Tribunal than they would 
have been in U.S. courts). 
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execution of judgments.l81 Finally, even if these barriers could be 
overcome, there was concern that the attached assets remaining in the 
United States would be insufficient to provide the claimants full 
recovery.182 In comparison, the Tribunal looked good. The 
Tribunal's jurisdiction over most of the claims was clear,183 and its 
181. See Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 97 {1981); 
Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 42 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen) 
{"Iran's sovereign immunity would have made it difficult in many cases to enforce 
judgments against [Iran's] assets."); House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 116 
(testimony of Harold H. Saunders) {The claimants "never would have collected claims had 
they secured judgments in the courts"). 
182. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 124 (prepared testimony 
of Lee R. Marks, lawyer for United States claimants) ("[H]owever adequate the billion-
dollar security account may or may not prove to be, it is one billion dollars more than is 
available with certainty for litigants in the United States courts."); Senate Banking Comm. 
Hearing, supra note 62, at 13 (prepared statement of Harold H. Saunders) ("[T]he 
settlement substitutes for the uncertain attachments on Iranian assets in U.S. banks a 
program of binding arbitration backed by a security account of $1 billion, not to fall below 
$500 million."). See also Drafting the Claims Settlement Agreement, in REVOLUTIONARY 
DAYS, supra note 19, at 91, 113-14 (comments of Robert Carswell) (U.S. could not have 
given claimants 100 cents to the dollar, even if it had not returned any assets to Iran). 
183. The primary uncertainty regarding the Tribunal's jurisdiction resulted from Article 
II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, see supra note 17, reprinted in 1 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9. Toward the end of negotiations, Iran insisted upon a 
jurisdictional exclusion for claims arising under contracts with Iranian choice-of-forum 
clauses. The United States did not want simply to exclude the claims but rather wanted 
the Tribunal to determine whether such forum-selection clauses should be enforced given 
the massive changes that Iran had made in its judicial system. The United States thus 
drafted Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration to exclude "claims 
arising under a binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any 
disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts in 
response to the Majlis position." Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II 
para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9 (emphasis added). The United States 
specifically inserted the word "binding" to give the Tribunal the opportunity to decide that 
the provisions were not in fact binding due to changed circumstances. Owen, supra note 
47, at 319; Mark B. Feldman, Implementation of the Iranian Claims Settlement 
Agreement-Status, Issues, and Lessons: View from Government's Perspective, in PRIVATE 
INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INT'L BUSINESS IN 1981 75, 80-81 
{Martha L. Landwehr ed., 1981). When presented with the question, however, the 
Tribunal declined to decide it, holding that "[i]f the parties wished the Tribunal to 
determine the enforceability of contract clauses specifically providing for the sole 
jurisdiction of Iranian courts, it would be expected that they would be [sic] so clearly and 
unambiguously." Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO (U.S. v. Iran), Case No. 51, Award 
No. ITL-2-51-FT, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 242, 245 (Nov. 5, 1983). The Tribunal did, 
however, interpret the forum-selection exclusion narrowly, holding that a contract clause 
that fails unambiguously to require that any and all disputes that arise under the contract 
be settled by Iranian courts, and only by Iranian courts, does not deprive the Tribunal of 
jurisdiction over disputes arising from the contract. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 103. 
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Security Account-labeled a "bottomless pitcher"184· because Iran was 
required to replenish it whenever it dipped below $500,000,000185 -
promised claimants full recovery on their claims. So, while there 
were unquestionably significant risks associated with an untested 
arbitral tribunal, one-third of whose members would be Iranian,186 the 
Tribunal nonetheless offered American claimants their best hope for 
compensation on their claims.187 
This fact was not lost on the claimants.188 As a consequence, they 
commenced a substantial lobbying effort to encourage the Reagan 
184. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 43 (testimony of Roberts B. 
Owen); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 31 (testimony of Warren 
Christopher). 
185. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 7, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. 0. Trib. Rep. 
at 2 ("Whenever the Central Bank shall thereafter notify Iran that the bahnce in the 
Security Account has fallen below $500 million, Iran shall promptly make new deposits 
sufficient to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in the Account."). 
186. Richard D. Harza, President of Harza Engineering Company, a claimant against 
Iran, stated: 
The new Iran-United States Oaims Tribunal presents another set of 
uncertainties. Will the Claims Tribunal actually be established as called for by 
the agreements? Will it operate with reasonable speed-and, in particular, will 
there be enough arbitrators to hear the many cases likely to be brought there? 
We can't tell yet whether the Claims Tribunal will provide the fair hearing we are 
seeking. 
Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 88; see also Decisions of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal: Remarks by the Chairman, 78 AM. SOC'Y !NT'L L. PROC. 
221, 221 (1984) (noting that lawyers representing claimants interests wondered at the 
outset "[w]ould the Tribunal observe standards of due process and fairness comparable to 
our own constitutionally based values? Would the Tribunal observe its mandate in article 
V of the Oaims Settlement Declaration to decide all cases 'on the basis of respect for law,' 
or would its process rather giveO support to the notion that 'arbitral' and 'arbitrary' mean 
the same thing?"). 
187. See The U.S.!Iranian Hostage Settlement, Remarks by Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 75 
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 236, 242 (1981) (opining that United States "claimants were 
much better off under the arbitral procedure than they would have been if they had been 
required to sue in American courts"); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE 
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECfS OF THE 
HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 38 (Comm. Print 1981) ("Strong arguments can be 
made that, for all the potential pitfalls in the Oaims Tribunal, non-bank claimants are 
better off now than before the freeze."); BOYLE, supra note 167, at 223-24 (contrasting the 
opportunity claimants against Iran had of obtaining "payment at full face value" for their 
claims with claimants against the People's Republic of China, who, after the United States' 
1979 settlement, received forty-two cents on the dollar, which, discounted for inflation and 
unpaid interest, amounted in reality to only twelve cents on the dollar). 
188. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 188 (testimony of Mark 
Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser for the Carter Administration and Acting Legal Adviser 
for the Reagan Administration) ("[M:]y impression from discussions with [the claimants] is 
that there is a large majority that probably always knew and are finally beginning to be 
ready to admit to us that the remedies they had in U.S. courts were of very great 
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Administration to implement the Declarations, but to implement 
them on terms favorable to the claimants189 - terms, so favorable in 
certain cases, that they bore little resemblance to the text of the 
Algiers Declarations. According to Lawrence Newman, Chairman of 
United States Iranian Claimants Committee, the lawyers representing 
American claimants were not "initially unhappy with" the Algiers 
Declarations; however, because they feared that the Reagan 
Administration "might rush uncritically into accepting the deal made 
by the Carter Administration," Newman wrote to President Reagan 
to express the concerns the claimants did have and to request a 
meeting to discuss them.190 Likewise, other lawyers for claimants 
against Iran wrote to President Reagan to raise additional concerns 
and to request meetings.191 These meetings were held,192 and they 
provided the claimants the input they had sought. The Reagan 
uncertainty."); id. at 189 (testimony of Walter Stoessel) (stating that claimants realize that 
they have a better chance of recovery in the Tribunal than they would have without it); id. 
at 31 (testimony of Warren Christopher) ("(I]n the opinion of most lawyers, the U.S. 
claimants will be generally better off with the new program than they were before the 
hostage crisis arose."). 
189. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 133 (testimony of Brice M. 
Claggett, lawyer for claimants) ("exhort(ing] the responsible branches of Government ... 
to see that the agreements are implemented in a way that serves American interests"); id. 
at 225 (prepared statement of John F. Olson, lawyer for claimants) (recommending that 
"the agreements with Iran [be] implemented with the overall objective of assuring the 
fairest possible treatment for American claimants consistent with their rather ambiguous 
terms"); see id. at 229 (same statement) (arguing that the Reagan Administration should 
honor the Algiers Declarations but "only if they are implemented fairly, carefully, and in a 
manner consistent with their language but sensitive to the valid and substantial concerns 
of American claimants against Iran. Only if that is done will the United States be living up 
to a promise we have made to our own citizens, a promise that is every bit as important as 
the international obligations we undertake."). 
190. Newman, supra note 61, at 635-36; see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 77-78 (reprint of Newman's letter to President Reagan). Newman gave 
the letter to the news media and also conducted radio and television interviews so as to 
"draw the attention of the public and the government to [the claimants'] concerns." 
Newman, supra note 61, at 636. See also Lawrence W. Newman, Litigation in the United 
States of Claims Against Iran, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 36-37. 
191. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 220-24 (letter and 
"presentation" sent to President Reagan from Burns, Jackson, Summit, Rovins & Spitzer, 
attorneys for William Bikoff and George Eisenpresser); id. at 127 (letter from Lee R. 
Marks, Chairman of American Bar Association's Committee on Foreign Claims Section of 
International Law) (suggesting meeting with committee members who "include attorneys 
representing U.S. claimants and Iranian interests"). 
192. /d. at 80 (Lawrence Newman's letter to several Reagan Administration officials) 
("We, together with Washington counsel for various plaintiffs, have had several meetings 
with you and other administration officials . . . for the purpose of discussing the 
interpretation and implementation of" the Algiers Declarations.). 
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Administration later made clear that in preparing the regulations 
which implemented the Algiers Declarations, the Administration had 
"discussed [the regulations] in extensive detail with representatives of 
a wide variety and large number of U.S. claimants" and had 
considered their views "fully ... in the drafting process. "193 
So, after approximately a month of consultation and review, 
President Reagan ratified the executive orders signed by President 
Carter,l94 and the State Department issued a statement regarding the 
settlement with Iran.l95 The tone of the latter document was 
recriminatory. It announced that the "present Administration would 
not have negotiated with Iran for the release of the hostages," and it 
pointedly noted that it had not considered how the whole crisis 
"could have been handled better [or whether] a better set of 
agreements [could] have been negotiated."l96 Nonetheless, stating 
that "[w]e are confronted with an accomplished fact," the 
Administration announced its decision to implement the Declarations 
but only "in strict accordance with the[ir] terms."197 The Statement in 
addition showed the Reagan Administration's disdain for 
international law by making clear that the Administration did not 
consider whether the Declarations were legally binding under 
international law but chose to implement them because it was "in the 
overall interests of the United States" to do so.19B Mark Feldman, 
who was Deputy Legal Adviser for the Carter Administration and 
Acting Legal Adviser for the Reagan Administration in its earliest 
days, explained: 
193. !d. at 158 (prepared testimony of R. Timothy McNamar, Deputy Secretary of the 
Treasury, Reagan Administration); see also id. at 162 (testimony of Walter Stoessel, 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Reagan Administration) ("We have 
discussed these regulations in detail with U.S. claimants. Their views have been 
considered fully in the drafting process."); id. at 83 (letter to Reagan Administration 
officials from Lawrence Newman) ("We hope that we will be afforded the opportunity to 
review the text of drafted executive orders and regulations before they are issued in order 
to ensure that they do not unintentionally adversely affect United States claimants."). 
194. Message to Congress, Feb. 24, 1981, reprinted in LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS 
FOR POLmCAL ENDS, supra note 31, at DS-874-75. 
195. Implementation of Hostage Agreements the Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T ST. 
BULL. No. 2048 at 17. 
196. !d. 
197. !d. 
198. Id.; see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 161 (testimony of 
Walter Stoessel, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Reagan Administration) 
("We did not see it as necessary to reach a conclusion as to the agreements' legally binding 
character under international law. We are proceeding with implementation because it 
appears clearly to be in the overall interests of the United States to do so."). 
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[T]he specific reason for the disclaimer of any determination 
concerning the binding effect of the Agreements under 
international law was a political concern. The Administration did 
not want it thought that it was observing these Agreements because 
it was bound by international law to do so. . . . The Agreements 
were implemented because they served the national interest.199 
As the Statement suggests, although the Reagan Administration 
decided to implement the Algiers Declarations, it by no means 
tempered its rhetoric or moderated any of the criticism it had leveled 
at the Carter Administration's handling of the crisis. Indeed, during 
subsequent hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Walter Stoessel, Deputy Secretary of State for the Reagan 
Administration, reiterated that the Reagan Administration would not 
have negotiated for the hostages' release and opined that the Reagan 
Administration "would have taken a different attitude from the 
outset, and that action immediately after the seizure of the hostages 
would have been very quick and very effective, and that we would not 
have been in a situation which would have required lengthy 
negotiations."200 Stoessel similarly maintained before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that the Carter Administration's 
handling of the crisis injured United States' prestige abroad because 
the whole situation went on for such a long time, that there were so 
many months of attempted negotiations, that there were setbacks 
and failures, that there were efforts to effect a release by other 
means which failed, and that the whole procedure and the 
prolonged nature of the situation was something that did not 
enhance the image of the United States as a country able to defend 
its interests, to defend its citizens, and to take the necessary action 
in time.201 
199. Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 55 (1981). 
200. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 200. However, persistent 
questioning by Representative Zablocki did force Stoessel to backtrack slightly. See id. at 
201 (acknowledging that "we would not wish to be categorical on" the question of 
negotiating and that the sentence appearing in his statement-"[w]e will not negotiate the 
payment of ransom nor the release of prisoners" -was "not clearly enough phrased"); see 
also id. at 205 (Rep. Fountain criticizing the Reagan Administration for "repeating the 
political comments"). Stoessel also repeated the recriminatory remarks that had appeared 
in Reagan Administration's statement during hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 161. 
201. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 182. Representative Solarz-
contrasting the Reagan Administration's statements with former Secretary of State 
Muskie's belief that the hostage crisis "will be seen in time as a sound and successful 
application of our preference for settling disputes by peaceful means" -commented that 
"this represents two rather fundamentally conflicting views of how we deal with this kind 
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These statements highlight a fundamental tension in the Reagan 
Administration's approach to the Algiers Declarations. The Reagan 
Administration wanted to have it both ways: it wanted to continue to 
talk tough-to trivialize international law and criticize the Carter 
Administration for bungling the hostage crisis by negotiating an 
international agreement-while at the same time, it wanted to gain 
the many benefits contained in the international agreement that the 
Carter Administration had in fact negotiated. 
And that is, in fact, just what the Reagan Administration did. 
All the while criticizing the Carter Administration, the Reagan 
Administration consulted with United States claimants, and in light of 
their comments, crafted its implementation of the Declarations in 
ways that would maximize their interests.202 Indeed, although 
promising to implement the Declarations "in strict accordance with 
the[ir] terms,"203 the Reagan Administration's implementation 
arguably diverged from those terms-in ways suggested by the 
United States claimants-in particular from certain provisions 
relating to the return of Iran's assets, to litigation against Iran in 
United States courts, and to litigation concerning the assets of the 
former Shah and his close relatives. 
Dissatisfied with these and other aspects of the Reagan 
Administration's implementation, Iran filed lawsuits with the 
Tribunal, claiming that the United States violated myriad and sundry 
provisions of the Algiers Declarations. The Tribunal has only 
recently decided the bulk of these cases, and taken as a whole, they 
show that the Reagan Administration tried to have it all: pressed by 
of situation." House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 168; see also Senate 
Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 176 (Senator Percy noting that "(t]here is a 
sharp difference of opinion enunciated by the Reagan administration against the Carter 
administration"). The Reagan Administration's statements also sharply contrast with the 
views of Cyrus Vance, the Carter Administration's first Secretary of State, who stated: 
I am still convinced that the basic strategy of restraint, escalating international 
pressure, and diplomacy adopted in the first days of the crisis was right and 
consistent with the honor and interests of the United States and the safety of the 
hostages. In the end it proved successful, even though the president and the 
administration were wounded by it. 
VANCE, supra note 29, at 380. 
202 See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 153 (opening statement of 
Senator Percy) ("Having decided to go forward, it also is my impression that you (the 
Reagan Administration] have done so with the greatest consideration for the interests of 
American citizens and the integrity of American institutions."). 
203. Implementation of Hostage Agreements the Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T ST. 
BULL. No. 2048 at 17. 
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American companies with claims against Iran, constrained by certain 
inflexible domestic laws, ideologically opposed to an agreement 
negotiated with terrorists, and tempted by the vague, undefined terms 
in the Declarations themselves, the Reagan Administration tried to 
secure for United States citizens the benefits provided by the Algiers 
Declarations while interpreting its own obligations in a narrow, 
sometimes highly implausible, way. The following section describes 
Iran's claims and the Tribunal's resolution of them. 
III. Cases Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
As noted above, President Reagan inherited an international 
agreement that had already been partially fulfilled. Iran had released 
the hostages, and the United States had already transferred a 
substantial portion of Iran's assets. But other obligations remained. 
The Algiers Declarations contain provisions concerning the United 
States' return of Iran's remaining assets, its termination of litigation 
against Iran in United States courts, and its assistance in Iran's 
litigation seeking the return of the Pahlavi assets. The Reagan 
Administration implemented these and other provisions, but not to 
Iran's satisfaction. Indeed, Iran complained about virtually every 
aspect of the Reagan Administration's implementation of the 
Declarations, and it consequently filed numerous suits with the 
Tribunal alleging myriad treaty violations. 
A. Standby Letters of Credit 
(1) Background 
Questions regarding standby letters of credit had plagued the 
Carter Administration throughout the hostage crisis,204 and these 
difficulties only increased with the signing of the Algiers 
Declarations. Some background is necessary to understand the 
issues. 
As noted above, prior to the Islamic Revolution, hundreds of 
American businesses had obtained lucrative contracts to supply goods 
and services in Iran. When a United States contractor contracted 
with an agency or instrumentality of Iran's pre-Revolutionary 
government, the contract typically required the United States 
contractor to secure its performance by means of a standby letter of 
204. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184. 
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credit. The United States contractor did this by obtaining a bank 
guarantee from an Iranian bank ("Iranian guarantor bank") in favor 
of the Iranian government agency that was party to the contract 
("beneficiary"). Normally, these guarantees were either advance 
payment guarantees that secured an accounting to the Iranian 
beneficiary for any advance payments for goods it made under the 
contract, or performance guarantees that secured payment to the 
Iranian beneficiary for damages if the United States contractor 
defaulted on the contract.205 The Iranian beneficiary would receive 
up to the amount guaranteed by making a demand upon the 
guarantee.206 Some guarantees would be paid upon a simple demand, 
while other guarantees required the Iranian beneficiary to certify that 
the United States contractor had breached its contractual 
obligations,207 but even the latter kind of guarantee did not require 
the Iranian beneficiary to provide any particulars, let alone any 
evidence, of the alleged breach.2os 
205. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A15(I:C), Award No. ITL 78-
AlS(I:C)-Fr, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 247,248 para. 2 (Nov.l2, 1992) [hereinafter Case 
No. A15(I:C)]. 
206. I d. at 248-49 para. 3. 
207. Id. 
208. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 159 (prepared testimony 
of R. Timothy McNamar) ("Under their terms, the standby letters of credit may be called 
by the Iranian beneficiary at any time, with or without cause, and the issuing bank is 
automatically obligated to pay the beneficiary, without regard to the merits of the 
underlying transactions."); Wyle v. Bank Melli Of Tehran, 577 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (N.D. 
Cal. 1983) (noting that a U.S. shipping company obtained a letter of credit requiring the 
Iranian beneficiary to document claims for missing or damaged cargo caused by the 
shipping company but the Iranian beneficiary rejected that letter of credit and insisted that 
the shipping company obtain one that was payable "against a 'simple demand'"); John A. 
Barrett, The Iranian Cases, 56 PLIICOMM 139, 143 (1985) (stating that payment letters of 
credit generally "required no other documentation than a simple written declaration by 
the Iranian bank beneficiary that it had paid out the funds under the Guarantee to the 
Iranian agency equal to the amount of the particular payment request on the Letter of 
Credit"). Such unconditional guarantees have been called "suicide" letters of credit or 
"suicide bonds." Newman, supra note 61, at 631; Herbert A. Getz, Enjoining the 
International Standby Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 189, 196 (1980); HJ. van der Vaart, Standby Letters of Credit and the Problem of Bad 
Faith Calls, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 36, 43-44 (1981) (noting that "'suicide' calling 
provisions" facilitate bad faith calls); George Kimball & Barry A. Sanders, Preventing 
Wrongful Payment of Guaranty Letters of Credit-Lessons from Iran, 39 Bus. LAW. 417, 
418 (1984). See also Getz, supra, at 195 (describing typical standby letters of credit as 
requiring only a pro forma declaration by the beneficiary that the customer has failed to 
perform); Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1356 (11th 
Cir. 1982) ("In order to collect upon the guarantee letter of credit [National Iranian Radio 
and Television] was required to declare that Harris had failed to comply with the terms 
and conditions of the contract."); Senate Banking Comm Hearing, supra note 62, at 23-24 
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To secure the Iranian bank's guarantee, the United States 
contractor would next have a United States bank open a standby 
letter of credit in favor of the Iranian guarantor bank. The United 
States bank ordinarily would pay the Iranian guarantor bank upon a 
certification by the Iranian bank that it had been required to pay 
under its guarantee.209 Once the United States bank made its 
payment, it would look to the United States contractor (or "account 
party") for reimbursement.2IO 
In sum, if an Iranian agency believed that the United States 
contractor defaulted on the contract, the Iranian agency would certify 
that the default had occurred and would receive payment from the 
Iranian guarantor bank under its guarantee. After making such 
payment, the Iranian guarantor bank would obtain reimbursement by 
drawing on the United States bank under the standby letter of credit, 
and the United States bank would then obtain reimbursement from 
the United States contractor.211 Standby letters of credit thus can be 
understood to provide their beneficiaries with irrevocable payment 
commitments that are independent of any dispute over the 
performance of the underlying contract.212 In essence, they provide 
(statement of Robert Carswell) (describing standby letters of credit as "written totally in 
Iran's favor, and on their face, arguably could be called on demand by the relevant Iranian 
entity"). 
209. Case No. A15(1:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 249 para. 4. 
210. See id.; United States v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. A-16, Award No. 108-
A-16/582/591-Fr, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 57, 59-60 (Dec. 27, 1985) [hereinafter Case 
No. A16]. For a more detailed description of standby letter of credit relationships, see 
Getz, supra note 208, at 190-96; van der Vaart, supra note 208, at 38-43. See also Harris 
Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1982): Itek 
Corp. v. First Nat'! Bank of Boston, 511 F. Supp. 1341, 1342-43 (D. Mass. 1981); Am. Bell 
Int'l v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 421-22 (S.D. N.Y. 1979); Mark P. 
Zimmett, Standby Letters of Credit in the Iran Litigation: Two Hundred Problems in 
Search of a Solution, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'LBUS. 927,932-33 (1984). 
211. Thus, the standby letters of credit were part of a complex four-party transaction 
involving three contractual relationships: the bank guarantee between the Iranian agency 
and the Iranian guarantor bank; the standby letter of credit itself between the issuing 
United States bank and the Iranian guarantor bank; and the reimbursement agreement 
between the United States contractor and the United States bank. 
212. See Zimmett, supra note 210, at 928; Getz, supra note 208, at 203; Rockwell Int'l 
Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, 719 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The letters of credit represent 
separate contractual undertakings that are, in legal contemplation, wholly distinct from 
whatever performance they ultimately secure."); United Techs. Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 
469 F. Supp. 473, 477 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) ("It is axiomatic that the issuing bank's obligations 
under its letter of credit is independent of its customer's obligations under the contract of 
sale."); Guy W. Lewin Smith, Irrevocable Letters of Credit and Third Party Fraud: The 
American Accord, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 55, 56 (1983). 
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the beneficiary (here the Iranian agency) rather than the account 
party (the United States contractor) the right to hold disputed funds 
until the underlying contractual dispute is settled, arbitrated, or 
litigated.213 
In November 1979, several hundred of these standby letters of 
credit worth more than $1 billion were outstanding.214 The day after 
President Carter froze Iran's assets, the Treasury Department 
implemented the freeze by promulgating the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations.215 Initially, these regulations permitted United States 
banks to honor Iranian calls on standby letters of credit but required 
the funds to be paid into the frozen bank accounts of the Iranian 
beneficiaries.216 The United States contractors, however, found 
themselves in a worrisome position. Although they had been 
perfectly happy to secure these so-called "suicide" letters of credit217 
when they were contracting with one of the United States' most 
reliable allies, once the Islamic Revolution succeeded and the 
American Embassy was seized, the United States contractors became 
concerned that Iran would make bad-faith calls on the letters of 
credit. So, beginning in November 1979, scores of United States 
contractors visited, phoned, and wrote the Treasury Department 
beseeching it to do something to protect them.218 Although these 
213. See Kimball & Sanders, supra note 208, at 419; Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1984) {"Parties to a contract may use a letter of credit in 
order to make certain that contractual disputes wend their way towards resolution with 
money in the beneficiary's pocket rather than in the pocket of the contracting party."). 
214. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184; see also Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 
205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 249 para. 5; Case No. Al6, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S. 
Cl. Trib. Rep. at 60. 
215. 31 C.P.R.§§ 535.101-535.901 {1979). 
216. 31 C.P.R. §§ 535.416, 535.508 {1979). See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 159 (prepared testimony of R. Timothy McNamar) ("[T]he initial 
regulations issued on November 14, 1979, authorized payment of any funds owed to Iran 
to blocked accounts in domestic banks in the name of Iran. Thus, when calls were made 
on the standby letters of credit, the banks would have paid the funds into blocked accounts 
and then demanded reimbursement from the U.S. contractors."). 
217. Getz, supra note 208, at 196; Kimball & Sanders, supra note 208, at 418. 
218. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184; Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, 
supra note 62, at 82 (statement of Joseph R. Creighton, Vice President-General Counsel 
of Harris Corp.) {describing "extensive negotiations with the government before the 
freeze regulations actually provided any protection whatsoever to the American 
contractors"); Lawrence W. Newman, Litigation in the United States of Claims Against 
Iran, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 34 {describing "importunings and 
recitations to the Treasury Department"); see also Newman, supra note 61, at 638 
(describing the similar concerns that American companies would later bring to the Reagan 
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contractors by and large were sophisticated business people who had 
knowingly bargained away their rights in order to secure the lucrative 
underlying contracts,Z19 they nonetheless argued that the risk of 
politically motivated calls by Iran justified protection by the United 
States government.220 By contrast, the United States banks that had 
issued the letters of credit opposed governmental intervention 
because they feared that anything that prevented them from honoring 
calls pursuant to the literal terms of their contracts would harm their 
reputation for reliability in the international financial community.zzt 
The contractors proposed restrictions of varying severity, with 
some arguing for a wholesale nullification of the obligations.222 The 
Treasury Department eventually settled on a less severe measure; on 
Administration in anticipation of its promulgation of Treasury Regulations regarding 
standby letters of credit). 
Some United States companies did not wait for the hostage crisis to take action but 
immediately upon the success of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979 filed suits to 
enjoin the banks from honoring letters of credit in favor of Iranian beneficiaries. See, e.g., 
KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); Am. Bell Int'l v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. N.Y. 1979); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. 
v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 79 Civ. 1190, (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 3, 1979). The suits were only 
marginally successful. See Zimmett, supra note 210, at 929-30; van der Vaart, supra note 
208. at 45-46; Gillespie, supra note 47, at 19-20. 
219. See Barrett, supra note 208, at 142 (noting that "the lucrative market for both 
commercial and consumer goods and services that existed in Iran under Shah Reza 
Pahlavi's government" was so attractive that "most U.S. companies agreed without 
hesitation to a demand by the contracting Iranian agencies for a 'performance guarantee' 
on behalf of each U.S. company contracting to supply goods or services to Iran"); Am. Bell 
lnt'llnc., 474 F. Supp. at 426 (denying Bell's motion for a preliminary injunction, stating 
that "Bell, a sophisticated multi-national enterprise well advised by competent counsel, 
entered into these arrangements with its corporate eyes open .... [T]hese arrangements 
redounded tangibly to the benefit of Bell. The Contract with Iran, with its prospect of 
designing and installing from scratch a nationwide and international communications 
system, was certain to bring to Bell both monetary profit and prestige and good will in the 
global communications industry. The agreement to indemnify Manufacturers on its Letter 
of Credit provided the means by which these benefits could be achieved."). 
220. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184; Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze 
Iranian Assets, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 18-19. 
221. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 185; Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze 
Iranian Assets, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 19; see also Am. Bell lnt'l, 
474 F. Supp. at 426 (case decided prior to asset freeze which noted that if Manufacturers' 
Bank were enjoined from paying a called standby letter of credit, bank could be subject to 
suit elsewhere for failing to pay its obligations; bank's assets could be attached; and bank 
would "face a loss of credibility in the international banking community"). Cf Senate 
Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 84 (written answers of Joseph R. Creighton) 
(responding to banks' claim that "they are required to pay on a draw by the Iranian banks 
in order to preserve the sanctity of international banking transactions"). 
222. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184. 
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November 28, 1979, it amended the Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations by adding Section 535.568, which required an issuing 
bank to notify the account party-the United States contractor-
when it received a call on a letter of credit. The account party was 
then allowed to apply for a license to establish a blocked account on 
its own books;223 if a license was issued, then the United States bank 
was prohibited from paying any proceeds into the blocked bank 
account of the Iranian guarantor bank.224 
Between November 1979 and January 1981, Iranian banks called 
scores of standby letters of credit.225 Pursuant to Section 535.568, the 
United States banks notified their account parties of the calls. In 
many cases, the account party availed itself of the procedure 
described in Section 535.568 and established a blocked account on its 
own books, thereby preventing the bank from paying funds into a 
blocked bank account.226 In addition, or as an alternative, some 
account parties obtained preliminary injunctions from United States 
courts enjoining the banks from honoring the letters of credit.227 In 
other cases, the account parties took no action at all, and the United 
States banks paid the amounts demanded into the blocked bank 
accounts of the Iranian guarantor banks.228 This is how matters stood 
223. 31 C.P.R. § 535.568(b ). That subsection provided: 
Whenever an issuing or confirming bank shall receive such demand for payment 
under a standby letter of credit, it shall promptly notify the person for whose 
account the credit was opened. Such person may then apply within five business 
days for a specific license authorizing the account party to establish a blocked 
account on its books in the name of the Iranian entity in the amount payable 
under the credit, in lieu of payment by the issuing or confirming bank into a 
blocked account and reimbursement therefor by the account party. 
See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 159 (prepared testimony of 
R. Timothy McNamar, Deputy Treasury Secretary, Reagan Administration). 
224. 31 C.P.R.§ 535.568(a). 
225. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 250 para. 7. 
226. !d.; Case No. A16, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 60. 
227. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 250 para. 7; Case 
No. A16, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 60-61. For examples of this 
litigation, see Rockwell Int'l Sys. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1983); Harris 
Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1982); Itek 
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 511 F. Supp. 1341, 1342-43 (D. Mass.1981). 
228. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 250 para. 7; Case 
No. A16, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 61. In many cases, the Treasury 
regulations were not called into play at all because the Iranian call did not on its face 
conform to the letter of credit, so the issuing bank accordingly refused to honor the call. 
Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 250 para. 7; Case No. 
A16, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 60. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Sys., 719 
F.2d at 585, n.3. 
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on January 19, 1981, when Iran and the United States entered into the 
Algiers Declarations. 
(2) Treatment under the Algiers Declarations 
The Algiers Declarations do not specifically address the return of 
standby-letters-of-credit proceeds, but several provisions could be 
read to bear on the issue. Most broadly, General Principle A of the 
General Declaration requires the United States, "[w]ithin the 
framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the" Algiers 
Declarations, to "restore the financial position of Iran, in so far as 
possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979" and to 
"ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its 
jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4-9."229 
As to the specifics of the United States' obligation to transfer 
Iranian funds, paragraphs 6, 8, and 9 of the General Declaration 
appear most relevant to the question of whether the United States 
was obligated to bring about the transfer of the standby-letters-of-
credit proceeds.230 Paragraph 6 obligates the United States to bring 
about the transfer "of all Iranian deposits and securities in U.S. 
banking institutions in the United States .... "231 Paragraph 8 
obligates the United States to bring about the transfer "of all Iranian 
financial assets (meaning funds or securities) which are located in the 
United States and abroad, apart from those assets referred to in 
Paragraph 5 and 6 above .... "232 Finally, Paragraph 9 obligates the 
United States to "arrange, subject to the provisions of U.S. law 
applicable prior to November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran of all 
Iranian properties which are located in the United States and abroad 
and which are not within the scope of preceding paragraphs."233 At 
229. General Declaration, supra note 17, General Principal A, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. 
Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3. 
230. The General Declaration contains several paragraphs addressing different parties 
in possession of different categories of Iranian assets. For instance, as to different parties, 
paragraph 4 addresses assets held by the Federal Reserve Bank, while paragraph 5 
addresses assets held by foreign branches of United States banks, and paragraph 6 
addresses assets held by United States branches of United States banks. General 
Declaration, supra note 17, paras. 4-6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 4-5. As to 
the different categories of assets, paragraphs 5 and 6 direct the transfer of "all Iranian 
deposits and securities" while paragraph 9 directs the transfer of "all Iranian properties 
which are located in the United States and abroad and which are not within the scope of 
the preceding paragraphs." /d. paras. 5-6, 9, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 5-6. 
231. /d. para. 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 5. 
232. /d. para. 8, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 6. 
233. Id. para. 9, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 6. 
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the time he signed the Algiers Declarations, President Carter issued 
Executive Orders 12279, 12280, and 12281, which implemented, and 
largely mirrored, Paragraphs 6, 8, and 9 of the General Declaration.234 
President Reagan ratified these and President Carter's other 
executive orders when he announced that he would implement the 
Algiers Declarations.ZJS 
Although neither the Algiers Declarations nor President Carter's 
executive orders specifically addresses the transfer of letter-of-credit 
proceeds, those proceeds that the banks had been able to place in 
blocked Iranian bank accounts were understood to fall within the 
Declarations' directives and were therefore transferred to Iran along 
with the other funds in those accounts.236 But what about the letter-
of-credit proceeds that the banks had not been able to pay either 
because the account parties had obtained injunctions enjoining the 
banks' payment or had created substituted blocked accounts on their 
own books pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 535.568? Although by no means 
perfectly clear, the provisions of the Algiers Declarations described 
above could easily be read to require the United States to transfer 
234. Executive Order 12279 directed "[a]ny branch or office of a banking institution 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to transfer all "funds or securities legally 
or beneficially owned" by Iran and all "deposits standing to the credit of or beneficially 
owned" by Iran. Exec. Order No. 12,279 § 1-101, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (1981). It also 
revoked "[a]lllicenses and authorizations for acquiring or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege, by court order, attachment or, otherwise," pertaining to the properties described 
in the executive order, id. § 1-102(a), and it nullified "all rights, powers, and privileges 
relating [to the above-mentioned property] which derive from any attachment, 
injunction, . . . or other action in any litigation" after November 14, 1979, except those of 
the Government of Iran and its agencies, id. § 1-102(b ). 
Executive Order 12280, implementing paragraph 8 of the General Declaration, 
directed "any person" ... which is not a banking institution and is ... in possession or 
control of funds or securities of Iran ... to transfer [the] funds ... to the Federal Reserve 
Bank." Exec. Order No.12,280 § 1-101,46 Fed. Reg. 7921 (1981). Like Executive Order 
12279, it also revoked all licenses relating to the properties it described, id. § 1-102(a), and 
it nullified all rights deriving from any attachment, injunction or like proceedings in 
litigation after November 14, 1979, except those of the Government of Iran and its 
agencies, id. § 1-102(b). Finally, Executive Order 12281, like its progenitor Paragraph 9 of 
the General Declaration, directs "all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States in possession or control of properties, not including funds and securities, owned by 
Iran" to transfer such properties to Iran. Exec. Order No. 12,281 § 1-101, 46 Fed. Reg. 
7923 (1981). Like the other two executive orders, Executive Order 12281 also revoked all 
licenses relating to the properties it described, id. § 1-102(a), and it nullified all rights 
deriving from any attachment, injunction, or like proceedings in litigation after November 
14,1979, except those of the Government oflran and its agencies, id. § 1-102(b). 
235. Message from the President of the United States, Feb. 24, 1981, reprinted in Senate 
Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 282. 
236. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 257 para. 24. 
HeinOnline -- 52 Hastings L.J. 360 2000-2001
360 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
those funds. Further, President Carter's Executive Orders, mirroring 
the terms of the Declarations, give no support for a contrary 
conclusion. 
(3) The Reagan Administration's Response 
However one might read the Algiers Declarations or President 
Carter's Executive Orders, in February 1981 it was the Reagan 
Administration that was implementing the Algiers Declarations, and 
that Administration was confronted with vocal American account 
parties who were utterly aghast at the thought that the hundreds of 
millions of dollars that they had-at least nominally-placed in 
substituted blocked accounts on their own books would be 
transferred to Iran. Most of the contractors were convinced that 
Iran's letter-of-credit calls were fraudulent,237 and this conviction was 
by no means without support. Iran had made a large number of its 
calls virtually simultaneously in March 1980 and for the full face 
amounts of the letters of credit, thus suggesting that the calls were not 
based on actual defaults but rather were politically motivated.238 
Although the Tribunal's ability to rectify any improper payments to 
Iran might in theory have mitigated the claimants' fears, some 
237. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 81 (testimony of Joseph R. 
Creighton, Vice President-General Counsel, Harris Corp., claimant against Iran) ("After 
the revolution several Iranian banks attempted to collect on such standby letters of credit, 
even though there was no default claimed by the Iranian contracting party."); Rockwell 
Int'l Sys. v. Citibank, 719 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The gist of Rockwell's case is that, 
as a result of the revolution in Iran and its aftermath, it was prevented by the new 
government in Iran from completing performance of the contract and that the subsequent 
calls by Iranian officials ... on the letters of credit were fraudulent."). 
238. See Rockwell Int'l Sys., 719 F.2d at 588, 589 (noting that letter-of-credit calls which 
had occurred on March 31, 1980 and April 22, 1980 arose "in the context of a wholesale 
series of calls on similar letters in other Iranian transactions" and supported "Rockwell's 
contention that these letters ... were therefore fraudulent"); Newman, supra note 61, at 
638-39 (contending that claimants seeking to enjoin payment of standby letters of credit 
"were aided .. . by statements contained in an order, a copy of which we managed to 
obtain, issued by the Central Bank of Iran, Bank Markazi. That document called for all 
Iranian banks that were beneficiaries under standby letters of credit issued at the request 
of American companies to demand payment under them, regardless of the underlying 
circumstances."); Wyle v. Bank Melli Of Tehran, 577 F. Supp. 1148,1154 (N.D. Cal. 1983) 
(noting that there "is some evidence of a substantial nature to support plaintiff's claims 
concerning an Iranian policy of demanding payment on letters of credit without regard to 
whether payment is justified" and pointing in particular to the "remarkable" document 
that Bank Melli transmitted to Bank of California to call the letter of credit which is "a 
form, fill-in-the-blanks, in which the operative language concerning failure to pay on 
demand on a letter of credit has clearly been typed by a different typewriter than the 
language which identifies the particular respondent bank and letter of credit"). 
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claimants were not certain that their claims against Iran would fall 
within the Tribunal's jurisdiction,239 and even those claimants who 
were relatively certain of their ability to bring a claim before the 
Tribunal were not inclined to pay first and wait for the Tribunal to 
issue them a refund later. As a consequence, they lobbied the 
Reagan Administration to allow them, at the very least, to retain the 
letter-of-credit proceeds that they had already placed in substituted 
blocked accounts and to retain the regulations permitting substituted 
blocked accounts so as to prohibit banks from paying subsequently-
called standby letters of credit.240 
And that is just what the Reagan Administration did. To 
implement the Algiers Declarations, the Treasury Department 
amended the Iranian Assets Control Regulations to provide for the 
transfer of the remaining Iranian assets. But, the Treasury 
Department retained 31 C.F.R. § 535.568, which allowed United 
States account parties to preclude issuing banks from honoring 
standby-letter-of-credit calls by establishing substituted blocked 
accounts on their own books. Moreover, the Treasury Department 
promulgated 31 C.F.R. § 535.438 which provided that the transfer 
239. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 228 (prepared testimony of 
John F. Olson, lawyer for claimants) (delineating Tribunal's jurisdictional exclusions and 
noting that "[t]here will thus be many cases where there will be doubt about the tribunal's 
eventual ability to make a decision and an award"); Feldman, supra note 183, at 79-80; 
Rockwell Int'l Sys., 719 F.2d at 586-87 (noting that district court's grant of preliminary 
injunction on the payment of standby letter of credit was "based largely on [its] finding 
that it was 'highly probable that the Hague Tribunal will refuse to accept jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's claims"'). 
240. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 87 (prepared statement of 
Richard D. Harza) (stating that Harza Engineering Co. advised the State and Treasury 
Departments, among other things, that "[f]unds subject to the letters [of credit] should be 
kept frozen until the underlying disputes between U.S. companies and Iranian agencies 
are decided on the merits"); id. at 227 (prepared statement of John F. Olson, lawyer for 
claimants) ("The protection against unwarranted calls on standby letters of credit and 
bank guarantees ... which presently appears in Section 535.568 of the freeze regulations 
must be maintained firmly in place until the underlying claims are determined before the 
new tribunal or in the courts."); Newman, supra note 61, at 636-37 (One of the concerns 
that the claimants brought to the Reagan Administration was "that the standby letters of 
credit might somehow be permitted to be called for payment before the Tribunal had a 
chance to deal with the claims arising out of the contracts under which those credits had 
been issued."); Senate Banking Comm Hearing, supra note 62, at 84 (prepared statement 
of Joseph R. Creighton) (noting that Harris Corp. and other similarly situated companies 
are satisfied with the Reagan Administration's regulations that would retain the freeze). 
However, Mr. Creighton of the Harris Corporation had gone so far as to suggest that 
Congress enact legislation permanently terminating the letters of credit. See id.; see also 
Trooboff, supra note 49, at 148 ("Many contractors believe that [standby letters of credit] 
should be cancelled by congressional action."). 
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directives contained in the amended regulations did not apply to 
standby letters of credit to which a blocked account had been 
established on the books of a United States account party, or to which 
payment was prohibited under a court injunction.241 So, United 
States account parties were not required to transfer to Iran the funds 
they had placed in substituted blocked accounts; moreover, when 
Iranian beneficiaries called letters of credit after the Algiers 
Declarations were signed, United States contractors were able to 
continue to prevent the issuing banks from honoring the calls by 
establishing blocked accounts on their own books. Finally, President 
Reagan also issued Executive Order 12294 which suspended all legal 
proceedings against Iran before United States courts with the 
exception of a few categories, one of which was claims concerning the 
validity or payment of standby letters of credit.242 Thus, in addition to 
providing the protection of the substituted blocked accounts, the 
Reagan Administration also authorized United States account parties 
to institute or continue litigation to enjoin United States banks from 
honoring Iranian calls on letters of credit. 
(4) Iran's Case Before the Tribunal 
Iran filed suit in the Tribunal, claiming that the United States 
had breached the Algiers Declarations by failing to bring about the 
transfer of the funds in the substituted blocked accounts; by 
authorizing further substituted accounts to be established; and by 
failing to terminate litigation pertaining to standby letters of credit.243 
As for its first two claims, Iran contended that by failing to revoke the 
241. 31 C.F.R. § 535.438{a) reads in full: 
Nothing contained in §§ 535.212, 535.213, and 535.214 [directing the transfer of 
Iranian funds] or in any other provision or revocation or amendment of any 
provision in this part affects the prohibition in § 535.201 and the licensing 
procedure in § 535.568 relating to certain standby letters of credit, performance 
bonds and similar obligations. The term "funds and securities" as used in this 
part does not include substitute blocked accounts established under section 
535.568 relating to standby letters of credit, performance or payment bonds and 
similar obligations. 
Likewise, Section 535.337 of the amended regulations provides that "[f]or purposes of 
this part, the term 'funds' shall mean monies in trust, escrow and similar special funds held 
by non-banking institutions, currency and coins. It does not include accounts created 
under§ 535.568." And Section 535.333{a) provides that "[t]he term 'properties' as used in 
§ 535.215 ... does not include obligations under standby letters of credit .... " 
242. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (1981); see also 31 C.F.R. § 
535.222(g) {1981). 
243. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 248 para. 1. 
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licensing procedure established by Section 535.568-and by failing to 
transfer the letter-of-credit proceeds that had previously been placed 
in substituted blocked accounts, the United States had breached its 
General Principle A obligation to "restore the financial position of 
Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 
1979."244 
In a previous case involving General Principle A, the United 
States had argued that the General Principles aid in interpreting the 
relevant Declarations' provisions but impose no independent 
obligations on Iran or the United States.24s This argument was 
consistent with the understanding of the Carter Administration 
officials who had negotiated the Declarations and who had added the 
General Principles with the belief that they would provide the Iranian 
negotiators with political cover while not altering the obligations 
contained in the Declarations in any substantive way.246 The Tribunal 
rejected the argument, however, holding that the "General Principles 
are not simply statements of purpose," but rather, embody "broad 
legal commitments, with the ways of their implementation being 
detailed in the following parts of the General Declaration."247 
In the letters-of-credit case, the United States acknowledged that 
it was required to transfer Iranian "assets" but argued that the letters 
of credit that had been subject to an injunction or whose proceeds 
had been placed in substituted blocked accounts were not assets but 
merely "contingent rights."248 According to the United States, the 
letters-of-credit proceeds became assets only when the letters of 
credit had been honored by American banks between November 14, 
1979 and January 19, 1981 and the proceeds deposited in the blocked 
bank accounts of the Iranian beneficiaries.249 In so arguing, however, 
the United States ignored the fact that it was the United States' own 
regulations that prevented the banks from honoring the letters of 
credit and placing the funds into the blocked bank accounts of Iranian 
beneficiaries. That is, if the funds were not "assets" under the United 
244. Id. at 256 para. 22. 
245. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. A15(I:G), Award No. ITL 63-A15(I:G)-Fr, 12 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 40, 45 para. 11 (Aug. 20, 1986) [hereinafter Case No. A15(I:G)]. 
246. Owen, supra note 47, at 318-19. 
247. Case No. A15(I:G), supra note 245, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 46-47 para.17. 
248. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 257-58 paras. 24-
25. 
249. Id. at 257 para. 24. 
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States' definition of the term, it was because United States 
regulations prevented them from so becoming. 
The United States next pointed out that Iranian banks had made 
"'wholesale claims' on large numbers of standby letters of credit 
without regard for their terms or for the status of the performance on 
the underlying contracts."250 According to the United States, if it had 
permitted the banks to honor the letters of credit under those 
circumstances, "the United States account parties involved would 
have initiated legal actions in the United States courts to block 
payment on what they regarded as fraudulent calls on these letters of 
credit."251 The United States thus argued that retaining the 
regulations preserved the status quo until the underlying contractual 
disputes could be decided by the Tribunal. This argument ignores the 
fact that the whole purpose of a standby letter of credit is to provide 
the beneficiary with the right to hold disputed funds until the dispute 
is settled.252 If the beneficiary must wait until the underlying 
contractual disputes are settled, then its standby letter of credit is 
valueless. More notably, the United States· argument begs the 
question of its General Principle B obligation-at issue in this very 
case-to terminate and prohibit further litigation against Iran in 
United States courts. The United States can hardly fulfill its General 
Principle A obligations by violating General Principle B. Indeed, the 
United States' remarkably weak legal arguments go a long way 
toward confirming that its preservation of the letter-of-credit 
regulations had very little to do with the terms of the Algiers 
Declarations and a lot to do with the political uproar that would have 
greeted the Reagan Administration had it adopted a different course. 
However, it is the Tribunal, and not the Reagan Administration, 
that definitively interprets the Algiers Declarations. In Award No. 
Al5(I:C), the Tribunal-with all three American arbitrators in 
agreement-held that the United States, by continuing to permit 
substituted blocked accounts, had failed to fulfill its General Principle 
A obligation to restore the financial position of Iran, insofar as 
250. /d. at 252 para. 11. 
251. /d. 
252. See Kimball & Sanders, supra note 208, at 419; Itek Corp. v. First Nat'! Bank of 
Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Parties to a contract may use a letter of credit in 
order to make certain that contractual disputes wend their way towards resolution with 
money in the beneficiary's pocket rather than in the pocket of the contracting party."); see 
also Zimmett, supra note 210, at 929 ("The issuing bank's independent, irrevocable 
commitment to honor th[e beneficiary's] demand is what gives the standby letter of credit 
its value and is why it is so widely accepted in international trade."). 
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possible, to that which existed before November 14, 1979.253 The 
Tribunal held that before November 14,1979, 
[i]f an Iranian guarantor bank called such a letter of credit, the 
United States bank would pay the amount called if it found the call 
to be timely and conforming. If the United States bank refused 
payment because of alleged untimeliness or nonconformity, the 
Iranian guarantor bank could attempt to remedy this deficiency. In 
addition, a United States account party that contended that a call 
was clearly legally unjustified could seek a court injunction to 
prevent payment of such a standby letter of credit. There existed 
no provision for United States account parties to establish 
substitute blocked accounts on their own books.254 
Fortunately for the United States, the Tribunal's holding covered 
few letters of credit. The Tribunal noted that Iran no longer pursued 
claims with respect to letters of credit (1) that the parties had settled; 
(2) that are or were at issue in a claim brought before the Tribunal for 
so long as the claim is or was pending before the Tribunal; or (3) that 
are or were at issue in a claim that the Tribunal will resolve or has 
resolved on the merits. Thus, the Tribunal held these claims to be 
moot.255 
The Tribunal did not find it feasible to determine the precise 
amount of damages at that stage of the proceedings, so it asked the 
parties to negotiate as to the identity of the letters of credit falling 
within the Tribunal's holding and "the consequences" of that 
holding.256 As noted above, Iran had also claimed that the United 
States had violated General Principle B by failing to vacate the 
preliminary injunctions that enjoined the payment of letters of credit 
and by failing to prohibit further litigation thereon. The Tribunal 
declined to address that claim because it and numerous, similar claims 
regarding continuing litigation in United States courts were at issue in 
another case Iran brought against the United States-Case No. 
A15(IV)-but it did encourage the parties to include the claim in 
253. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 261 para. 35. 
254. Id. at 258 para. 27. The Tribunal acknowledged, however, that "for a certain 
period after 19 January 1981, the United States' retention of the [licensing regulations] 
might well have been consistent with ... General Principle A," inter alia, because "'the 
restoration of the financial position of Iran is a complex process' that 'compris[es] several 
successive steps"' so that '"General Principle A does not imply that all Iranian funds 
within the United States ... were to be returned to Iran immediately' after the Algiers 
Accords were concluded." Id. at 260 para. 31 (quoting Case No. A15(I:G), supra note 245, 
12 Iran-U.S. a. Trib. Rep. at 48 paras 21-22). 
255. I d. at 260 para. 32. 
256. Id. at 261-62 para. 36. 
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their overall negotiations.257 The United States, apparently 
recognizing that its chances of prevailing on the litigation claim were 
slim, did just that and settled both Case No. A15(I:C) and Case No. 
A15(IV:C)-involving letter-of-credit litigation-in February 1996 as 
part of an even larger settlement.258 
(5) Preliminary Conclusions 
Faced with great potential harm to United States account 
parties259 and a not-entirely-clear text, the Reagan Administration 
called the doubt in favor of the United States account parties. And it 
lost; that is, it was held to have breached the Algiers Declarations, 
and, as a result, it paid Iran damages. Those consequences are 
obviously undesirable, and they can be said to stem in some part from 
the Reagan Administration's long-standing predisposition to take a 
hardline against Iran. However, a closer, more textured view suggests 
that on the issue of standby letters of credit, the Reagan 
Administration had no real choice but to interpret the Declarations as 
257. !d. at 262 para. 38. 
258. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A13, A15(1 and IV:C), and 
A26(1, II, and III), Award No. 568-A13/A15(I and IV:C)/A26(l, II, and III)-Fr, 1996 WL 
1171803 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Feb. 22, 1996). As part of the settlement, the Parties disposed 
of a case pending before the International Court of Justice as well as several cases pending 
before the Tribunal, including Cases No. A15(I:C) and AIS(IV:C). See id. The parties 
named 37 letters of credit as falling within the Tribunal's Interlocutory Award, although 
they acknowledged that there could be others. See id. 
In summary, the United States agreed to pay Iran $131.8 million, $61.8 million of 
which was in settlement of the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of July 3, 1988 
pending before the International Court of Justice. The United States paid the remaining 
$70 million in settlement of (a) four cases pending before the Tribunal-(1) Case No. 
A15(1), excluding A15(I:F), except for accounts 78915710 and 01297539 formerly held at 
Philadelphia National Bank; (2) Case A15(IV:C); (3) Case A13; and (4) those parts of 
Case A26 that had been consolidated with Case A15(I) pursuant to the Tribunal's Order 
of June 2, 1993 in that case-and (b) Dollar Account No.2. Of the $70 million paid in 
settlement of Tribunal cases, $15 million was deposited into the Tribunal's Security 
Account. See 11 No. 2 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 3 (1996) (describing settlement); 
Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 278-79 (1996) (describing settlement); Conrad K. Harper, 
Friedmann Award Address, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 267-68 (1997) (describing 
negotiations leading to settlement). The United States also amended 31 C.F.R. §535.568. 
As amended, it revoked authorization for blocked accounts unless the account party could 
provide documentation that the license pertained to a standby letter of credit that fell 
within one of the categories that the Tribunal had found to be moot. 56 Fed. Reg. 6546-47 
(1991). 
259. See van der Vaart, supra note 208, at 44 (noting that when a beneficiary "exercises 
its 'unconditional' right to call for payment of the standby letter," it may cause the 
bankruptcy of the account party and solvency problems for the bank). 
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it did. Given the substantial evidence that Iran's calls were 
fraudulent, given the uncertain nature of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to 
rectify improper payments along with doubts as to how equitable and 
efficacious the Tribunal would be even when it had jurisdiction, and 
given the background of pervasive hostility amongst United States 
voters toward anything that could be deemed pro-Iranian,260 there 
was no politically viable way for the Reagan Administration to order 
the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars in standby-letter-of-
credit funds absent a clear directive in the Algiers Declarations. 
Indeed, even though neither the Declarations nor President 
Carter's Executive Orders provides any specific protection to United 
States account parties, and there is nothing in the negotiating history 
of the Declarations suggesting that such protection was contemplated, 
the political pressures which would support such protection were 
sufficiently clear at the time the Declarations were being 
implemented. Thus, in prepared testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Robert 
Carswell, who had been Deputy Treasury Secretary for the Carter 
Administration, opined-notably without referring to any provision 
of the Declarations-that "under the [Declarations] the U.S. can 
continue to prevent payments under" standby letters of credit.261 The 
Reagan Administration had issued a "clarifying announcement" on 
January 26, 1981-about three weeks before Carswell's testimony-
indicating that letter-of-credit payments (and substituted blocked 
accounts created as a result of past letter-of-credit calls) would 
260. Indeed, even some U.S. public officials had difficulty concealing their animosity 
towards Iran. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 50 (comments of 
Senator Hayakawa) (asking whether the United States had agreed to do "police work for 
this nasty nation of Iran"); Transcript of Prehearing Conference at 5, Nov. 27, 1991, 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Shams Pahlavi, Case No. WEC69489 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 
26, 1993) (Doc. 105, Ex. 10) (Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Irving Shimer stating, 
among other things, that he was "biting [his] tongue" because the things he thought about 
the Ayatollah Khomeini were "not printable") (on file with author). 
261. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 24. Carswell went on to state in 
live testimony: 
I think it is clear that before the freeze, firms that had entered into these 
irrevocable letters of credit were dangerously exposed. Indeed, a number of 
them were in court, trying to prevent the banks from paying over on the 
irrevocable letters of credit. And there were no very good defenses. They had 
lost lawsuits they brought. The banks were either paying, or preparing to pay. 
When the freeze came along we, in effect, gave them relief. And that relief is still 
in effect. The way the agreements were negotiated, the new administration is in 
a position to keep that relief indefinitely in effect. 
Id. at 56. 
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remain frozen.262 So, when testifying before a Senate committee that 
was concerned about the concessions the United States had made,263 
Carswell was no doubt reluctant to cnticize the Reagan 
Administration's proposed implementation of the Declarations on 
the ground that the Reagan Administration had wrongfully provided 
United States nationals with the much-needed protection that the 
Carter Administration had failed to secure. Interestingly, however, 
Carswell's broad, unsupported statement contrasts with the 
comments of Mark Feldman, who drafted portions of the Algiers 
Declarations as Deputy Legal Adviser for the Carter Administration 
and who coordinated the Reagan Administration's implementation of 
the Declarations for its first four months. Feldman was careful not to 
speak of what the Declarations provide with respect to letters of 
credit but only of the "position" the "United States has taken."264 
Events occurring after the Reagan Administration made its 
decision to retain the blocking regulations confirmed the need for 
those regulations.265 In November 1981, Iran instituted another wave 
of calls on standby letters of credit, this one prompted by a directive 
from Iran's Bureau for the Coordination and Implementation of the 
Algerian Declarations, which stated: 
As regards overdue guarantees [standby letters of credit], where a 
bank issuing the guarantee has not been asked to pay the sum of 
the guarantee prior to maturity, the Iranian bank should request 
the issuing bank by telex to pay the sum of the guarantee. 
Where the guarantees [standby letters of credit] issued by 
American banks have not yet matured, the Iranian bank should 
262. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 227. 
263. See, e.g., Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 3 (Senator Heinz 
asking whether "[b]y moving previously frozen and attached assets out of the country, is 
the President doing by indirection what he most certainly could not do directly, namely 
using the assets of private citizens to pay ransom to a foreign government, thereby 
depriving those citizens of their property without due process as guaranteed by the fifth 
amendment"); id. at 49-51 (Senator Heinz subjecting Carter Administration officials to 
pointed questioning about the United States' obligations to assist in Iran's litigation 
against the former Shah and his close relatives); id. at 53-54 (Senator Garn questioning 
Carter Administration officials on same); id. at 57 (Senator Heinz questioning as to 
whether Iran will renege on its obligation to replenish the Tribunal's Security Account); 
id. at 61-63 (Roberts B. Owen's responses to Senator Proxmire's questions). 
264. Feldman, supra note 183, at 82. 
265. The Iranian standby-letter-of-credit cases motivated many companies to re-
examine the terms of the performance guarantees they had given to other countries and to 
propose provisions that would prevent the beneficiaries from making the kind of unilateral 
calls that Iran had been able to make. Trooboff, supra note 49, at 148. 
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contact the relevant beneficiary and take appropriate action for the 
collection of the sum of the guarantee.266 
369 
This directive, along with other circumstances, resulted in United 
States courts as well as courts around the world enjoining payment on 
the letters of credit because of the substantial likelihood that the calls 
were fraudulent.267 Typical of the foreign cases is A/fa-Laval AB, in 
which the Tribunal de Commerce de Bruxelles found Bank Melli's 
draw on a Bank of America standby letter of credit "obviously 
abusive," "obviously in bad faith," "abusive and fraudulent," and "of 
a purely political nature ... in the context of the conflict between the 
United States and Iran."268 Further, the Tribunal, in one of its earliest 
cases involving a contract secured by a standby letter of credit, found 
Iran's call on the letter to be "improper."269 
It goes without saying, of course, that the desirability of the 
protection the United States provided its nationals-however 
obvious-is irrelevant if the treaty text prohibits such protection. 
However, an ironic feature of Case No. A15(I:C) is that the United 
States was not found to have breached any of the detailed provisions 
of the Algiers Declarations that specified the United States' 
obligations to return Iran's assets. Rather, the Tribunal held that the 
United States violated General Principle A, one of the two additions 
that Iran had insisted upon including at the eleventh hour and that 
the Carter Administration had agreed to, believing that it-the Carter 
266. 1982 Iranian Assets Lit. Rep. 4409, 4416-17; Barrett, supra note 208, at 151. 
267. See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1984) 
(holding that account party had shown that Iranian beneficiary's call had "no plausible or 
colorable basis under the contract [so that] its effort to obtain the money is fraudulent"); 
Rockwell Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, 719 F.2d 583, 589 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that account 
party will probably be able to demonstrate that the letter of credit call was fraudulent); 
Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(issuing preliminary injunction because account party showed substantial likelihood that it 
would prevail on the ground of fraud); Wyle v. Bank Melli Of Tehran, 577 F. Supp. 1148, 
1163 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (finding that facts show Iranian beneficiary's "active, intentional 
fraud"); Collins Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Trib. com. Paris ( ord. ref.), Feb. 
12, 1982, D. 1982, 507, note Vasseur; Fortres-Icas Continental Assoc./Algemene Bank 
Nederland, N.V., President of the District Court, 18 Dec. 1980, Kort Geding, 1980, No. 
1065, affd Ct. App. Amsterdam, 4th Chamber, 13 Jan. 1983 (unpublished). See also 
Barrett, supra note 208, at 156 (noting that Iranian cases resulted in a sharp shift in the 
jurisprudence concerning fraud as a basis for enjoining payment on standby letters of 
credit). 
268. Alfa-Laval AB v. Bank of America v. Bank Melli and Iranian Dairy Industries, 
Case No. 2920, Commercial Court of Brussels (Apr. 6, 1982), 1982 D.S. Jur. 504. 
269. Ultrasystems Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 84, Partial Award No. 27-
84-3,4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 100 (Dec. 19, 1983). 
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Administration-had drafted the Principles in such a way that they 
would have no substantive content independent of the Declarations' 
specific provisions. Thus, although it was the Reagan Administration 
that breached the Algiers Declarations by retaining the blocking 
regulations, it breached a provision that the Carter Administration 
believed to impose no obligations. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the consequences of the Tribunal's 
holding were relatively slight, particularly when contrasted with the 
political costs that the Reagan Administration would have incurred 
had it rescinded the protective regulations. Because the Tribunal did 
not make its decision until nine years after the Declarations were 
signed, and because it held moot all the letters of credit relating to 
claims pending before the Tribunal, claims resolved by the Tribunal, 
and claims settled by the parties,270 the Tribunal ended up issuing a 
very narrow award, one that should not have cost the United States 
too much to settle.2n 
B. Iran's Interests in Tangible Assets 
(I) Background 
In 1992, the Tribunal addressed another aspect of the Reagan 
Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations, this 
time involving Iran's tangible assets. When President Carter froze 
Iran's assets on November 14, 1979, he blocked the transfer of, among 
other things, numerous tangible properties. These properties 
included military equipment that Iran had purchased from the United 
States Government but that, for one reason or another, remained in 
the hands of the United States, as well as both military and non-
military properties that Iran had sent to American private parties for 
repairs or improvements and that were held by those parties at the 
time of the asset freeze. Paragraph 9 of the General Declaration 
addresses the United States' obligation to return Iran's tangible 
properties, and in particular, requires the United States to "arrange, 
subject to the provisions of United States law applicable prior to 
November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran of all Iranian properties 
270. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 260 para. 32. 
271. See 5 No. 20 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 3 (1990) ("Iran's victory on the letter of 
credit issue was somewhat hollow" as a result of the Tribunal's conclusion that most of the 
letter-of-credit claims were moot). 
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which are located in the United States and abroad and which are not 
within the scope of the preceding paragraphs."272 
At the same time that President Carter signed the Algiers 
Declarations, he issued several executive orders, one of which-
Executive Order 12281-implemented paragraph 9's directives. The 
Executive Order addressed "properties, not including funds and 
securities, owned by Iran," and it directed "[a]ll persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States ... to transfer such properties, as 
directed ... by the Government of Iran," subject to the caveat that 
the directive "does not relieve persons subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States from existing legal requirements other than those 
based upon the International Emergency Economic Powers Act."273 
The Executive Order also revoked all licenses for acquiring any right, 
power, or privilege in Iranian properties,274 and it nullified all rights, 
powers, and privileges relating to Iranian property which derive from 
any attachment, injunction, or like process in any litigation after 
November 14, 1979, except those of the Government of Iran.275 
Finally, and most relevant to the Reagan Administration's 
subsequent implementation of paragraph 9, section 1-102(c) of the 
Executive Order provides that "[a]ll persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States are prohibited from acquiring or 
exercising any right, power, or privilege, whether by court order or 
otherwise, with respect to the properties" described in the Executive 
Order.276 
Neither paragraph 9 nor Executive Order 12281 defines the term 
"properties," nor does either one of them make clear the role that 
"the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior to November 14, 1979" 
might play in the definition of that term, if any.277 What was clear to 
the Reagan Administration at the time that it was called upon to 
implement the Algiers Declarations, however, was that the American 
companies who were holding arguable "properties" of Iran did not 
want to return them. Specifically, companies that held Iranian 
272. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 9, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
at 6. Since the preceding paragraphs covered bank deposits and funds and securities, the 
properties which form the subject of paragraph 9 were understood to be Iran's tangible 
assets. 
273. Exec. Order No.12,281 § 1-101,46 Fed. Reg. 7923 (1981). 
274. Id. § 1-102(a). 
275. Id. § 1-102(b). 
276. Id. § 1-102(c). 
277. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 124-25 (prepared 
statement of Lee R. Marks). 
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property but that also had claims against Iran lobbied the Reagan 
Administration to be permitted to retain the property until their 
claims had been adjudicated; this way, if the companies prevailed on 
their claims, they could use the Iranian property to satisfy the claims 
by way of set-off or counterclaim.21s 
However, lawyers for these claimants recognized that however 
much their clients might desire the right to retain Iranian property 
until their claims against Iran had been resolved, it was not a right 
which the Carter Administration had provided them. In hearings 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, one laVv)'er stated 
that President Carter's executive orders required all of Iran's assets to 
be returned.279 Similarly, another lawyer criticized President Carter's 
"last minute executive orders," maintaining that, while they 
"purported to implement" the Declarations, they "did so without 
careful consideration of the immensely complex status of Iranian 
assets frozen in the United States" so that if they had been executed 
immediately, they would have severely prejudiced the interests of 
American claimants.280 He went on to praise by contrast the Reagan 
Administration for "slow[ing] the express train down" and in 
particular, for its "clarifying announcement" that signalled its initial 
plans for the return of Iran's tangible assets.281 
278. !d. at 95 (prepared statement of Brice M. Claggett, lawyer for claimants) ("The 
forthcoming Treasury regulations should make it clear that, in any situation where under 
our Jaw Iran's claim might fail because of the successful assertion of the U.S. company's 
claim in the form of a counterclaim, the U.S. company is under no obligation under the 
agreement to send any so-called 'property' to Iran until the claims on both sides have been 
resolved."); id. at 227 (prepared testimony of John F. Olson, lawyer for claimants) (stating 
that regulations must "make it crystal clear that American claimants who can assert a lien, 
counter-claim or right of set-off against Iranian property they hold, or which is held by a 
third party, have the right to have their rights determined before the property is returned 
to Iran"); id. at 124-25 (prepared statement of Lee R. Marks, lawyer for claimants). See 
also id. at 89 (prepared statement of Richard D. Harza, President of Harza Engineering 
Co.) ("Recent statements by State and Treasury Department officials also lead us to hope 
that the Executive's regulations implementing the agreements will enable companies that 
now hold Iranian property in this country, and that seek to satisfy their claims against Iran 
by set-offs or counter-claims against this property, to retain this property rather than 
transfer it at once to Iran, and to satisfy their claims against Iran out of this property."). 
279. !d. at 139 (testimony of LeeR. Marks). 
280. !d. at 227 (prepared testimony of John F. Olson, lawyer for United States 
claimants). 
281. !d. The lawyer, John F. Olson, also proved himself well-versed in the anti-Iranian 
rhetoric prevailing at that time when he stated: 
Quite apart from the language of the agreements, nothing could be more 
inappropriate, or more damaging to the image of the United States in the world, 
than the spectacle of our Government racing about the countryside vacuuming 
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The Reagan Administration ultimately promulgated regulations 
that obliged the United States claimants entirely. Although 35 C.P.R. 
§535.215 repeated almost verbatim Executive Order 12281's transfer 
directive, it made that directive applicable only to "properties" as 
defined in Section 535.333.282 Section 535.333(a) defines "properties" 
as including "all uncontested and non-contingent liabilities and 
property interests of the Government of Iran."283 Section 535.333(c) 
provides that "[l]iabilities and property interests may be considered 
contested if the holder thereof reasonably believes that a court would 
not require the holder, under applicable law to transfer the asset by 
virtue of the existence of a defense, counterclaim, set-off or similar 
reason."284 Finally, Section 535.333(b) provides that "[p]roperties are 
not Iranian properties or owned by Iran unless all necessary 
obligations, charges and fees relating to such properties are paid and 
liens against such properties (not including attachments, injunctions 
and similar orders) are discharged."285 So, the Reagan 
Administration's regulations appear to allow a holder of Iranian 
property to retain that property if the holder reasonably believed that 
Iran owed him money for storage of the property, for repair, for 
breach of an unrelated contract, for expropriation, or for any other 
reason.286 The Reagan Administration's regulations also made clear 
that the transfer of properties remained subject to any restrictions 
that might be imposed by United States export control laws, including 
the requirement that licenses be obtained for the transfer of military 
equipment.287 
I d. 
up all assets to which Iran has any claim, however tenuous, and then delivering 
those assets post haste to the same Iranian Government that has illegally 
detained our diplomatic personnel in open defiance of international law for more 
than fourteen months. 
282. 35 C.F.R. § 535.215 (1981). 
283. 35 C.F.R. § 535.333(a) (1981) (emphasis added). 
284. 35 CF.R. § 535.333(c) (1981). 
285. 35 CF.R. § 535.333(b) (1981). 
286. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A15 II:A & II:B, Award 
No. 529-A15-Ff, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112, 127-28 para. 44 (1992) [hereinafter Case 
No. A15(II:A & II:B)]; Trooboff, supra note 49, at 117. 
287. 35 CF.R. § 535.437 provides: 
Nothing in this part in any way relieves any persons subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States from securing licenses or other authorizations as required from 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce or other relevant agency prior 
to executing the transactions authorized or directed by this part. This includes 
licenses for transactions involving military equipment. 
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(2) Iran's Case Before the Tribunal 
Iran brought Cases No. A15(II:A and II:B) to the Tribunal in 
October 1982. In Case No. A15(II:B) Iran sought compensation for 
the damages that it suffered as a result of the United States' freezing 
of its assets during the period in which hostages were held.288 That 
claim found no basis in the Algiers Declarations, and the Tribunal 
appeared to have no difficulty in deciding to dismiss it.289 Iran's Case 
No. A15(II:A), however, proved more troublesome. There, Iran 
claimed that the United States had violated the Algiers Declarations 
by failing to require the transfer of "all Iranian tangible properties" as 
Iran believed paragraph 9 and General Principle A required.290 The 
United States responded by arguing that paragraph 9 did not create 
an unconditional duty to transfer all Iranian properties within its 
jurisdiction; rather, the United States maintained that the phrase 
"subject to the provisions of United States law applicable prior to 
November 14, 1979" in paragraph 9 preserved the rights of individual 
property holders under United States property laws and permitted 
the application of the United States export control laws in effect prior 
to November 14, 1979.291 
The Tribunal held that the United States violated the Algiers 
Declarations by exempting from its transfer directive Iranian 
properties held by persons who possessed liens or by persons who 
contested Iran's right to the property by virtue of a defense, 
counterclaim, or set-of£.292 As for liens, the Tribunal held that 
paragraph 9 required the United States to transfer to Iran "all Iranian 
See also Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 118 
para.14. 
Finally, in July 1982, the Reagan Administration amended its regulations to grant the 
Treasury Department the discretion to issue licenses permitting the public sale of Iranian 
tangible properties that were subject to outstanding charges, liens, or claims, but only after 
certain conditions had been met, and in particular, after the holder of the property agreed 
to indemnify the United States "for any monetary loss which may accrue to the United 
States from a decision by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal that the United States is liable to 
Iran for damages that are in any way attributable to the issuance of such license." 35 
C.F.R. § 535.540 (1982). 
288. Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 114 para. 
1. Specifically, Iran sought compensation for "excessive and unnecessary storage charges" 
and for the damage, deterioration, and the decline in value that its property suffered 
during the freeze as well as for Iran's inability to use the property. /d. at 120 para. 19. 
289. /d. at 138-39 paras. 68-70. Predictably, however, the Iranian arbitrators dissented 
to the Tribunal's dismissal. 
290. /d. at 119 para. 16. 
291. /d. at 120 para. 18. 
292. /d. at 130-32 paras. 50-54. 
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properties," including those subject to liens, no matter when those 
liens arose.293 In reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal relied 
primarily on President Carter's Executive Order 12281. The United 
States had made available to Iran the text of this and other executive 
orders during the negotiations of the Declarations,294 and the 
Tribunal found them to form part of the "practice" of the 
Declarations for purposes of their interpretation.295 The Tribunal 
read Executive Order 12281 as "clearly prohibit[ing] the exercise of 
all liens, no matter when they arose";296 in light of this Executive 
Order, the Tribunal concluded that the Reagan Administration's 
regulations had unilaterally redefined "Iranian properties" as "non-
Iranian properties. "297 
In so holding, the Tribunal rejected the United States' argument 
that the so-called U.S. law clause of paragraph 9298-the phrase 
"subject to the provisions of United States law applicable prior to 
November 14, 1979"-allowed the holders of Iranian properties to 
contest Iran's possession of the properties pursuant to United States 
lien laws.299 First, the Tribunal noted that even if the United States' 
argument were accepted in principle, its regulations were too broad in 
that they also protected holders of properties outside of the United 
States who claimed rights under "applicable law." More 
fundamentally, the Tribunal determined the United States law clause 
not to refer to "rights and privileges accorded by that law to the 
holders of Iranian properties," but to the "restrictions and 
requirements imposed by that law on the movement of those 
properties."300 In support, the Tribunal relied again, inter alia, on 
President Carter's Executive Order 12281, which the Tribunal 
interpreted as forbidding the exercise of liens or similar claims and as 
implementing the U.S. law clause by providing that "persons subject 
293. Id. at 129 para. 48. 
294. ld. at 143-44 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part, concurring in 
part). 
295. Id. at 129 para. 48. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 130 para. 50. The Tribunal also found support for its conclusion in General 
Principle B, the main purpose of which, the Tribunal held, was to remove claims against 
Iran from United States courts so that they could be brought to the Tribunal. Id. at 129 
para. 49. The Tribunal believed that the purpose of General Principle B would best be 
effected by prohibiting the exercise of liens since the only way that Iran could contest a 
lien was through litigation in United States courts. Id. 
298. ld. at 130 para. 51. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
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to United States jurisdiction are not relieved 'from existing legal 
requirements other than those based upon the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act."'301 Finally, although it did not 
decide the question, the Tribunal held that its conclusions were 
supported by the argument that the United States state laws on which 
the liens were based "violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
are unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and are 
not in conformity with general internationallaw."302 
Given its analysis with respect to liens, the Tribunal, not 
surprisingly, reached the same conclusions about properties held by 
persons who asserted a defense, counterclaim, or set off. According 
to the Tribunal, if the United States had wanted to protect such 
possessory interests it should have done so explicitly in the Algiers 
Declarations. It did not and thus could not consistently with the 
Algiers Declarations unilaterally provide such protection through its 
regulations. 303 
Finally, the Tribunal addressed the properties that were subject 
to United States export control laws. As noted above, Iran had 
purchased numerous military items from the United States and from 
private parties, and at the time President Carter froze Iran's assets, 
many of these properties remained in the United States, some in the 
possession of the United States Government, others in the possession 
of private parties. In a prior case-Case No. Bl (Claim 4)304-the 
Tribunal had considered the United States' obligation to transfer the 
military properties in its possession. The United States had refused to 
license the transfer of such items pursuant to its export laws, and 
relying on both the text and the negotiating history of the U.S. law 
clause in paragraph 9, the Tribunal held that the United States' 
refusal did not violate the Algiers Declarations because the U.S. law 
301. !d. 
302. !d. at 131 para. 52. 
303. !d. at 131 para. 54. As to 35 C.F.R. § 535.540, which permitted holders of Iranian 
properties to sell them under certain conditions and after obtaining a license from the 
Treasury Department, the Tribunal held the regulation not to be per se inconsistent with 
the Algiers Declarations. The Tribunal held that if a person who received a license to sell 
Iranian property was in possession of that property by virtue of one of the exemptions 
from the transfer obligation that the Tribunal had already held to be violative of the 
Algiers Declarations, then liability already existed, and the licensing of the sale of the 
property could not affect that liability. By contrast, if the exemption was consistent with 
the Algiers Declarations, then the Tribunal found it "difficult to see how the licensing 
would ... give rise to any United States liability." !d. at 133 para. 57-58. 
304. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. B1, Award No. 382-B1-FT, 19 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 273 (Aug. 31, 1988). 
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clause preserved the United States President's discretion to deny 
export permission provided in the security export laws that were in 
effect prior to November 14, 1979.305 The United States 
acknowledged, however, that it should compensate Iran for the 
properties it had refused to transfer, conceding that otherwise it 
would be unjustly enriched by their retention. Consequently, the 
Tribunal ordered the United States to compensate Iran, relying both 
on the United States' acceptance of its obligation to do so,306 as well 
as on the Tribunal's conclusion that paragraph 9 in conjunction with 
General Principle A, implicitly obligates the United States to do so.307 
In Case No. A15(II:A), however, the United States did not 
believe that it owed Iran compensation because the properties at 
issue in that case were held by private persons, including Iran's freight 
forwarders, which meant that Iran could at any time order the 
properties sold and receive compensation.3os Despite that obvious 
and substantial distinction, the Tribunal applied its holding from Case 
No. B1 (Claim 4) to conclude that paragraph 9, read in conjunction 
with General Principle A, impliedly obligates the United States to 
compensate Iran for losses incurred as a result of the United States' 
refusal to license exports of Iranian properties, regardless of whether 
those properties were military or non-military or whether they were 
held by the United States or by private parties.309 According to the 
Tribunal, "[t]he United States' implied obligation ... derives from the 
[General Principle A] obligation to restore Iran's financial position to 
that which existed prior to 14 November 1979."310 The Tribunal 
appeared to recognize that the United States had no obligation to 
grant the necessary export licenses prior to November 14, 1979 and 
that the risk that the United States would not grant the licenses was 
higher in 1979, particularly just before November 14, 1979, than it had 
been at the time the relevant contracts were entered into. The 
305. I d. at 287 para. 45-46. 
306. I d. at 294-95 para. 68. 
307. Id. at 294 para. 66-67. One of the American arbitrators, Judge Boltzmann, 
dissented on a number of grounds including the Tribunal's "needless stretching and 
twisting of the terms of the General Declaration in an effort to find an implied treaty 
obligation that requires the United States to do what it has always been prepared to do 
without any such compulsion." Id. at 298-99 para. 3 (Boltzmann, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
308. Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 135-36 
para. 64. 
309. Id. at 136 para. 65. 
310. Id. 
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Tribunal, nonetheless, concluded that "the reason why Iran's 
properties were not returned was due to decisions that the United 
States Government took as a result of the change in its relations with 
Iran after the Islamic Revolution and the seizure of the American 
Embassy in 1979."311 According to the Tribunal, if the United States 
thereby caused losses to Iran, the Algiers Declarations implicitly 
required the United States "to compensate Iran ... since Iran's 
financial position would otherwise not be restored fully."312 
Finally, the Tribunal concluded that the parties' pleadings were 
not sufficient for it to determine Iran's damages.313 Consequently, the 
Tribunal ruled that a hearing on damages would follow and ordered 
the parties to submit pleadings thereon.314 The parties have not yet 
completed their pleadings, so the amount of damages the United 
States must pay is as yet undetermined. 
The Tribunal's American arbitrators-Judges Holtzmann, 
Aldrich, and Allison-were unanimous in their vehement dissent 
from the Tribunal's conclusion that the Algiers Declarations 
impliedly obligate the United States to compensate Iran for property 
in the hands of private parties that the United States refuses, pursuant 
to its export control laws, to license for transfer.315 The American 
arbitrators sharply criticized the majority's "blind" application of its 
holding in Case No. B1 (Claim 4) when all of the relevant elements of 
that case were missing in Case No. A15(II:A).316 Further, with 
respect to the United States' General Principle A obligation to 
restore Iran's financial position insofar as possible to that which 
existed prior to November 14, 1979, the American Arbitrators 
pointed out that 
1) prior to 14 November 1979, the United States bore no risk of 
liability to Iran or to anyone else for refusal of export licenses for 
Iranian properties in the custody of private American companies; 
and 2) Iran or its contractors assumed all the risks involving export 
licensing decisions by the United States.317 
311. Id. at 137. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 124 para. 31, 137 para. 67. 
314. Id. at 139 para. 71. 
315. See id. at 144-49 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part). 
316. Id. at 145 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). 
317. Id. at 146 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). 
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According to the American arbitrators, the Tribunal relieved 
Iran of the risks that it had assumed, and it did so by erroneously 
assuming that Iran routinely received export licenses prior to 
November 14, 1979. The American arbitrators pointed out that 
United States export licensing policy changed drastically once the 
Islamic Revolution, with its virulent anti-American overtones, 
succeeded in February 1979. Although the United States continued 
to grant some licenses during the following months, it rejected others, 
so that Iran could not assume that all such licenses would be 
granted.JlS More importantly, the American arbitrators contended, 
no one would have expected any licenses to be granted after the 
seizure of the American Embassy on November 4, 1979; thus, by 
November 14, 1979-the date as of which General Principle A 
required the United States to restore Iran's financial position-Iran 
had "no prospect whatsoever of receiving U.S. export licenses."3l9 
The American arbitrators disagreed among themselves as to the 
Tribunal's holding that the United States breached the Algiers 
Declarations by failing to direct the transfer of property encumbered 
by liens. All three American arbitrators dissented from the 
Tribunal's statements regarding the relationship between liens and 
sovereign immunity.320 Judge Aldrich, however, concurred with the 
majority's finding of a United States breach because, in his view, 
Executive Order 12281 appeared to prohibit the exercise of liens 
against Iranian properties, so that Iran could have reasonably 
believed that they were prohibited.321 Judges Holtzmann and Allison 
disagreed that Executive Order 12281 either implicitly or explicitly 
prohibited the exercise of liens.322 They pointed out that the word 
"lien" does not appear anywhere in the Executive Order;323 further, 
"[ s ]ection 102(b) of the Order nullifies only rights deriving from 
318. Id. at 147 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at 154-58 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring 
in part). 
321. !d. at 143-44 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring 
in part). As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 234, Executive Order 12281 
prohibited all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from "exercising any 
right, power, or privilege, whether by court order or otherwise, with respect to the 
properties." 
322. Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 144 
(Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
323. ld. at 151 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). 
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attachments obtained after November 14, 1979," thus, implying that 
attachments obtained before November 14, 1979 were left 
undisturbed. 324 
(3) Preliminary Conclusions 
The lessons one might draw from Case No. A15(II:A) point in 
different directions. First, it is clear that the same concerns that 
motivated the Reagan Administration in its treatment of standby 
letters of credit were also at work in its interpretation of its obligation 
to transfer Iran's tangible properties. Again, the Reagan 
Administration was subject to substantial political pressure, this time 
from American companies who did not want to lose the only security 
they had for their claims, particularly since the Tribunal's jurisdiction 
and its substantive decisions, presuming jurisdiction existed, were 
uncertain. That pressure, in conjunction with the Reagan 
Administration's own ideological inclination to interpret the Algiers 
Declarations "in strict accordance with the[ir] terms" no doubt 
contributed to the Administration's decision to exempt from its 
transfer directive both properties subject to liens and properties held 
by persons who could maintain a defense, counterclaim, or set-off 
against Iran. 
Be that as it may, it is likewise true that, with respect to 
properties subject to liens, the Administration's interpretation was 
also well-grounded in the text of paragraph 9. Although paragraph 9 
requires the United States to transfer "all Iranian properties," that 
requirement is "subject to the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior 
to November 14, 1979," and the lien laws on which the United States 
relied were certainly United States laws applicable prior to November 
14, 1979. However, the Administration's decision also to exempt 
from the transfer directive properties held by persons who reasonably 
believed that "under applicable law" a court would not require them 
to transfer the property by virtue of "a defense, counterclaim, set-off 
324. Id. Judges Holtzmann and Allison also criticized the majority's reliance on 
General Principle B, noting that although the majority defined the purpose of General 
Principle B to be the "removal of disputes against Iran from United States courts," the 
invalidation of liens does not serve that purpose; rather it eliminates Iran's need to bring 
suits "against United States nationals in United States courts." Id. at 152 (Holtzmann & 
Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part). They further pointed out that Iran 
would have had no other forum in which "to contest the validity of liens in situations in 
which the lienholders are United States nationals" because the "Tribunal has no 
jurisdiction over the claims by Iran against United States nationals." Id. at 153 
(Holtzmann & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
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or similar reason"325 strongly suggests that the text of paragraph 9 was 
not the sole or even a primary factor guiding the Reagan 
Administration's interpretation, but rather a convenient post hoc 
defense.326 There is no credible argument that there exists any 
provision of United States law that permits a holder of another's 
property to retain the property without a lien merely if the holder 
believes that some court under some "applicable law" would not 
require the transfer. Such an exemption has no basis in the text of the 
Algiers Declarations and was designed simply to satisfy the desire of 
United States claimants to keep Iran's property until the claimants' 
claims had been resolved. Thus, it is not surprising that Judges 
Holtzmann and Allison in dissent made no attempt to justify the 
United States regulations insofar as they relate to this category of 
property. 
Of course, the clearest evidence that President Reagan's gaze 
was focused not on the terms of the Algiers Declarations but on 
providing United States claimants with rights that the Carter 
Administration had failed to secure is found in the comparison 
between President Carter's contemporaneous Executive Order 12281 
and President Reagan's subsequent regulations. It is true, as Judges 
Holtzmann and Allison pointed out, that the word "lien" does not 
appear in the Executive Order. Moreover, it must also be noted that 
after the Reagan Administration issued its "clarifying 
announcement" indicating that the United States would not require 
transfer of Iranian properties that were contested or contingent,327 
Robert Carswell, Deputy Treasury Secretary for the Carter 
Administration, presented testimony before the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which was somewhat 
ambiguous but which could be read to support the Reagan 
Administration's interpretation of paragraph 9.328 Nonetheless, by 
325. 31 C.F.R. § 535.333{c) {1981). 
326. In addition, as the Tribunal found, "there is a complete absence . . . of any 
evidence that the United States suggested during the negotiation of the Algiers 
Declarations that the U.S. law clause had any purpose other than the preservation of 
strategic export controls on military items," Case No. AlS{II:A & II:B), supra note 286, 28 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 130 para. 51, which also suggests that the clause was not 
understood by either party as justifying the actions the Reagan Administration later took. 
327. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 227 (prepared testimony of 
John F. Olson). 
328. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 25. In his testimony, Mr. 
Carswell described various categories of Iranian assets, and when he addressed the catch-
all category of"[o]ther assets in the U.S. and [a]broad," he stated: 
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providing that "[a]ll persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States are prohibited from acquiring or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege, whether by court order or otherwise, with respect to the 
properties" described in the Executive Order,329 the Executive Order 
appears, as the Tribunal held, clearly to prohibit the exercise of liens. 
The Reagan Administration, by permitting the exercise of liens, 
showed itself willing to re-write the bargain that the Carter 
Administration had agreed to on the more politically palatable terms 
that the Reagan Administration desired. Indeed, it was the 
obviousness of the "re-write" that appeared to be the primary source 
of the United States' liability; that is, in finding that the United States 
violated the Algiers Declarations by failing to transfer properties 
subject to liens, the Tribunal relied heavily on the fact that President 
Carter's Executive Order had directed the transfer of those 
properties. President Carter's Executive Order thus provided a basis 
for liability where the text of the Declarations alone might not have. 
These facts notwithstanding, some points can be made in defense 
of the Reagan Administration's interpretation of paragraph 9. First, 
there is at least an argument that the Reagan Administration might 
have encountered constitutional difficulties had it prohibited the 
exercise of state-law liens. The United States Supreme Court upheld 
the United States' nullification of attachments, but it may be 
I d. 
Some of these assets are subject to various types of liens or are contested by the 
U.S. parties holding them. Many have also been attached. Under the 
Declarations of Algiers, these assets will be returned to Iran, subject to 
settlement of contests by the holders of these properties as to Iran's rights to the 
property. 
Although Mr. Carswell's statement could be read to mean that the Algiers 
Declarations did not require the transfer of Iranian property until any contests by United 
States holders were satisfied, the phrasing is rather ambiguous. More important than any 
textual ambiguity, however, is the fact that Carswell's statement refers both to properties 
subject to lien as well as properties subject to attachment. It is highly unlikely that 
Carswell would suggest that the Algiers Declarations permit the retention of Iranian 
properties subject to attachment given that General Principle B clearly obliges the United 
States "to nullify all attachments," an obligation that even the Reagan Administration 
appeared to recognize. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.218(b) (1981); see also Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. United States, Case Nos. A15(IV) & A24, Award No. 590-A15(IV)/A24-Fr, paras. 
173-77, 1998 WL 930565 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Dec. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Case No. 
A15(IV)/A24]. Carswell's rather unclear statement, then, like his statement pertaining to 
standby letters of credit, seems to reflect a desire to de-emphasize divergences between 
the Reagan Administration's and the Carter Administration's interpretations of the 
Algiers Declarations, particularly those divergences that highlight the concessions that 
Carswell and his co-negotiators made. 
329. Exec. Order No. 12,281 § 1-102(c), 46 Fed. Reg. 7923 (Jan. 19, 1981). 
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interpreted as having done so at least partly because the attachments 
were obtained under revocable Treasury Department licenses.330 The 
liens at issue in Case No. A15(II:A), by contrast, were based on state 
laws that the United States federal government had less power to 
modify.331 Of course, even if ordering the transfer of property subject 
to liens would have run afoul of the United States Constitution, that 
would not have excused the United States from the obligation that it 
assumed under international law to transfer the property,332 but it 
would provide a somewhat more principled justification for the treaty 
violation. 
Second, the portion of Case No. A15(II:A) involving properties 
subject to export laws lends support to the fears that United States 
claimants and the Reagan Administration must have harbored about 
the Tribunal's ability to issue principled decisions. The Tribunal's 
conclusion that paragraph 9 obliged the United States to compensate 
Iran for properties held by private parties that the United States 
refused to license for export was clearly unjustifiable for the reasons 
given by the American arbitrators in dissent. The American 
arbitrators concluded that the majority seemed mesmerized by the 
words it used in Case No. B1 (Claim 4) and that its decision on this 
issue "can be explained only by . . . a misguided view of the 
equities."333 Although in 1981 the United States was probably more 
concerned that the Tribunal would never get started, or that if it did 
330. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,673-74 (1981). In Dames & Moore, the 
Court noted that 
Petitioner proceeded against the blocked assets only after the Treasury 
Department had issued revocable licenses authorizing such proceedings and 
attachments. The Treasury Regulations provided that 'unless licensed' any 
attachment is null and void, and all licenses 'may be amended, modified, or 
revoked at any time.' As such, . . . petitioner was on notice of the contingent 
nature of its interest in the frozen assets. 
ld. at 673 (citation omitted). However, the above rationale only supplemented the court's 
primary basis for upholding the nullification of attachments: The International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act authorized the President's actions. Id. at 672-73. 
331. The holders of Iranian properties relied, inter alia, on TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. Art. 
5503 (West 1989) and CAL. CIV. CODE § 3051 (West 1993). Statement of Defense of the 
United States, Doc. 25, at 22-23, Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. 
A15(II-A and II-B), 1992 WL 928957 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. May 6, 1992) (on file with 
author). 
332. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331,339. 
333. 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 147 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part). 
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commence, Iran would soon cease participating,334 the United States 
must also have feared that the Tribunal would interpret the Algiers 
Declarations less by reference to their specific terms than to 
amorphous equitable and political considerations. The portion of 
Case No. A15(II:A) relating to properties subject to export controls 
proves that such fears were not baseless. 
C. Litigation Against Iran in United States Courts 
(1) Background 
By the time the Algiers Declarations were signed, United States 
nationals had filed approximately 400 lawsuits against Iran in United 
States courts,335 and had attached some billions of dollars in Iranian 
assets.336 As discussed above, Iran had made the cancellation of these 
suits one of its four conditions for releasing the hostages. The United 
States made clear during the negotiations, however, that claims could 
be removed from United States courts only if Iran and the United 
States agreed to an alternative claims settlement procedure.337 As a 
result, the countries agreed in the Claims Settlement Declaration to 
promote the settlement of a specified group of claims, and if such 
claims were not settled, to submit them to binding third-party 
arbitration in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.338 The Claims 
Settlement Declaration went on to provide that "[c]laims referred to 
the ... Tribunal shall, as of the date of filing such claims with the 
334. Mark B. Feldman, Book Review, 26 GEO. WASH. J. [NT'L L. & ECON. 451, 454 
(1992) (reviewing JOHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS 
INVOLVING GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL (1991)). 
335. Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel Relating to 
the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 71, 92 (1984); Statement of 
Interest of the United States, reprinted in Symposium, Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J . 
INT'L L. A109, Alll n.3 (1981); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND 
URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE 
HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 57 (Comm. Print 1981). 
336. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 88 (prepared testimony of 
Richard D. Harza); see also Iranian Asset Controls: Hearing Before the House SubComms. 
on Europe and the Middle East and on International Economic Policy and Trade, 96th 
Cong. 23 (1980) (reporting that by May 30, 1980 attachments totalled approximately $2.6 
billion). 
337. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 24. 
338. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. I, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. at 9. 
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Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court."339 
As also noted above, in the very last stages of the negotiations, 
Iran had insisted upon including certain General Principles, one of 
which addressed the termination of claims against Iran in United 
States courts. In response to Iran's demand, the United States 
negotiators, inter alia, drafted General Principle B, which states: 
It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and 
pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 
to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party 
and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement 
and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration. 
Through the procedures provided in the Declaration relating to the 
Claims Settlement Agreement, the United States agrees to 
terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving 
claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its 
state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained 
therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and 
to bring about the termination of such claims through binding 
arbitration. 34° 
Immediately upon signing the Algiers Declarations, the Carter 
Administration issued executive orders that implemented various of 
the Declarations' provisions, and several of those executive orders 
contained provisions nullifying the attachments that United States 
litigants had obtained from United States courts;341 however, the 
Carter Administration issued no executive order pertaining to the 
general termination of litigation against Iran in United States courts. 
This omission may seem surprising because Paragraph 11 of the 
General Declaration obligated the United States to "bar and 
preclude" any United States national from prosecuting any claim 
against Iran relating to Iran's hostage-taking or to the hostages' 
subsequent detention,342 and the Carter Administration did issue an 
339. I d. at art VII, para. 2, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 11. 
340. General Declaration, supra note 17, at General Principle B, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3. 
341. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,277 § 1-102(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 7915 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec. 
Order No. 12,279 § 1-102(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,280 
§ 1-102(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 7921 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,281 § 1-102(a), 46 Fed. 
Reg. 7923 (Jan. 19, 1981). 
342. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 11, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. at6-7. 
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executive order implementing that provision.343 Whatever its reasons, 
the Carter Administration provided the Reagan Administration no 
guidance in its implementation of General Principle B, but, as a 
consequence, also imposed on it no potential constraints. 
Implementation of General Principle B proved not to be a simple 
matter and, in particular, was complicated by the fact that Iran and 
the United States did not agree to submit all the claims that United 
States nationals could bring against Iran to the Tribunal. The 
excluded claims relating to the hostage-taking, referred to above, 
posed no problem because the United States had agreed to extinguish 
those claims entirely. By contrast, other categories of claims were not 
explicitly required to be extinguished but at the same time did not fall 
within the jurisdiction that the countries had bestowed on the 
Tribunal. For instance, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over 
claims arising out of tort;344 likewise, it has no jurisdiction over 
"claims arising under a binding contract between the parties 
specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the 
sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts .... "345 
Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations believed that 
General Principle B did not require the United States to terminate 
these and other categories of claims that fell outside the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction. Rather, they believed that General Principle B required 
the United States to terminate only those claims that the two 
countries had agreed to submit to the Tribunal-claims that the 
343. Exec. Order No. 12,283,46 Fed. Reg. 7927 (Jan. 19, 1981). 
344. International Sys. and Controls Corp. v. Indus. Dev. and Renovation Org. of Iran, 
Case No. 439, Award No. 256-439-2, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 239,262-263 paras. 94-95 
(Sept. 26, 1986) (dismissing claim of intentional tort for lack of jurisdiction); see also 
Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 29 (prepared testimony of Robert 
Carswell) ("The claims settlement agreement does not provide a mechanism for 
individuals to be compensated for tort claims."); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra 
note 19, at 58 (testimony of Warren Christopher) (advising that "[t]here may be some tort 
claims that are not covered" by the Algiers Declarations); id. at 187 (testimony of Larry 
Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Reagan Administration) (same). Rather, the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction, inter alia, over claims of United States nationals against Iran 
which are "outstanding on the date of [the Algiers Declarations), whether or not filed with 
any court, and arise out of debts, contracts (including transactions which are the subject of 
letters of credit or bank guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property 
rights .... " Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, para. 1, reprinted in 1 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9. 
345. Cla!ms Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9. 
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Tribunal could arbitrate on the merits.346 The difficulty, however, was 
that it was not clear at the outset which claims the Tribunal would 
eventually determine to fall within its jurisdiction and which it would 
deem outside thereof, so the United States had no way of knowing 
which claims to terminate and which to allow to proceed. 
It was not long before the United States claimants brought this 
and other problems to the Reagan Administration's attention347 and 
asked the Administration not to nullify attachments or terminate 
litigation if there existed a possibility that the underlying claims were 
not cognizable by the Tribuna1.348 Indeed, some claimants requested 
that the United States take no action with respect to any claim unless 
and until Iran stipulated that that particular claim fell within the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction.349 The Reagan Administration tried to "flush 
Iran out" by asking it to identify those claims which it considered to 
346. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 63 (prepared testimony of 
Roberts Owen) ("If a particular claim asserted by a U.S. national does not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the claimant should be entitled (if he is otherwise entitled) to 
proceed in the U.S. courts, and I believe that the new Administration's regulations reflect 
that principle."). 
347. Indeed, United States claimants somewhat pointedly asked the Reagan 
Administration not to "take further prejudicial action [regarding their litigation] in the 
guise of implementing" the Algiers Declarations. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 228 (prepared testimony of John F. Olson, attorney for United States 
claimants). " 
348. !d. at 120 (testimony of Lee R. Marks, attorney for United States claimants) 
(recommending that "[c]laimants who are or may be excluded from the tribunal should be 
entitled to continue their litigation in U.S. courts and to maintain their existing 
attachments"); see also id. at 123 (prepared statement of LeeR. Marks) (emphasizing that 
it is not enough to allow litigation to proceed; attachments must also be preserved); id. at 
88 (prepared testimony of Richard D. Harza, President of Harza Engineering Co.) 
(expressing hope that claims that the Tribunal finds to be outside its jurisdiction can 
proceed in United States courts); Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 91" 
(prepared statement of Arthur Albertson, vice president of CBI Industries) ("As a first 
step, the Administration should be urged to avoid taking any affirmative steps designed to 
nullify or terminate pending lawsuits in the United States courts. Otherwise claimants 
who find they have been excluded from the Iran-United States Oaims Tribunal may be 
barred everywhere."). 
349. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 228-29 (testimony of John 
F. Olson, attorney for United States claimants); id. at 124 (prepared statement of Lee R. 
Marks, attorney for United States claimants) ("In those cases ... in which a U.S. claimant 
is not sure that a claim is cognizable by the Tribunal and prefers to be in court, the United 
States Government should do nothing unless and until Iran comes into court and agrees 
that the claim is cognizable by the Tribunal."). 
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fall within one of the Tribunal's jurisdictional exclusions,350 but that 
endeavor met with only limited success.351 
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12294 on February 24, 
1981 to implement General Principle B, and in doing so, appeared to 
steer something of a middle course between the requests of the 
United States claimants and the text of the Algiers Declarations. 
Although General Principle B speaks of the United States' obligation 
to "terminate" claims, Executive Order 12294 instead "suspended" 
them while they were pending before the Tribunal.352 That 
suspension ceased "upon a determination by the Tribunal that it [did] 
not have jurisdiction" over the claim in question.353 In this way, the 
Reagan Administration, consistent with its interpretation of General 
350. See id. at 187 (testimony of Larry Simms, the Reagan Administration's Acting 
Attorney General). 
351. Larry Simms, the Reagan Administration's Acting Attorney General stated that 
Iran's attorneys "seem to be disposed also to take a narrow view of the construction of 
[the jurisdictional exclusion] clauses for the purpose of insuring that as little litigation in 
the U.S. courts as possible take[s] place," but he acknowledged that the Reagan 
Administration was not sure of the extent to which Iran's attorneys represent Iran's views. 
Id. See also Feldman, supra note 183, at 81 ("The [Reagan] administration had hoped that 
Iran would help resolve the issues by taking a position in the U.S.Iitigation as to whether a 
particular claim was excluded from the Tribunal. Iran has refused to do this."). 
Whatever Iran's views were at the outset, by the time the United States nullified 
the attachments and returned the remainder of Iran's assets, Iran had no further interest 
in having claims against it brought before the Tribunal; consequently, it argued 
vehemently for a broad construction of any and all of the Tribunal's jurisdictional 
exclusions. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO, Case ~o. 51, Award No. ITL-2-51-
FT, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 242 (Nov. 5, 1982) (addressing the forum-selection clause 
exclusion); Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A18, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 251, 265 (Apr. 6, 1984) (arguing that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over dual 
Iranian-United States nationals). 
352. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 1, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (Feb. 24, 1981). The relevant 
portion of the section reads in full: 
All claims which may be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
under the terms of Article II of the Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of 
Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and all claims for equitable or other judicial relief 
in connection with such claims, are hereby suspended, except as they may be 
presented to the Tribunal. During the period of this suspension, all such claims 
shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United 
States, including the courts of any state or any locality thereof, the District of 
Columbia and Puerto Rico, or in any action commenced in any such court after 
the effective date of this Order. 
!d. See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(a) (1981) (implementing this portion of the executive 
order). 
353. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111; see also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(e) 
(implementing this portion of the Executive Order). 
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Principle B, preserved for future United States litigation the claims 
that the Tribunal would later hold to fall outside of its jurisdiction. 
However, the Reagan Administration did not similarly protect the 
corresponding attachments, as some claimants had requested. As 
noted above, President Carter's executive orders had nullified those 
attachments, and on February 24, 1981, President Reagan ratified and 
implemented Carter's executive orders.354 
Next, in order to protect claimants who had not yet filed in 
United States courts from being precluded from subsequently filing 
by United States statutes of limitation, Executive Order 12294 
authorized the filing of lawsuits in United States courts for the 
purpose of tolling the relevant statutes of limitations_3ss These suits 
were then immediately suspended.356 In this way, claimants who had 
not yet filed suits in United States courts could preserve their ability 
to litigate their claims there if the Tribunal later dismissed those 
claims for lack of jurisdiction. 
The Reagan Administration's interpretation of General Principle 
B, as applying only to claims falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, 
has a strong basis in the text of General Principle B, which requires 
the United States to terminate all legal proceedings against Iran in 
United States courts, but "[t]hrough the procedures_ provided" in the 
Claims Settlement Declaration;357 that is, arguably, through 
arbitration in the Tribunal. Consequently, the provisions of 
Executive Order 12294, which suspended rather than terminated 
litigation and which permitted tolling suits, while not expressly 
354. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 8, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111; see also Message to Congress, Feb. 
24, 1981, reprinted in LoWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLmCAL ENDS, supra note 
31, at DS-874. 
355. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 1, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. The relevant portion reads: 
"Nothing in this action precludes the commencement of an action after the effective date 
of this Order for the purpose of tolling the period of limitations for commencement of 
such action." Id. See also 31 C.P.R. § 535.222(c) (implementing this portion of the 
Executive Order); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 228 (prepared 
testimony of John F. Olson) ("It will undoubtedly be a period of years before these 
[jurisdictional] questions can be decided as to individual cases. Yet statutes of limitations 
may be running against claimants who are not permitted access to United States courts but 
may also be rejected from the reach of the tribunal."). 
356. See Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 127; Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (pursuant to Executive Order 
12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111, after claimant filed the tolling suit, "the District Court took no 
action" while the plaintiffs "presented their claims against Iran to the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal"). 
357. General Declaration, supra note 17, at General Principle B, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3. 
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authorized by General Principle B, nonetheless seemed a reasonable 
method of implementing that Principle while at the same time 
preserving those claims that would later be held to fall outside the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction. Executive Order 12294 went further, 
however, and authorized two additional classes of litigation: litigation 
involving counterclaims3ss and litigation involving standby letters of 
credit.359 These authorizations, by contrast, had little or no basis in 
the Algiers Declarations. 
(2) Iran's Cases Before the Tribunal 
Iran did not concern itself merely with these matters but claimed 
to be dissatisfied with virtually every aspect of the United States' 
interpretation of General Principle B, both those featured in 
President Carter's contemporaneous executive orders as well as those 
featured in President Reagan's subsequent Executive Order 12294. 
Consequently, Iran brought Case No. A15(IV) to the Tribunal, 
charging the United States with a multitude of Algiers Declarations' 
violations. Some years later, Iran also brought to the Tribunal Case 
No. A24, which addressed the United States' treatment of a particular 
claim that had been brought to the Tribunal, subsequently dismissed 
by the Tribunal, and finally amended and brought to a United States 
court. The Tribunal consolidated Case No. A24 with Case No. 
A15(IV)36o and then bifurcated the consolidated cases into two 
phases, the first addressing United States' liability, and the second 
addressing any damages that might follow from the Tribunal's 
holdings in the first phase.361 
Iran argued that General Principle B required the United States 
to terminate all claims against Iran regardless of whether or not they 
fell within the Tribunal's jurisdiction; consequently, Iran claimed, 
358. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 6, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. It reads: 
Nothing in this Order shall prohibit the assertion of a counterclaim or set-off by a 
United States national in any judicial proceeding pending or hereafter 
commenced by the Government of Iran, any political subdivision of Iran, or any 
agency, instrumentality, or entity controlled by the Government of Iran or any 
political subdivision thereof. 
!d. See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(b) (implementing this portion of the Executive Order). 
359. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. It reads: "Nothing in this Order 
shall apply to any claim concerning the validity or payment of a standby letter of credit, 
performance or payment bond or other similar instrument." !d. See also 31 C.F.R. § 
535.222(g) (implementing this portion of the Executive Order). 
360. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 5. 
361. !d. para. 6. 
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among other things, that the United States had violated General 
Principle B by allowing litigation involving claims that the Tribunal 
had determined to fall outside of its jurisdiction to resume in United 
States courts.362 The Tribunal rejected this claim. It held that 
General Principle B expressly ties the United States' obligation to 
terminate litigation to "the procedures provided" in the Claims 
Settlement Declaration,363 in particular to the "arbitration mechanism 
before the Tribunal."364 Thus, the Tribunal concluded that any claims 
which "cannot be resolved on the merits by the Tribunal are not 
within the scope of the [United States] termination obligation. "365 
The Tribunal likewise rejected several of Iran's other claims. For 
instance, Iran argued that the United States violated General 
Principle B by allowing United States nationals to bring suits against 
Iran in foreign courts.J66 The Tribunal disagreed, holding that the 
plain language of General Principle B confines the United States' 
termination obligation to litigation pending in United States courts.367 
Iran also claimed a General Principle B violation in the United 
States' failure to nullify the attachments that had been obtained 
before President Carter froze Iran's assets on November 14, 1979.368 
The Tribunal held that the language in General Principle B that 
requires the United States to "nullify all attachments" obtained in 
legal proceedings involving claims of United States nationals against 
Iran in United States courts "must be interpreted in light of General 
Principle A," which obligates the United States to "restore the 
financial position of Iran, insofar as possible, to that which existed 
prior to November 14, 1979."369 The Tribunal reasoned that if Iranian 
362 Id. para. 32 (Oaim A). Iran also claimed more specifically that the United States 
violated General Principle B by allowing claims to proceed in United States courts that the 
Tribunal had determined fell outside its jurisdiction by reason of the forum-selection 
exclusion of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Id. para. 33 
(Claim B). 
363. Id. para. 79. 
364. Id. para. 81. 
365. Id.; see also id. paras. 119-125 (rejecting Iran's claim that the United States violated 
General Principle B by allowing claims to proceed in United States courts that the 
Tribunal had determined fell outside its jurisdiction by reason of the forum-selection 
exclusion of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration). 
366. Id. para. 35 (Oaim E). 
367. Id. paras. 142-43; see also id. para. 141 (dismissing Iran's claim based on espousal 
of claims); id. para. 144 (dismissing Iran's claim based on Article VII, para. 2, of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration). 
368. Id. para. 36 (OaimF}. 
369. Id. paras.158-161 (emphasis added). 
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assets were restrained by attachments on November 14, 1979, then 
those attachments were a component of Iran's financial position at 
that date, and to lift those attachments would improve Iran's financial 
position, rather than merely restore it. Thus, the Tribunal concluded 
that General Principle B required "the United States to nullify only 
attachments of Iranian property that were obtained by United States 
nationals in United States courts on or after 14 November 1979."370 
Finally, the Tribunal rejected Iran's claim that the United States 
violated General Principle B by failing to take a sufficiently active 
role in nullifying attachments obtained after November 14, 1979, 
holding that "[n]othing in the evidence suggests that the United 
States stopped short of doing everything that it could pursuant to the 
procedures of its legal system to have all post-[November 14, 1979] 
attachments lifted."371 
By contrast, the United States did not fare so well with respect to 
other aspects of the Reagan Administration's implementation of 
General Principle B, which will be discussed in the following sections. 
(a) Suspension vs. Termination 
Pointing to General Principle B's reference to the "termination" 
of litigation, Iran argued that the United States violated that Principle 
by suspending litigation in United States courts pending a decision by 
the Tribunal, rather than immediately terminating it. The Tribunal 
acknowledged that there existed a "conceptual difference" between 
the terms "suspension" and "termination," noting that '"termination' 
implies that the activity being terminated is brought to an end 
[whereas] '[s]uspension,' on the other hand implies a temporary 
cessation of activity."372 Nonetheless, the Tribunal took a pragmatic 
view, concluding that suspension satisfied the Algiers Declarations if, 
in effect, it resulted in a termination of litigation.373 The Tribunal was 
concerned in this initial phase of the proceedings only with questions 
of liability, but its holding as to suspension in fact tied the finding of 
United States' liability to a determination of damages that would not 
be made until the following phase. The Tribunal held that the United 
States violated General Principle B if 
370. !d. para. 161. 
371. !d. para. 175 (rejecting Iran's Claim G). 
372. !d. para. 94 (emphasis omitted). 
373. !d. para. 99. 
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Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its 
interests to make appearances or file documents in United States 
courts subsequent to 19 July 1981 in any litigation in respect of 
claims [within the Tribunal's jurisdiction] or in respect of claims 
filed with the Tribunal until such time as those claims are dismissed 
by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction .... 374 
393 
In setting forth this standard, the Tribunal showed itself disinclined to 
find formalistic violations of the Algiers Declarations; whatever 
words the United States may have used to fulfill its obligation, the 
Tribunal found it to violate the Algiers Declarations only if its 
implementation imposed actual damages on Iran. 
Unfortunately for the United States, however, the Tribunal 
seemed to abandon this pragmatic approach when it was called upon 
to apply the standard that it had just articulated in the consolidated 
Case No. A24. That case involved several affiliated American 
corporations that had filed suit with the Tribunal, claiming that Iran 
had expropriated their interests in an Iranian dairy.375 The Tribunal 
has jurisdiction only over claims that were outstanding on January 19, 
1981, the date of the Algiers Declarations,376 so when the American 
corporations-collectively known as Foremost-brought their suit to 
the Tribunal, they claimed that Iran's expropriation of their interests 
had culminated prior to January 19, 1981.377 A few months after filing 
suit with the Tribunal, Foremost "filed a complaint against Iran in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for the 
purpose of tolling the relevant statute of limitation."378 That 
complaint, while otherwise identical to the Statement of Claim that 
Foremost had filed in the Tribunal, did not specify an expropriation 
date.379 
In Apri11986, the Tribunal issued its Award in Foremost-Tehran 
and Islamic Republic of Iran,380 dismissing Foremost's expropriation 
claim on the ground that Iran's interference with Foremost's rights in 
374. Id. para. 101. The Tribunal also invited Iran to produce "evidence of the losses it 
suffered as a result of the monitoring of the suspended claims" and invited both parties to 
address whether Iran should be compensated for such losses. Id. para. 102. 
375. Id. para. 39. 
376. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, para.1, reprinted in 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9. 
377. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para.199. 
378. Id. para. 41. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 82-
0220-TAF (D. D.C. 1981). 
379. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para.199. 
380. Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos. 37 & 231, Award No. 
220-37/231-1, 10 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 228 (Apr.ll, 1986). 
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the dairy "did not, by 19 January 1981,... amount to an 
expropriation."381 The case that had been filed in the United States 
District Court had been dormant on that court's docket since it was 
filed, and it remained that way until two years after the Tribunal 
issued its Award. Then, on April 1, 1988, Foremost revived the 
District Court suit by filing a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
In that motion and in a subsequent motion for leave to amend its 
1982 complaint, Foremost made clear that it accepted the Tribunal's 
determination that no expropriation occurred by January 19, 1981 but 
asked the District Court to determine whether a post-January 19, 
1981 expropriation had taken place.382 On June 23, 1997, the District 
Court issued a decision holding that Iran's interference with 
Foremost's rights "had ripened into an expropriation by April 
1982."383 
In Case No. A24, Iran alleged that the claim pursued by 
Foremost before the District Court was the same claim that the 
Tribunal had decided in 1986. Thus, Iran argued that by allowing the 
Foremost lawsuit to proceed in the District Court, the United States 
"breached its obligation ... to prohibit all further litigation of claims 
resolved by the Tribunal. "384 
Over the forceful dissent of the American arbitrators, the 
Tribunal agreed with Iran that the two claims were identical at the 
time they were filed,385 but it went on to conclude that the claim that 
Foremost pursued in the District Court after April1, 1988-that of a 
post-January 19, 1981 expropriation-[was] materially different from 
that considered by the Tribunal .... "386 The United States thus 
381. !d. at 250. 
382. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, paras. 43-44. 
383. !d. para. 45. 
384. !d. para. 189. 
385. !d. para. 198. According to the American arbitrators: 
The Tribunal's initial conclusion-that Foremost's Statement of Claim and its 
District Court complaint were identical-is patently wrong.... [T]he fact that 
the Statement of Claim alleged an expropriation which culminated by 19 January 
1981 while the complaint contained no such date restriction is a real and 
important textual difference which reflects the real and decisive difference 
between the two claims. 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A15(IV) and A24, Award No. 590-
A15(IV)/A24-FT, at 9, 1998 WL 930569 (Iran-U.S. CL Trib. Dec. 28, 1998) (Separate 
Opinion of George H. Aldrich, Richard C. Allison, and Charles T. Duncan, Concurring in 
Part and Dissenting in Part) [hereinafter American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case 
No. A15(IV)/A24]. 
386. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 209. 
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incurred no liability for the litigation that proceeded in District Court 
after April 1, 1988. But the Tribunal still had to address the nearly 
two-year period between the Tribunal's dismissal of Foremost's 
expropriation claim on Aprilll, 1986 and Foremost's revival of the 
"materially different" claim in United States District Court on April 
1, 1988. Had the Tribunal applied the standards it set forth in Claim 
A of Case No. A15(IV), it would have held that the United States 
violated the Algiers Declarations by failing to remove Foremost's 
case from the District Court's docket only if that failure reasonably 
compelled Iran "in the prudent defense of its interests to make 
appearances or file documents" in the case.387 Instead, the Tribunal 
ignored the standards it had previously set forth and simply held the 
United States to have violated the Algiers Declarations by leaving the 
case on the United States court's docket.388 The Tribunal did, 
however, remain consistent with its holding in Claim A in its 
determination that Iran is entitled to damages only to the extent it 
"was . . . compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make 
appearances or file documents with respect to" the lawsuit during the 
two-year period in which it inappropriately remained on the United 
States court's docket.389 
(b) Statute of Limitations Tolling Suits 
The formalistic bent that the Tribunal exhibited in Case No. A24 
extended to its decision, in Claim D of Case No. A15(IV), regarding 
the Reagan Administration's authorization of tolling suits. As noted 
above, the Algiers Declarations require United States nationals to 
bring their claims to the Tribunal; however, it was not always clear in 
advance whether the Tribunal would have jurisdiction over a 
particular claim. The Reagan Administration believed, and the 
Tribunal later confirmed, that the Algiers Declarations permit a 
387. ItL para. 101. 
388. /d. para. 203. The American arbitrators stated in dissent: 
The Tribunal states in Claim A that the United States can be considered to have 
breached General Principle B only if Iran was reasonably compelled in the 
prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or file documents in the 
cases [described above]. Thus, a dead case which remains in name only on the 
docket of a United States court after the Tribunal has issued an award on the 
merits of the case is not a violation of General Principle B. Only if Iran was 
required to file documents or make appearances in such a case would the United 
States violate General Principle B. 
American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 385, at 11. 
389. Case No. A15(IV)f A24, supra note 328, para. 205. 
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United States claimant to return to United States courts if the 
Tribunal declined jurisdiction over his claim, but by that time, the 
applicable United States statute of limitations might bar the suit. So, 
by allowing litigants to file tolling suits, the United States allowed 
them to preserve their claims pending the Tribunal's jurisdictional 
decision.390 
Although the Tribunal acknowledged that General Principle B 
does not forbid the United States from preserving claims that the 
Tribunal would ultimately find to be outside of its jurisdiction, the 
Tribunal held that the particular means the United States chose-
authorizing tolling suits-does violate the Algiers Declarations.391 
According to the Tribunal, the authorization of tolling suits conflicts 
both with General Principle B's first sentence, which states that it is 
the purpose of both parties to "terminate all litigation as between the 
government of each party and the nationals of the other" and with its 
second sentence, which obliges the United States "'to prohibit all 
further litigation' based on claims by United States nationals against 
Iran."392 
This holding is extremely formalistic: a tolling suit that is 
immediately suspended can be "litigation" only in the most formal 
sense of the term. Further, the holding, like the Tribunal's holding in 
Case No. A24, is unnecessary and in tension with the pragmatic 
standards the Tribunal set forth in Claim A, as the American 
arbitrators pointed out in dissent.393 In Claim D, the Tribunal 
concluded that Iran was entitled to damages only to the extent that it 
suffered losses as a result of making appearances or filing documents 
in United States courts with respect to tolling suits filed after the 
signing of the Algiers Declarations.394 This is precisely the same 
conclusion that the Tribunal reached in Claim A with respect to 
390. /d. para. 127. See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 228-29 
(prepared testimony of John F. Olson, lawyer for United States claimants) (noting that 
because some time will pass before the Tribunal can determine whether it has jurisdiction 
over a particular case, "new actions should be permitted to be filed, to prevent the running 
of statutes of limitations"). 
391. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 131. 
392. /d. 
393. American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 385, 
at4. 
394. See Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 133. The Tribunal also invited 
Iran to produce evidence "of the losses it suffered as a result of monitoring the tolling 
suits" and invited both parties to address whether Iran should be compensated for those 
losses. /d. 
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damages for suspended claims filed before the Algiers Declarations. 
Thus, the Tribunal's finding of a United States' treaty violation had 
virtually no practical effect: whether a suit had been filed in a United 
States court before the Algiers Declarations or only after by means of 
a tolling suit, the United States was, in either event, liable for 
damages only to the extent Iran was compelled to file documents or 
make appearances in the case.395 
(c) Litigation Involving Counterclaims 
General Principle B states that the United States must terminate 
"all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of 
United States persons and institutions against Iran" and that the 
United States must "prohibit all further litigation based on such 
claims." President Reagan apparently interpreted the word "claim," 
as used in General Principle B, not to include counterclaims, for his 
Executive Order 12294 specifically authorizes United States nationals 
to bring counterclaims in suits that Iran brought to United States 
courts.396 
There is little obvious evidence that the United States claimants 
lobbied the Reagan Administration for the right to bring 
counter~laims, but it is nonetheless easy to understand why they 
would want such a right: Many United States nationals who had 
claims against Iran would, for one reason or another, choose not to 
bring those claims to the Tribunal. Some claimants' litigation costs 
would exceed the value of their claims, while other claimants would 
be disinclined to travel to The Hague to arbitrate a claim before an 
untested arbitral body. But the claimants who were least likely to 
bring their claims to the Tribunal were those who knew that if they 
did, they would be subject to meritorious Iranian counterclaims-
claims that the Tribunal could not otherwise hear because it does not 
have jurisdiction over the claims of Iran or the United States against 
395. See American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 
385. The scope of United States' liability is not precisely identical for the two sets of 
claims because the Tribunal interpreted the Algiers Declarations as providing a six-month 
grace period for the United States to carry out its obligation to terminate claims filed 
before the signing of the Algiers Declarations, but it held the United States liable for 
losses that Iran incurred immediately after the signing of the Algiers Declarations for suits 
filed after that date. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, paras.llO, 133. 
396. Exec. Order No; 12,294 § 6, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111; see also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(b) 
(implementing this portion of the Executive Order). 
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nationals of the other government.397 Whatever their reasons for not 
bringing their claims before the Tribunal in the first instance, if these 
litigants were to be sued by Iran in United States courts, perhaps 
years after the deadline for filing in the Tribunal had passed, they 
would want the opportunity to assert their original claim as a 
counterclaim against Iran. So, the Reagan Administration provided 
them that opportunity.398 
Unfortunately, however desirable the counterclaims exception 
might have appeared from the United States' point of view,399 there is 
nothing in the Algiers Declarations suggesting that litigation 
involving counterclaims against Iran may be treated differently from 
all the other litigation against Iran that the United States was 
obligated to terminate. Indeed, the Tribunal held that General 
Principle B and Articles I and II of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration make clear 
that claims that would have been within the Tribunal's jurisdiction 
and were not settled by negotiation were to be presented to the 
Tribunal, and that if a claimant chose not to present such a claim to 
the Tribunal, he was not to be permitted thereafter to raise it in 
United States courts.400 
Consequently, the Tribunal unanimously found the United States to 
have violated the Algiers Declarations by authorizing counterclaims 
in United States courts.401 
397. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Decision No. DEC-1-A2-FT, 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 101 (Jan. 13, 1982). However, the Tribunal does have jurisdiction over 
"any counterclaim which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that 
constitutes the subject matter of th[e] national's claim .... " Claims Settlement 
Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9. 
398. In Case No. A15(IV)/A24, the United States argued in defense that 
the Algiers Declarations relieve Iran of the obligation to defend itself against 
involuntary litigation in United States courts which falls within the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction; nothing in the Declarations, however, requires the United States to 
grant Iran a favored position by precluding the assertion of counterclaims in 
litigation that Iran itself voluntarily chose to commence in United States courts. 
Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para.113. 
399. And, it certainly appeared acceptable to at least one United States federal court. 
In Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing, 771 F.2d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit 
held that Section 6 of Executive Order 12,294 permitting counterclaims did not violate the 
Algiers Declarations. 
400. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 114. 
401. See id. 
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(d) Litigation Involving Standby Letters of Credit 
Quite likely, the Tribunal also would have held the United States 
to have violated the Algiers Declarations by its authorizing continued 
litigation in United States courts for claims involving standby letters 
of creditwz had the United States and Iran not settled that claim 
before the Tribunal could render a decision.403 Again, the Reagan 
Administration had perfectly good reasons for excepting those claims 
from suspension. Although a large number of standby letters of 
credit had been called in March 1980, a substantial number remained 
uncalled at the time the Algiers Declarations were concluded.404 The 
United States believed that the earlier calls had been made in bad 
faith,40s and it no doubt expected Iran to make subsequent bad faith 
calls on the outstanding letters of credit. So, in addition to retaining 
the regulations prohibiting United States banks from honoring called 
letters of credit if the United States account parties set up substituted 
blocked accounts on their own books-the provisions the Tribunal 
found to violate General Principle A in Case No. A15(I:C)-the 
Reagan Administration also allowed United States account parties to 
continue to file new lawsuits in United States courts to enjoin United 
States banks from honoring Iranian calls.406 
402. Section 5 of Executive Order 12,294, authorizing the continued litigation, was 
implemented by 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(g). Further, at the outset of its implementation, the 
Reagan Administration amended 31 C.F.R. § 535.504, which, during the hostage crisis, had 
barred the entry of any final judgment in relation to blocked Iranian assets to permit final 
judgments in standby-letter-of-credit proceedings authorized by § 535.222. More than a 
year later, on July 2, 1982, the Treasury Department again amended§ 535.504(3}(i), see 47 
Fed. Reg. 29,529 {July 7, 1982), presumably in order to appease Iran, to prohibit "[a]ny 
final judicial judgment or order {A) permanently enjoining, (B) terminating or nullifying, 
or (C) otherwise permanently disposing of any interest of Iran in any standby letter of 
credit, performance bond or similar obligation." 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(b)(3)(i) (1982). See 
also Itek Corp. v. First Nat'! Bank of Boston, 704 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1983). And the 
Treasury Department again amended§ 535.504 on December 7, 1982 to include within the 
prohibition on final judgments cases in which judgment in a lower court was entered 
before the July 2, 1982 amendment but which were still pending on appeal. 31 C.F.R. § 
535.504(b)(3)(i) (1982). 
403. See supra text accompanying notes 243-258. 
404. See Statement of Defense of the United States, Doc. 65, June 1, 1983, at 13-14, 
Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, (on file with author); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 265 through 269 (discussing the wave of Iranian calls occurring in November 1981). 
405. See Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 252 para. 11. 
406. The United States made two arguments to the Tribunal in its defense. First, as 
noted supra note 402, the Treasury Department amended its regulations in July 1982 to 
prohibit final judgments "permanently disposing of any interest of Iran in any standby 
letter of credit" 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(b )(3)(i) (1982) (codifying 47 Fed. Reg. 29,529 (July 7, 
1982)). Thus, United States litigants were permitted to obtain only preliminary 
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The Tribunal, however, had not found these same concerns to 
justify the United States regulations permitting substituted blocked 
accounts. Further, other factors, some known at the time and others 
learned only later, indicate that the Tribunal would not have looked 
any more kindly upon the regulations authorizing continued 
litigation. For one thing, even if the Tribunal had been sympathetic 
to the United States' concerns about fraudulent calls on letters of 
credit, the regulations authorizing litigation would likely have 
appeared to be overkill since any such concerns should have been 
eliminated by the United States' authorizing account parties to 
establish substituted blocked accounts on their own books. Further, 
the Tribunal's formalistic conclusion in Claim D of Case No. A15(IV) 
that the United States breached General Principle B merely by 
authorizing tolling suits (even though the suits were immediately 
suspended) suggests a similar conclusion for the United States' 
authorization of letter-of-credit suits that it did not immediately, or at 
any time thereafter, suspend. Thus, the United States' decision to 
settle the claim appeared at the time, and even more so in retrospect, 
to be the correct one. 
(3) Preliminary Conclusions 
By authorizing counterclaims and continued litigation involving 
standby letters of credit in United States courts, the Reagan 
Administration continued its pattern of interpreting the Algiers 
Declarations not by reference to their text but by the needs and 
desires of American claimants. These authorizations had no basis in 
injunctions or other temporary relief. Consequently, the United States argued that this 
relief was necessary to prevent the claims presented to the Tribunal involving standby 
letters of credit from being rendered moot by payment of the letter of credit. The relief 
was also appropriate, the United States maintained, in light of Article 26(3) of the 
Tribunal's Rules, which provides that "(a] request for interim measures addressed by any 
party to a judicial authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to 
arbitrate." Statement of Defense of the United States, Doc. 87, at 52-55, Case No. 
A15(I:C), supra note 205, (Nov. 12, 1990) (on file with author). Second, the United States 
pointed out that most of the lawsuits in United States courts were brought by United 
States contractors who sought to prevent United States banks from paying the standby 
letters of credit; that is, the lawsuits pitted the account party against the issuing bank, both 
of whom were United States nationals. While the Algiers Declarations obligate the 
United States to terminate legal proceedings in United States courts brought by United 
States nationals against Iran, they do not obligate the United States to terminate legal 
proceedings between United States nationals. !d. at 55-58. The United States 
acknowledged, however, that while some courts enjoined only the issuing bank from 
paying the standby letter of credit, others also enjoined collection by Iran under the letter 
of credit and under the related Iranian bank guarantee. !d. at 57. 
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the Declarations; thus, the United States was rightfully held to have 
breached the Declarations for authorizing counterclaims and was 
prudent to have settled Iran's claim as to standby-letter-of-credit 
litigation. 
That said, it must be remembered that the Reagan 
Administration's treatment of counterclaims and standby-letter-of-
credit litigation constituted only a small part of its overall 
implementation of General Principle B, and that implementation, 
examined in total, appears to have been conducted in good faith.407 
Although the United States claimants had asked the Reagan 
Administration not to nullify attachments until the Tribunal 
determined that the underlying claims fell within its jurisdiction,4os the 
Reagan Administration rejected their requests, nullified all the 
attachments, and transferred the formerly attached funds back to 
Iran. Doing so left United States claimants whose claims had been 
dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction little incentive to 
return to United States courts since Iran no longer held money in the 
United States and was not likely to pay a judgment issued against it 
voluntarily. 
The unjustifiable features of the Reagan Administration's 
implementation of General Principle B seem even further minimized 
when viewed retrospectively in light of the Tribunal's somewhat 
confused conclusions as to that implementation. The Tribunal held 
the United States to have breached the Algiers Declarations by 
authorizing tolling suits that were immediately suspended and by 
failing to remove the Foremost case from a United States court's 
docket between Apri11986 and Apri11988, a time during which the 
suit was completely dormant. Both decisions were arguably wrong on 
the merits, but more troublingly, they manifest an inability or 
unwillingness to apply the general principles that the Tribunal itself 
set forth to specific situations. The Tribunal's failure to apply to Case 
No. A24 the standards it set forth in Claim A of Case No. AlS(IV) 
was unjustifiable, and its formalistic holding as to tolling suits shows 
that it employed a rigid, non-contextual analysis that, in particular, 
took no account of the domestic law constraints under which the 
Reagan Administration operated. The Tribunal held that the Algiers 
407. See Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 98 ("There is no reason to doubt 
that the United States acted in good faith when it suspended, rather than terminated, the 
litigation."). 
408. See supra text accompanying note 348. 
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Declarations permit the United States to use other means to toll the 
relevant statutes of limitation; the Declarations simply forbid the use 
of tolling suits to do so. The Tribunal, however, seemingly took no 
account of the fact that the United States federal government was 
probably unable to take other action to toll state-law statutes of 
limitation without running afoul of constitutional principles of 
federalism. Of course, as noted above, a state cannot invoke its 
domestic law provisions as justification for its failure to perform the 
treaty,409 but it is appropriate to consider that law in assessing the 
particular means a state chose in performing its obligations, 
particularly when that means produced precisely the result the state 
was obligated to produce-in this case, a cessation of litigation 
against Iran in United States courts.410 
Finally, the Reagan Administration's actual treaty violations 
seem trivial in light of Iran's allegations of United States' treaty 
violations. Iran contended that everything the United States did or 
did not do with respect to implementing General Principle B violated 
the Algiers Declarations. Most of those allegations were too 
meritless to warrant much discussion here or even by the Tribunal in 
its Award. But Iran's proclivity to litigate each and every aspect of 
the United States' implementation, if known or suspected in advance, 
provided the Reagan Administration further incentive to call all 
doubts in the United States' favor since a more balanced approach 
would hardly have gained it anything. 
D. Return of the Assets of the Shah and his Close Relatives 
(I) Background to Point IV of the Algiers Declarations 
In its most recent Award addressing the Reagan 
Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations, the 
Tribunal again found the United States in breach of the Algiers 
Declarations, this time as a result of the Reagan Administration's 
implementation of Point IV of the General Declaration, which 
addresses Iran's efforts to recoup the vast assets of the former Shah of 
409. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 339; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (3d ed. 1979). 
410. Cf American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 
385, at 5 (noting that a state party is bound to implement treaty terms "in good faith"; 
however, "the specific manner of compliance is-unless it is stipulated in the agreement 
itself-left up to the complying state"). 
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Iran and his family, assets that Iran claimed were ·stolen by the Shah 
and his family. 
The fate of the Shah and of his assets took on great importance 
both to the United States and to the new Iranian government 
virtually from the moment the new government seized power. On 
January 16, 1979, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and his 
wife, Farah Diba Pahlavi, left Iran for the last time.411 The new 
Revolutionary Government took control of the country in February 
1979412 and immediately announced that it would demand the 
extradition of the Shah from Morocco, where he and Farah Diba 
were staying, along with the confiscation and return to Iran of the 
Pahlavi assets.413 Toward that end, on February 28th, Ayatollah 
Khomeini issued a "Decree of Imam Concerning Confiscation of the 
Pahlavi Properties," which charged the Islamic Revolutionary 
Council with confiscating, "in favor of the needy ... , all movable and 
immovable properties of the Pahlavi Dynasty, its branches, agents 
and affiliates who during their illegal rule embezzled [them] from the 
Treasury."414 
The Shah's departure from Iran raised troubling policy questions 
for the Carter Administration. The Shah had been an important ally 
of the United States while he was in power, so President Carter 
wanted to show support for him in his time of need.415 Consequently, 
when the Shah left Iran, President Carter invited him to come to the 
United States.416 Instead, desiring to remain nearer to Iran,417 he 
went first to Egypt, then to Morocco,418 but a few months later, he 
4ll. Nicholas Gage, Ruler Goes to Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1979, at Al. After a 
brief stay in Egypt, the couple took up temporary residence in Morocco on January 22, 
1979. Marvine Howe, Moroccan Security Tight as Shah Arrives for 'Strictly Private Visit', 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1979, at A3. 
412. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, case No. All, Award No. 597-All-FT, 
para. 7 2000 WL 394260 (Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter case No. All]. 
413. See Iran Likely to Demand Extradition of the Shah, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1979, at 
A4; Iran Urges that Swiss Freeze Assets of Shah, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1979, at A3; Swiss 
Refuse a Request to Block Shah's Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1979, at A3; Shah to be Tried 
in Absentia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1979, at AS. 
414. I A DIGEST OF LAWS ANn REGULATIONS APPROVED BY THE ISLAMIC 
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 1 (Masouduzzafar trans., 1979). 
415. See CARTER, supra note 41, at 448. 
416. Id. at 448, 452. Soon after his departure from Iran, the Shah appeared to be 
making plans to move to the United States. A.O. Sulzberger, Jr., Iran's Ambassador 
Prepares for Shah's Trip to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1979, at A14. 
417. CARTER, supra note 41, at 448. 
418. Marvine Howe, Moroccan Security Tight as Shah Arrives for 'Strictly Private Visit', 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1979, at A3. The Shah soon decided that "coming to the United 
HeinOnline -- 52 Hastings L.J. 404 2000-2001
404 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 52 
was asked to leave Morocco.419 By that time, however, President 
Carter, concerned about the intense anti-American hostility in Iran 
and the vulnerability of Americans remaining there, determined that 
allowing the Shah to enter the United States would be too 
dangerous.420 This decision was not without controversy: Carter's 
National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, advised him to invite 
the Shah, as did former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and 
Chief Executive Officer of Chase Manhattan Bank, David 
Rockefeller.421 President Carter remained steadfast in his refusal, 
however, until the Shah became ill while living in Mexico and needed 
essential diagnostic tests that were not available in that country.422 
President Carter then relented and, in October 1979, he permitted the 
Shah to enter the United States for medical treatment.423 
The Shah's arrival in New York has been widely blamed as 
precipitating the hostage-taking.424 Whether or not that assessment is 
accurate, it is certainly true that immediately after taking the 
hostages, the students responsible demanded that the Shah be 
returned to Iran.425 Twelve days later, Acting Foreign Minister Bani-
States would signal a political abdication; to return to Iran would then be impossible 
because he would appear to have been sent by the Central Intelligence Agency." Bernard 
Gwertzman, Shah Delays Arrival in U.S. as Envoy Opposes Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
1979, at A3. 
419. CARTER, supra note 41, at 452. 
420. !d.; MACKEY, supra note 27, at 293 ("When the shah expressed his wish to enter 
the United States ... the nervous Carter Administration found him refuge in a villa in 
Cuernavaca, Mexico."). 
421. CARTER, supra note 41, at 452. See also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, 
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., REPORT ON IRAN: THE FINANCIAL 
ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 55 (Comm. Print 1981) ("It is no 
secret that David Rockefeller and persons associated with him played an important role in 
the Shah's admission to the United States."). 
422. CARTER, supra note 41 , at 455. 
423. !d. at 456. 
424. See Saunders, The Crisis Begins, supra note 27, at 58-60. See also House Foreign 
Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 230 (statement of Bruce Laingen, former Charge 
D'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Tehran) ("We did counsel in messages, both in July and in 
the latter days of September, against admission of the Shah at that time . . . . (I]t was my 
view, that until we had a regular government in place, a constitution adopted, the 
provisional government no longer provisional . .. that it would be unwise to admit the 
Shah."). 
425. Teheran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and Hold Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
1979, at A1; ROCKY SICKMANN, IRANIAN HOSTAGE: A PERSONAL DIARY 7 (1982). 
Iran's Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, queried Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Carter 
Administration's National Security Adviser, about the return of the Pahlavi assets a few 
days before the American Embassy takeover. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 476 ("When 
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Sadr repeated the students' demand that the Shah himself be 
returned for trial, but later that day, he stated that Iran sought instead 
the return of the Shah's assets.426 To this latter demand, the United 
States repeatedly advised Iran that it must pursue its claims against 
the Shah in United States courts,427 and at about this time, Iran 
attempted to do just that. On November 27, 1979, Iran filed suit 
against the Shah and Farah Diba Pahlavi in New York State court, 
claiming that the couple had misappropriated, embezzled, and 
otherwise diverted to their own use assets belonging to Iran.428 The 
Shah and Farah Diba left the United States on December 15, 1979 for 
Panama,429 but a month later they, through their lawyers, moved to 
dismiss Iran's lawsuit on several grounds including invalid service and 
forum non conveniens.430 A few months later, on February 25, 1980, 
Iran filed a similar suit against the Shah's twin sister Ashraf Pahlavi 
also in New York State court, claiming that she had conspired with 
the Shah to divert money and property belonging to Iran to her 
personal use.431 Several months later, the United States requested 
that both lawsuits be stayed to avoid prejudicing the Administration's 
efforts to resolve the hostage crisis. The courts granted these 
requests.432 The Shah died on July 27, 1980 in Cairo.433 
Throughout the negotiations over the release of the hostages, 
Iran continued to insist that the United States return the Pahlavi 
assets.434 As noted above, on September 12, 1980, the Ayatollah 
the question of the Shah's assets was raised, I told my Iranian interlocutors that the doors 
to our courts were open and that they could sue for them anytime they wished."). 
426. See Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure, supra note 53, at 81, 87; Senate Foreign 
Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 10 (prepared testimony of Edmund Muskie). On 
November 17, 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the hostages would not be 
released "until the United States had handed over the former Shah for trial and returned 
his property to Iran." Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 34, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 553, 569 (1980). 
427. Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure, supra note 53, at 80; House Foreign Affairs 
Hearings, supra note 40, at 42, 49 (prepared statement of Harold H. Saunders); Senate 
Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at ll, 13 (prepared testimony of Edmund 
Muskie). 
428. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 28. 
429. Bernard Gwertzman, New Phase in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.16, 1979, at A1. 
430. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 31. 
431. Id. para. 44. 
432 Id. paras. 33, 46. 
433. Deposed Shah Dies in Egypt at 60; Iran Says Death Will Not Affect Fate of the 52 
American Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1980, at Al. 
434. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30 (testimony of Warren 
Christopher). 
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Khomeini announced four conditions for the release of the hostages, 
and these conditions were confirmed in a resolution by the Iranian 
Parliament (or "Majlis").435 As the fourth condition, the Majlis 
demanded 
[t]he return of all assets of the defunct Shah as well as official 
recognition as valid of the action of the government of Iran in 
exercising its sovereignty to expropriate the assets of the defunct 
Shah and his close relatives, which assets, according to the laws of 
Iran, belong to the Iranian nation, the issuance of an order by the 
American President that these assets be identified and frozen, and 
the taking of all administrative and legal measures necessary for 
transferring these assets and possession to Iran.436 
The United States negotiators found this demand to be 
particularly troublesome. They recognized that the return of the 
Shah's assets was an issue of great political and symbolic importance 
to Iran, but they questioned its practical significance, since they 
"doubted that any substantial portion of [the Shah's] estate 
remained" in the United States.437 Further, as a matter of principle, 
they could not agree to any proposal that would simply confiscate the 
Pahlavis' United States assets and return them to Iran.438 
Consequently, the United States negotiators repeatedly conveyed to 
Iran that, under the United States Constitution, the transfer of private 
property from one party to another can be ordered only pursuant to 
procedures which afford due process of law.439 Thus, they advised 
Iran that the only entity within the United States Government that 
could order the transfer of allegedly stolen property was the United 
States courts, so that Iran's only means for recovering any such 
property was to bring suit in those courts. The United States did 
promise, however, to facilitate Iran's litigation efforts in certain, 
limited ways;440 these promises would later, with some minor 
modifications, become the obligations that the United States assumed 
in Point IV of the General Declaration. 
435. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 76. 
436. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 16. 
437. Owen, supra note 47, at 304; CARTER, supra note 41, at 586 ("I would guess [the 
Pahlavi assets amounted to] approximately one-thousandth as much as the Iranians claim 
the value to be-maybe $20 to $60 million maximum (probably none of it in the United 
States), compared to $20 to $60 billion that the Iranians have claimed."). 
438. Owen, supra note 47, at 304. 
439. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30 (testimony of Warren 
Christopher). 
440. Owen, supra note 47, at 304. 
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The negotiations concerning the Pahlavi assets seemed to be 
progressing satisfactorily, when, on December 19, 1980, in a 
development described by one of the United States negotiators as a 
lowpoint in the negotiations,441 Iran demanded, among other things, 
that the United States provide a "$10 billion cash guarantee to ensure 
that the [Pahlavi] wealth would be returned to Iran."442 The United 
States categorically rejected this demand,443 and Iran seemed to 
retreat from it in a December 21 communication that it conveyed to 
the United States.444 A few days later, the New York Times published 
Iran's December 21 communication and, a few days after that, it 
published the United ·states' November and early-December 
communications.445 These publications must have given the Pahlavis 
ample warning to remove their assets from the United States.446 
On December 30, 1980, United States negotiators delivered to 
the Algerian intermediaries a draft of what would become the 
General Declaration.447 The draft included five paragraphs in which 
the United States promised, among other things, to freeze the assets 
within the control of the estate -of the former Shah and any of his 
close relatives served as defendants in United States litigation 
brought by Iran to recover those assets, and the United States 
promised to require persons within its jurisdiction to submit reports 
.441. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 141 (testimony of Warren 
Christopher). 
442. Owen, supra note 47, at 309-10; John Kifner, Iran Proposes U.S. Create a Bank 
Fund to Cover Frozen Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1980, at Al. This demand was so 
demoralizing that the United States negotiators considered abandoning negotiations and 
leaving them for the incoming administration. See Owen, supra note 47, at 310-ll; 
Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1981) (statement of 
Mark Feldman); Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Said to Consider Halting Exchanges on 
Hostages in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1980, at Al. 
443. John Kifner, Iran Proposes U.S. Create a Bank Fund to Cover Frozen Assets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1980, at A1; Owen, supra note 47, at 310; CARTER, supra note 41, at 590, 
592. 
444. See Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 22. Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 
13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1981) (statement of Mark Feldman). 
445. Text of the Iranian Response to the U.S. on Terms for Release of the Hostages, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1980, at A14; First American Response and Second American Response, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1980, at A10. See also Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 23. 
446. For this reason, one would have thought that Iran would have had the most to gain 
by keeping the negotiations secret, yet it was Iran that first made public its December 17, 
1980 demand and two of the United States' communications. Bernard Gwertzman, 
Formal Proposals on Hostage Release Made Public by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1980, at 
Al. See also John Kifner, Iran Gives No Explanation for Publicizing Documents, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1980, at All. 
447. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 24. 
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about those assets, with all reported information to be transmitted to 
Iran. Iran suggested no modifications to those paragraphs; thus, on 
January 19, 1981, they were adopted verbatim as paragraphs 12-16 of 
the General Declaration.448 In total, they read: 
12. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above,449 the United States 
will freeze, and prohibit any transfer of, property and assets in the 
United States within the control of the estate of the former Shah or 
of any close relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in 
U.S. litigation brought by Iran to recover such property and assets 
as belonging to Iran. As to any such defendant, including the estate 
of the former Shah, any freeze order will remain in effect until such 
litigation is finally terminated. Violation of the freeze order shall 
be subject to the civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S.law. 
13. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will 
order all persons within U.S. jurisdiction to report to the U.S. 
Treasury within 30 days, for transmission to Iran, all information 
known to them, as of November 3, 1979, and as of the date of the 
order, with respect to the property and assets referred to in 
Paragraph 12. Violation of the requirement will be subject to the 
civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S. law. 
14. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will 
make known, to all appropriate U.S. courts, that in any litigation of 
the kind described in Paragraph 12 above the claims of Iran should 
not be considered legally barred either by sovereign immunity 
principles or by the act of state doctrine and that Iranian decrees 
and judgments relating to such assets should be enforced by such 
courts in accordance with United States law. 
15. As to any judgment of a U.S. court which calls for the transfer 
of any property or assets to Iran, the United States hereby 
guarantees the enforcement of the final judgment to the extent that 
the property or assets exist within the United States. 
16. If any dispute arises between the parties as to whether the 
United States has fulfilled any obligation imposed upon it by 
Paragraphs 12-15 inclusive, Iran may submit the dispute to binding 
448. !d. paras. 24-25. 
449. Paragraph 3, among other things, provided that the Government of Algeria would 
make a certification to the Algerian Central Bank once the fifty-two American hostages 
had safely departed from Iran. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 3, reprinted in 1 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 4. 
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arbitration by the tribunal established by, and in accordance with 
the provisions of, the Claims Settlement Declaration. If the 
tribunal determines that Iran has suffered a loss as a result of a 
failure by the United States to fulfill such obligation, it shall make 
an appropriate award in favor of Iran which may be enforced by 
Iran in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws.45° 
409 
On the day he signed the Algiers Declarations, President Carter 
also issued a series of executive orders, including Executive Order 
12284 which implemented Point IV.451 The Executive Order 
appeared to conform in all relevant respects with paragraphs 12-16 of 
the General Declaration. Of particular relevance, it appeared to 
order the immediate freezing of the assets within the control of the 
estate of the former Shah or of any close relative that Iran served as a 
defendant in United States courts.452 
450. General Declaration, supra note 17, paras.12-16, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. 
Rep. at7-8. 
451. Exec. Order No. 12,284, 46 Fed. Reg. 7929 (Jan. 23, 1981 ). 
452 !d. Section 1-101 of the Executive Order reads: 
1-101. For the purpose of protecting the rights of litigants in courts within the 
United States, all property and assets located in the United States within the 
control of the estate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, or 
any close relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in litigation in such 
courts brought by Iran seeking the return of property alleged to belong to Iran, is 
hereby blocked as to each such estate or person until all such litigation against 
such estate or person is finally terminated. 
!d. (emphasis added). 
The remaining relevant sections read: 
1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed (a) to promulgate 
regulations requiring all persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States and who, as of November 3, 1979, or as of this date, have actual or 
constructive possession of property of the kind described in Section 1-101, or 
knowledge of such possession by others, to report such possession or knowledge 
thereof, to the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with such regulations and 
(b) to make available to the Government of Iran or its designated agents all 
identifying information derived from such reports to the fullest extent permitted 
by law. Such reports shall be required as to all individuals described in 1-101 and 
shall be required to be filed within 30 days after publication of a notice in the 
Federal Register. 
1-104.The Attorney General of the United States having advised the President of 
his opinion that no claim on behalf of the Government of Iran for recovery of 
property of the kind described in Section 1-101 of this Order should be 
considered legally barred either by sovereign immunity principles or by the act of 
state doctrine, the Attorney General is authorized and directed to prepare, and 
upon the request of counsel representing the Government of Iran to present to 
the appropriate court or courts within the United States, suggestions of interest 
reflecting that such is the position of the United States, and that it is also the 
position of the United States that Iranian decrees and judgments relating to the 
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(2) The Reagan Administration's Implementation of Point IV 
In many ways, the ultimate resolution of Iran's demands 
concerning the Pahlavi assets provided the United States with its most 
obvious negotiating victory. Iran had repeatedly demanded that the 
United States confiscate and return the Pahlavi assets located in the 
United States;453 in the end, however, Iran was willing to bring its own 
lawsuits to United States courts and to settle for some very limited 
assistance in those lawsuits-essentially a promise to freeze and 
require reporting about the United States assets within the control of 
the estate of the Shah and his close relatives; a promise that the 
Executive Branch would provide to the courts its opinion that Iran's 
claims should not be barred by principles of sovereign immunity or 
act of state; and, a promise that Iranian decrees and judgments 
relating to the above assets would be enforced in United States courts 
"in accordance with United States law," the quoted phrase limiting the 
United States' promise to providing Iran with little more than is 
available to any other litigant in United States courts. At the same 
time, the fact that Iran was willing to settle for such limited 
obligations, and, in particular, that it accepted the United States' 
December 30, 1980 proposal regarding the Pahlavi assets without 
suggesting a single modification (while, at the same time, aggressively 
negotiating on other issues), can be understood as confirming what 
the United States negotiators had suspected all along: that the 
question of the Pahlavi assets was of great symbolic and political 
importance for Iran, but not of great financial importance.454 
/d. 
assets of the former Shah and the persons described in Section 1-101 should be 
enforced by such courts in accordance with United States law. 
1-106.This Order shall be effective immediately. 
453. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30 (testimony of Warren 
Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, Carter Administration) ("Throughout the crisis, 
Iran attempted to insist on a return of the wealth of the former Shah and his family."); 
Owen, supra note 47, at 310. 
454. In an affidavit submitted in Case No. All, supra note 412, Warren Christopher 
stated: 
[A ]s we expressed to our Algerian intermediaries several times during the 
negotiations, I and the other U.S. negotiators believed that the significance was 
not financial, but political and symbolic. It was our best judgment that the 
former Shah, his estate and his family simply would not have left substantial 
assets in the United States, if in fact there had ever been any there, in the face of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini's constant public demands for confiscation and return of 
such assets. 
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The Carter Administration officials who had negotiated the 
Algiers Declarations recognized the very limited nature of the 
obligations the United States had assumed in Point IV. Indeed, the 
negotiators believed that the whole of Point IV gave Iran little more 
than any other litigant would ordinarily enjoy in United States 
courts.4ss During hearings before the United States Senate and 
House of Representatives, the Carter Administration negotiators 
were repeatedly queried as to the nature and scope of Point IV, and 
they repeatedly and consistently emphasized that the United States' 
obligations were narrowly drawn.456 The Reagan Administration 
officials who testified did not disagree, so there appeared to be no 
obvious dispute between the Carter and Reagan Administrations 
regarding the implementation of Point IV. Nor, during that time, was 
there apparent any substantial lobbying of the Reagan 
Administration by the Pahlavis or by their United States friends and 
associates with respect to the implementation of Point IV. Although 
Affidavit of Warren Christopher, Doc. 117, Ex. 1, para. 32, Case No. All, supra note 412 
(on file with author). 
455. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 54 (testimony of Roberts Owen, 
the Carter Administration's Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State and one of the lead 
drafters of the Algiers Declarations) ("[W]e were careful to insure that we were not giving 
Iran anything substantially more than they would have enjoyed as a litigant in our courts 
anyway."); Owen, supra note 47, at 304 (noting that the United States' negotiating offer 
"would not provide Iran with any significant litigating advantage that it would not 
otherwise have enjoyed"); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30-31 
(testimony of Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, Carter Administration) 
(noting that "even in the absence of a governmental freeze order, a court would place 
approximately the same restrictions on the property in litigation by judicial order" and 
that "the information to be furnished to the Treasury is the same kind that would be 
available to a plaintiff under the normal civil 'discovery' procedures in our Federal 
courts"); see also Trooboff, supra note 49, at 150-51 ("(T]he United States agree[d] to 
make known to the U.S. courts no more than what the U.S. Government thought that the 
courts probably would have ruled anyway-i.e., that the act of state and sovereign 
immunity defense should not legally bar the Iranian claim to these assets."). 
456. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30 (testimony of Warren 
Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, Carter Administration) (describing the United 
States' obligations as "carefully circumscribed"). Further, Mr. Christopher explained: 
I do not think it is fully appreciated that the commitment to prohibit the transfer 
of the Shah-related property will arise only when Iran has filed a lawsuit against 
and served legal process on individuals who it claims are close relatives of the 
Shah, and only then will the property be temporarily frozen. Such a freeze order 
will remain in effect only until the litigation is terminated. 
!d.; see also id. at 50 (testimony of Warren Christopher) (defending the Declarations 
against the severe criticism of Republican Senator Hayakawa and describing Point IV as a 
"very limited provision"); Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 54 (testimony 
of Roberts Owen, Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, Carter Administration) 
(describing the burden on the United States as "very slight" if any). 
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numerous United States nationals with claims against Iran testified 
during the Senate and House hearings, no Pahlavi was heard from.457 
For these reasons, one might have expected the Reagan 
Administration's implementation of Point IV to have been 
straightforward and uncontroversial. Indeed, it seemed headed that 
way on February 24, 1981, when, as noted above, President Reagan 
issued Executive Order 12294, ratifying President Carter's executive 
orders, including Executive Order 12284 implementing Point IV.458 
President Carter's Executive Order 12284 appeared to order the 
immediate freezing of assets located in the United States within the 
estate of the former Shah or of any close relative that Iran had served 
as a defendant in United States courts. However, the Reagan 
Administration either did not read it to do so or ignored that feature 
of the Executive Order because, on that same day, the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury 
("OFAC") issued a regulation, 31 C.P.R.§ 535.217 titled "Blocking of 
property of the former Shah of Iran and of certain other Iranian 
nationals," which was made retroactive to January 19, 1981. The first 
sentence of paragraph (a) of § 535.217 repeats, almost verbatim, 
Section 1-101 of President Carter's Executive Order 12284, but it 
omits the suggestion of an immediate freeze.459 Moreover, the second 
sentence imposed on Iran a burden not previously discussed: that of 
furnishing to OFAC proof of service on a defendant before OFAC 
would freeze that defendant's assets. Finally, and most importantly, 
paragraph (b) of§ 535.217, which was to contain the names of the 
457. See Trooboff, supra note 49, at 150 ("Most of us have little direct interest in the 
Iranian claim to certain of the former Shah's assets or the disposition of that issue under 
the Algerian Declarations."). 
458. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 8, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (Feb. 24, 1981). 
459. Executive Order 12,284, 46 Fed. Reg. 7929, states that the assets are "hereby 
blocked" while 31 C.F.R. § 535.217(a) describes the assets as "blocked" and conditions 
that blocking on the obligation it imposes on Iran in the second sentence of§ 535.217(a). 
The whole of paragraph (a) provides: 
For the purpose of protecting the rights of litigants in courts within the United 
States, all property and assets located in the United States in the control of the 
estate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, or any close 
relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in litigation in such courts 
brought by Iran seeking the return of property alleged to belong to Iran, is 
blocked as to each such estate or person, until all such litigation against such 
estate or person is finally terminated. This provision shall apply only to such 
persons as to which Iran has furnished proof of service to the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control and which the Office has identified in paragraph (b) of this 
section. 
31 C.F.R. § 535.217(a). 
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defendants whose assets were to be frozen, initially included no 
names; that is, at the outset, the Reagan Administration froze no 
property. Likewise, the Reagan Administration initially did not 
require reporting about any property; indeed, it did not even 
promulgate a regulation concerning reporting requirements. 
Two days after the Reagan Administration promulgated 
§ 535.217, on February 26, 1981, Iran provided OFAC with proof of 
service on the Shah, on Farah Diba Pahlavi, and on Ashraf Pahlavi 
and requested that OF AC immediately freeze their assets.460 When 
OF AC failed to act, Iran reiterated its requests on March 2, 1981 and 
on March 19,1981.461 However, OFAC, both then and subsequently, 
declined to accept Iran's proffered proof with respect to the Shah and 
Farah Diba. Instead, the Reagan Administration interpreted the 
phrase "served as a defendant," appearing in Paragraph 12 of the 
General Declaration, to mean that the defendant was uncontestedly 
or validly served;462 because-the Shah and Farah Diba had challenged 
the validity of their service, OF AC did not consider them "served as a 
defendant" under Paragraph 12 and declined to freeze or require 
reporting about their assets. Indeed, OF AC never froze or required 
reporting about the assets of the Shah and Farah Diba because the 
validity of their service continued to be contested throughout the 
course of their litigation, including while on appeal.463 
Ashraf Pahlavi had not challenged the validity of her service, yet 
OF AC likewise failed to freeze or require reporting about her assets 
for some months, without providing any reason for its failure and 
despite Iran's repeated requests. Finally, on May 13, 1981, almost 
three months after Iran's original request, OFAC amended 31 C.F.R. 
§ 535.217(b) to add Ashraf Pahlavi's name, thereby freezing her 
assets.464 On the same day, the Reagan Administration promulgated 
31 C.F.R. § 535.619, which required persons who had knowledge of or 
who were in possession of assets belonging to a person listed in § 
535.217(b) to report that information. Once Ashraf Pahlavi was 
included in§ 535.217(b), reporting was required as to her assets, and 
in July 1991, OFAC transmitted the information that it had received 
to Iran. These reports showed that the United States had frozen 
460. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 34. 
461. !d. paras. 35-36. 
462. Id. paras. 62,127-30. 
463. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (App. Div. 1983); 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1984). 
464. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 47. 
HeinOnline -- 52 Hastings L.J. 414 2000-2001
414 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
approximately $4 million worth of real property belonging to Ashraf 
Pahlavi located in New York City.465 
Iran brought additional cases against other Pahlavis, but the 
Reagan Administration held fast to the pro-Pahlavi interpretation of 
"served as a defendant" that it had unveiled in Iran's litigation against 
the Shah and Farah Diba, and it continued its dilatory 
implementation of Point IV, first seen in Iran's litigation against 
Ashraf Pahlavi. For instance, on December 17, 1981, Iran filed a civil 
lawsuit in New York state court against Fatemeh Pahlavi, another of 
the Shah's sisters, and against fifty-nine other relatives and associates 
of the Shah.466 The following day, Iran obtained an ex parte order 
from the New York court authorizing service upon the defendants by 
publication and certified mail.467 Iran effected service by publication 
three months later, in March 1982,468 and six months later, on 
September 29, 1982, Iran notified OFAC that the sixty defendants 
had been served in New York trial court. Iran asked OFAC to freeze 
and require reporting about their assets.469 OF AC apparently never 
responded even though service was uncontested at this point.470 
Another three months elapsed when, in December 1982, one of the 
defendants did move to vacate the service by publication and to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to all of the defendants.471 The court 
never decided that issue, instead dismissing Iran's complaint on July 
31, 1984 on grounds of forum non conveniens.472 When litigation 
finally terminated, OF AC had neither frozen nor required reporting 
about the assets of Fatemeh Pahlavi and her fifty-nine co-defendants. 
465. /d. para. 48. 
466. Id. para. 54. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Fatemeh Pahlavi and 59 Others, No. 81 
Civ. 0186 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 13, 1981); Iran had brought the same suit against the same 
defendants eleven months earlier in United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 53. Iran did not attempt to serve any 
of the defendants and voluntarily dismissed the suit on December 16, 1981. /d. paras. 53-
54. 
467. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 55. 
468. Id. 
469. /d. para. 56. 
470. /d. Iran contended, and the United States did not deny, that OFAC made no 
response to Iran's request. Reply of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Statement of 
Defense of the United States of America, Doc. 58, at 46, Case No. All, supra note 412 (on 
file with author); Iran's Hearing Memorial and Evidence on the Issue of Liability, Doc. 
105, at 48-49, Case No. All, supra note 412 (on file with author). 
471. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 57. 
472. /d. para. 58. 
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Finally, Iran brought three lawsuits against Shams Pahlavi, 
another sister of the Shah, but issues concerning service arose 
primarily in the first suit, which Iran filed in Los Angeles Superior 
Court on June 30, 1981.473 Iran obtained an ex parte order from the 
Superior Court permitting service by publication in December 
1981,474 and it effected service by publication five months later, in 
May 1982.475 During the interim, on April 22, 1982, Shams Pahlavi 
filed a Motion to Quash Summons, challenging the ex parte order.476 
On June 7, 1982, Iran notified OFAC that Shams had been 
"served as a defendant" and requested that OF AC freeze her United 
States assets.477 OFAC did not, so one month later, Iran reiterated 
the request. Five months later, in December 1982, OFAC finally 
informed Iran that because "the validity of the service is contested 
and has not been established," it was "not prepared to block the 
defendant's assets at this time."478 
On· May 24, 1983, the trial court granted Shams Pahlavi's motion 
to quash service,479 and the California Court of Appeal upheld that 
ruling.48o Iran apparently took no further action for six years; then, 
on October 17,1990, Iran effected personal service on Shams Pahlavi, 
and the California Court of Appeal upheld that service in December 
1990.481 In April 1991, six months after it had effected service, Iran 
notified OF AC that it had done so. Two months later, in June 1991, 
Iran further informed OF AC that the Court of Appeal had upheld 
service on Shams Pahlavi and asked OF AC to freeze her United 
States assets.482 Two additional months elapsed before OF AC added 
Shams Pahlavi's name to paragraph (b) of 31 C.P.R. § 535.217, 
thereby freezing and requiring reporting about her United States 
assets.483 Her assets remained frozen until March 1, 1996, the day 
after she died, even though the final suit against her terminated 
fifteen months earlier, in November 1994.484 
473. Id. para. 59. 
474. Id. para. 60. 
475. ld. para. 62. 
476. Id. para. 61. 
477. Id. para. 62. 
478. Id. 
479. Id. para. 63. 
480. Id. para. 64. 
481. Id. para. 65. 
482 Id. para. 66. 
483. 56 Fed. Reg. 40553 (Aug.15, 1991) (amending 31 C.P.R.§ 535.217(b)). 
484. 31 C.F.R. § 535.217 (1996); Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 81. 
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As a result of the Reagan Administration's interpretation of 
Paragraph 12's phrase "served as a defendant," OFAC never froze or 
required reporting about the assets of Farah Diba Pahlavi or of 
Fatemeh Pahlavi and her fifty-nine co-defendants; it did freeze and 
require reporting about the assets of Shams Pahlavi but only after the 
validity of service was litigated in trial court and on appeal. Further, 
as a result of what might be seen as either carelessness or pettiness, 
the United States delayed three months before freezing and requiring 
reporting about Ashraf Pahlavi's assets even though she never 
contested service,485 and it delayed four months before freezing 
Shams Pahlavi's assets after it learned that the California Court of 
Appeal had upheld service upon her. 
Looking beyond the service question to the resolution of Iran's 
cases, we find that Iran failed entirely in its efforts to obtain the 
return of Pahlavi assets through United States litigation. After the 
Shah died, Iran petitioned the New York trial court in which it had 
filed its suit against the Shah and Farah Diba to appoint an 
administrator to represent the Shah's estate.486 The court denied this 
request, finding that Iran had failed to establish that the Shah owned 
any property in New York.487 The court found service on the couple 
to have been proper, but it dismissed the suit against them on grounds 
of forum non conveniens.488 On appeal to both the Appellate 
Division of the New York Supreme Court and to the New York 
Court of Appeals, Iran sought to reverse the forum non conveniens 
dismissal while Farah Diba Pahlavi sought to reverse the 
determination that service had been proper.489 Both parties failed,490 
and Iran's case against the Shah and Farah Diba Pahlavi terminated 
when the United States Supreme Court denied Iran's petition for 
certiorari. 491 
Ashraf Pahlavi also moved to dismiss Iran's complaint against 
her, inter alia, on grounds of forum non conveniens,492 but the New 
485. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 269, 272. 
486. !d. para. 37. 
487. !d. para. 39. 
488. !d. para. 38. 
489. !d. paras. 40, 41. 
490. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 {App. Div. 1983); 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 247 (N.Y. 1984). 
491. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 469 U.S. ll08 (1985); see also Case No. All, 
supra note 412, para. 42. 
492. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 45. 
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York trial court denied her motion.493 However, in March 1984, the 
Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed 
Iran's suit on grounds of forum non conveniens, following its earlier 
decision in the case against Farah Diba.494 In February 1985, the New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision.495 
Although litigation against Ashraf Pahlavi was finally terminated with 
that decision, it was not until six years later, and on the same day that 
it froze Shams Pahlavi's assets, that OF AC removed Ashrafs name 
from§ 535.217(b ), and thereby unfroze her United States assets.496 
Iran's litigation against Fatemeh Pahlavi and the fifty-nine 
codefendants met a similar fate. In July 1984, the New York trial 
court sua sponte dismissed Iran's complaint on the ground of forum 
non conveniens, citing the cases against Farah Diba and Ashraf 
Pahlavi, and Iran did not appeal.497 
Iran's litigation against Shams Pahlavi took a more circuitous 
route but proved equally unsuccessful in the end. In its first lawsuit 
against Shams Pahlavi, Iran's original complaint charged her and her 
co-defendants with conspiring with the Shah to embezzle and 
otherwise divert to their personal use money belonging to the 
government of Iran.498 In August 1991, however, Iran amended its 
complaint, abandoning all of its original causes of action and 
replacing them with a single cause of action: to enforce the February 
28, 1979 Decree of Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, which sought to 
confiscate all Pahlavi property. Iran maintained that the Algiers 
Declarations required the United States courts to enforce Iranian 
decrees and judgments.499 In January 1992, Shams Pahlavi asked Iran 
to produce the original 1979 Decree and to respond to a set of 
interrogatories. Iran refused,500 and it subsequently refused to 
comply with a court order compelling discovery.501 So, in September 
493. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 455 N.Y.S.2d 987, 994 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); see 
also Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 49. 
494. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 473 N.Y.S.2d 801 {App. Div. 1984); see also 
Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 50. 
495. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 476 N.E. 2d 338 (N.Y. 1985); see also Case No. 
All, supra note 412, para. 51. 
496. 31 C.P.R. § 535.217 {1991) {adding Shams Pahlavi's name to subsection {b) and 
removing Ashraf Pahlavi's name from that same section). 
497. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 58. 
498. !d. para. 59. 
499. Id. para. 69. 
500. Id. para. 73. 
501. Id. para. 76. 
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1992, the court dismissed Iran's suit for failing to comply with the 
court's order,502 and the dismissal was upheld on appeal.503 
Iran brought its second suit against Shams Pahlavi in July 1981 
when it and Bank Mellat filed a complaint in Los Angeles Superior 
Court charging Shams with defaulting on a $5 million loan.504 Upon 
Shams Pahlavi's motion, in February 1984, the court dismissed Iran's 
complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens.505 The California 
Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal,506 and Iran was not able to 
obtain review in either the California Supreme Court or the United 
States Supreme Court.507 
Finally, Bank Melli Iran and Bank Mellat filed suit against 
Shams Pahlavi in September 1992 in the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California, seeking to enforce a series of 
default judgments that Tehran courts had rendered against her 
between 1982 and 1991.508 On Shams Pahlavi's motion, the court 
dismissed Iran's complaint, holding that at the time the judgments 
were entered, she could not have obtained due process in the courts 
of Iran.5°9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,510 and the 
United States Supreme Court denied Iran's petition for certiorari.511 
(3) Iran's Case before the Tribunal 
In January 1982, long before most of the events recounted above 
took place, Iran filed suit in the Tribunal claiming that the United 
States had breached its Point IV obligations. The briefing in the case 
took numerous years, so by the time the Tribunal heard the case, in 
502. !d. para. 78. 
503. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal, id. para. 79; the 
California Supreme Court denied Iran's petition for review, id. para. 80; and the United 
States Supreme Court denied Iran's petition for certiorari. Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
Pahlavi, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994); see also Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 80. 
504. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 82. 
505. !d. para. 86. 
506. !d. para. 87. 
507. !d. para. 88; Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 479 U.S. 804 (1986) (denying 
certiorari). 
508. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 89-90. One of the judgments was for the loan 
default that had been at issue in Bank Mellat's suit against Shams in Los Angeles Superior 
Court. !d. para. 89. 
509. !d. para. 93. 
510. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Case No. All, 
supra note 412, para. 94. 
511. BaP-k Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 516 U.S. 989 (1995); see also Case No. All, supra note 
412, para. 95. 
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February 1998, Iran's litigation against the Pahlavis had ended and all 
of the relevant facts were available. 
Iran, as had been its practice in previous cases, accused the 
United States of violating Point IV in virtually all conceivable ways, 
most of which were frivolous. For instance, Iran alleged that Point IV 
obligates the United States to ensure the return of all Pahlavi assets, 
so that the United States violated Point IV by failing to return 
them.512 The Tribunal rejected that argument, seemingly without 
difficulty, holding that no such United States' obligation could 
reasonably be inferred from the text, context, or negotiating history 
of Point IV or of the General Declaration as a whole.513 Iran also 
contended that the Algiers Declarations prevent United States courts 
from dismissing Iran's claims on any procedural or jurisdictional 
ground, including forum non conveniens; that is, that Point IV 
obligates the United States to make available to Iran a United States 
forum in which Iran can pursue its claims against the Pahlavis on the 
merits.S14 The Tribunal rejected that claim as well, stating that 
"nowhere in the text of Point IV did the United States expressly 
obligate itself to provide Iran with access to United States courts for 
the consideration of Iran's Pahlavi-assets claims on the merits" and 
concluding that no such obligation could be inferred.515 With respect 
to the forum non conveniens dismissals in particular, the Tribunal 
noted that the Shah and Farah Diba Pahlavi had raised the defense of 
forum non conveniens long before the Algiers Declarations were 
signed; thus, Iran was on notice that the defense could be raised, yet it 
did not attempt to address it in any way in Point IV.S16 
512. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 184. 
513. Id. paras. 186, 193-99, 204. 
514. Id. paras. 243-44. 
515. Id. para. 245. The Tribunal noted, among other things, that Paragraph 14 requires 
the United States to inform its courts that two defenses-act of state and sovereign 
immunity-should not apply to Iran's claims against the Pahlavis. The inclusion of those 
two defenses indicates the intention to exclude all other defenses. Id. 
516. Id. para. 246. There is a certain perverse irony in the fact that the United States 
clearly invited Iran to bring its Pahlavi-assets litigation to United States courts, yet the 
courts subsequently dismissed four of Iran's six cases for forum non conveniens; that is, on 
the ground that United States courts were not convenient fora to hear the cases. However 
bad a taste that might leave, the Tribunal's conclusion in favor of the United States was 
clearly the correct one: the bottom line is that Point IV gave Iran very little, and one thing 
it definitely did not give it was immunity from forum non conveniens dismissals and from 
other procedural and jurisdictional defenses. 
The Tribunal also rejected some more plausible arguments that Iran advanced 
pertaining to its litigation against the former Shah. Recall that Paragraph 12 requires the 
United States to freeze "property and assets within the control of the estate of the former 
HeinOnline -- 52 Hastings L.J. 420 2000-2001
420 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
In contrast, the Tribunal appeared to have just as little difficulty 
determining that the Reagan Administration violated Paragraph 12 
and 13 in its interpretation and implementation of those paragraphs 
with respect to the former Shah's close relatives.517 As noted above, 
the Reagan Administration interpreted Paragraph 12's "served as a 
defendant" requirement to mean "effective service as determined by 
the court."518 That is, according to the United States, Iran's service 
on a defendant had to be either uncontested, or if contested, upheld 
by the highest court presented with the issue before the United 
States' obligation to freeze and require reporting about that 
defendant's assets was triggered.519 That interpretation, of course, 
would and did completely eliminate what little value Iran may have 
derived from Paragraphs 12 and 13. By insisting that service on a 
Pahlavi defendant be uncontested before freezing that defendant's 
assets, the Reagan Administration gave the Pahlavi defendants the 
power to prevent the United States freeze merely by contesting 
service (regardless of how frivolous that contest might be) and thus 
Shah or of any close relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in U.S. litigation." 
General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 12, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 7. 
As noted above, the New York trial court denied Iran's Petition for Letters of 
Administration, Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 39, so no estate for the former Shah 
was ever created and, because no estate was ever created, the United States never froze or 
required reporting about property and assets "within the control of the estate of the 
former Shah," id. para. 125. Iran claimed that the United States should have frozen those 
assets on the date the Algiers Declarations were signed. /d. para. 97. First, Iran 
maintained that the phrase "served as a defendant" in Paragraph 12 modifies the close 
relatives of the former Shah but not the former Shah himself so that Iran did not need to 
serve process on the former Shah to trigger the United States' obligation to freeze his 
assets. /d. para. 100. Second, Iran contended that the phrase, "estate of the former Shah" 
simply means the property or assets left by the deceased Shah, id. para. 104, so that the 
United States should have frozen "the property and assets within the control of the estate 
of the former Shah" and not required a formally constituted decedent's estate acting 
through a court-appointed executor to be established, see id. para. 105. The Tribunal 
rejected Iran's interpretation of the term "estate," reasoning that "litigation cannot be 
bought against 'property and assets,' as such, left by a deceased." /d. para. 207. In light of 
that conclusion, the Tribunal determined that it did not need to address whether the 
service requirement applied to the estate of the former Shah in addition to his close 
relatives. /d. para. 216. 
517. One of the American arbitrators, Richard Mosk, dissented from the Tribunal's 
conclusions, Separate Opinion of Richard M. Mosk, Case No. All, supra note 412, 2000 
WL 394320, but the other two American arbitrators, George H. Aldrich and Charles T. 
Duncan, voted with the majority. 
518. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 130. 
519. ld. para. 224. 
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gave them ample time to transfer out of the United States any assets 
that may have been located there.520 
These facts were not lost on the Tribunal. Noting both that Iran 
and the United States could have required "uncontested" service had 
they wished and that such a requirement would void Paragraph 12 of 
any significance, 52! the Tribunal held that Paragraph 12's requirement 
that a close relative of the former Shah be served as a defendant in 
United States litigation is satisfied if service "reasonably appears to 
comply with the applicable law of the forum ... [which] ensure[ s] that 
the method of service used is reasonably calculated to give the 
defendant actual notice of the lawsuit and to afford him an 
opportunity to present his defenses."522 
The Tribunal next turned to the timing of the United States' 
freeze obligation and held that because the purpose of the obligation 
is to prevent Pahlavi defendants from removing assets from the 
jurisdiction of the court, the Algiers Declarations impliedly obligated 
the United States to issue freeze orders promptly after the conclusion 
of the Algiers Declarations with respect to any "close relative covered 
by Point IV whom the United States knew had previously been 
'served as a defendant' in United States litigation and promptly after 
Iran has furnished the required proof to OF AC that any other such 
close relative has been 'served as a defendant' in United States 
litigation."523 The Tribunal found the same timing requirement to 
apply to Paragraph 13's information-reporting obligation.524 
As a consequence of these interpretive holdings, the Tribunal 
determined that the United States had repeatedly violated 
Paragraphs 12 and 13. In particular, it held that since the United 
States was aware that Farah Diba and Ashraf Pahlavi had been 
served as defendants in New York litigation in apparent compliance 
with the applicable law of the forum prior to the Algiers 
Declarations,525 the United States violated Paragraphs 12 and 13 by 
failing to freeze and require reporting about their assets promptly 
520. Indeed, because the question of service continued to be litigated on appeal in the 
cases against Farah Diba Pahlavi and Shams Pahlavi, the United States' interpretation of 
Paragraph 12 gave these defendants some years to transfer their assets out of the United 
States. Id. paras. 40-41, 65. 
521. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 227. 
522 I d. para. 228. 
523. Id. para. 220. 
524. I d. para. 241. 
525. I d. paras. 266, 273. 
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after those Declarations were concluded on January 19, 1981.526 
Further, the Tribunal held that the United States violated Paragraphs 
12 and 13 by failing to freeze and require reporting about the assets of 
Fatemeh Pahlavi and her co-defendants promptly after September 29, 
1981, the date Iran furnished the required proof of service to 
OFAC,527 and by failing to freeze and require reporting about the 
assets of Shams Pahlavi promptly after June 7, 1982, the date Iran 
furnished the required proof of service in that case to OF AC.528 Since 
the Tribunal had earlier bifurcated the liability phase of the case from 
the remedies phase,529 it determined that it would hold further 
proceedings to decide upon Iran's loss, if any, resulting from the 
United States' violations.s3o 
(4) Preliminary Conclusions 
This article has described several instances in which the Reagan 
Administration's interpretation and implementation of the Algiers 
Declarations was later determined by the Tribunal to violate those 
Declarations. This article has further attempted to place the choices 
the Reagan Administration made and the determinations the 
Tribunal made into their relevant contexts; that is, it has examined 
the text and context of the Algiers Declarations, critiqued the 
Tribunal's holdings when appropriate, and attempted to bring to light 
the various pressures placed on the Reagan Administration as well as 
the likely consequences it and United States nationals would have 
suffered had it made the choices the Tribunal concluded it should 
have made. Undertaking a similar task with respect to the Reagan 
Administration's implementation of Point IV proves far simpler 
because the Tribunal's holdings are clearly correct and because there 
appears little that one can say to explain, let alone to justify, the 
Reagan Administration's interpretation and implementation of Point 
IV. While negotiating the Algiers Declarations, Iran presented the 
Carter Administration with a very burdensome demand; yet, in the 
end, the Carter Administration convinced Iran to accept the most 
minimal of United States' obligations. However, despite the meager 
burden that those obligations placed on the United States and on the 
526. !d. paras. 267,274. 
527. !d. para. 279. 
528. !d. para. 290. 
529. !d. para. 4. 
530. !d. paras. 268, 275, 280, 291. 
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Pahlavi defendants,531 the Reagan Administration nonetheless 
interpreted Paragraphs 12 and 13 in a way that vitiated what little 
value Iran might have derived from them. 
Further, the Reagan Administration did so in the face of a 
relatively clear treaty text and Carter Administration executive order, 
while seemingly under little or no political pressure, and with virtually 
nothing to gain. Whereas the Administration's rather self-interested 
treatment of standby letters of credit and property subject to liens, for 
instance, can be understood as resulting from an ambiguous text, an 
onslaught of influential lobbying, and a genuine desire not to impose 
substantial financial costs on United States nationals, its treatment of 
Point IV, by contrast, appears petty and motivated largely by spite. 
Very little was at stake in Point IV for anyone. The Reagan 
Administration's interpretation benefited, at best, a few members of 
the dethroned Iranian dynasty-people who, many believe, emptied 
Iranian coffers for their own gain, and who, whatever their merits, 
had little connection with the United States and who should have had 
little political clout, despite their association with Henry Kissinger 
and David Rockefeller.532 In fact, the Reagan Administration's pro-
Pahlavi interpretation of Point IV did not provide the Pahlavis much 
assistance for the simple reason that the obligations of Point IV-
interpreted correctly-are largely coextensive with ordinary discovery 
and attachment procedures available to all litigants in United States 
courts. It was only because Iran's attorneys failed to make use of 
those discovery and attachment procedures that Iran did not obtain 
all the information it desired about any Pahlavi assets within the 
United States and attachments thereon. 
In addition to its unjustifiable legal interpretation of Paragraphs 
12 and 13, the Reagan Administration also exhibited a certain 
pettiness in its dilatory implementation of Point IV. For example, on 
531. That the burden on the Pahlavi defendants was indeed minimal is shown by the 
fact that OPAC failed to lift the freeze on Ashraf Pahlavi's assets until six years after 
litigation against her terminated, 31 C.P.R. § 535.217 (1991) (adding Shams Pahlavi's name 
to subsection (b) and removing Ashraf Pahlavi's name from that same section), and it 
failed to lift the freeze on Shams Pahlavi's assets until fifteen months after the litigation 
against her terminated and one day after she died. 31 C.P.R. § 535.217 (March 4, 1996); 
Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 81. One can only assume that Ashraf and Shams 
Pahlavi never bothered to ask OPAC to lift the freezes. 
532 Cf. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT v (Comm. Print 1981) ("Mr. Rockefeller ... was personally acquainted with 
the Shah [but] was not an intimate associate to the degree that is often assumed."). 
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February 26, 1981, Iran notified OFAC that Ashraf Pahlavi had been 
served as defendant and asked OFAC to freeze her assets; however, 
despite Iran's repeated reiterations of that request and even though 
Ashraf had never contested service, OFAC delayed for nearly three 
months before finally freezing her assets on May 13, 1981.533 Such a 
delay provides a motivated defendant ample time to transfer property 
and assets out of the country. Similarly inexcusable was the Reagan 
Administration's delay in freezing and requiring reporting about the 
assets of Fatemeh Pahlavi and her codefendants and the assets of 
Shams Pahlavi. Iran notified OF AC on September 29, 1982 that it 
had served Fatemeh Pahlavi and her co-defendants, and at that time 
service was uncontested,534 yet Iran contended (and the United States 
did not deny) that OFAC made no response to the request;535 it 
certainly did not freeze the defendants' assets, and at that time, it had 
no justification for failing to do so even on its own interpretation of 
Paragraph 12's service requirement. Further, in April 1991, Iran 
notified OFAC that it had effected personal service on Shams 
Pahlavi. This service had been upheld by the California Court of 
Appeal and was no longer contested, yet it still took OF AC four 
months to freeze and require reporting about Shams Pahlavi's 
assets.536 Such delays are entirely contrary to the purpose of the 
freeze obligation, which was to prevent the Pahlavi defendants from 
removing their assets from the United States, and were clearly not 
necessary as an administrative matter: the United States had been 
able to freeze approximately $12 billion of Iran's assets in the span of 
a few hours in November 1979 after the hostages were taken, so it did 
not need three months to add Ashraf Pahlavi's name to 
§ 535.217(b ).537 
533. See Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 271-72. 
534. ld. paras. 56-57. 
535. Reply of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Statement of Defense of the United 
States of America, Doc. 58, at 46, Case No. All, supra note 412 (on file with author); 
Iran's Hearing Memorial and Evidence on the Issue of Liability, Doc. 105, at 48-49, Case 
No. All, supra note 412 (on file with author). 
536. Case No. All , supra note 412, paras. 66-67. OFAC exhibited similar discourtesy 
during the period in which Shams Pahlavi was contesting service. Iran initially notified 
OFAC that it had served Shams Pahlavi as a defendant in United States litigation on June 
7, 1982. /d. para. 62. OFAC apparently made no response. On July 7, 1982, Iran 
reiterated its request, and again OFAC did not respond. Indeed, it was only five months 
later, on December 14, 1982, that OFAC sent Iran a letter, informing it that it would not 
freeze Shams Pahlavi's assets because she contested service. !d. 
537. But see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT 
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As unjustifiable as it was, the Reagan Administration's 
implementation of Point IV is unlikely to result in the imposition of 
any damages against the United States. Iran must show in subsequent 
proceedings that it suffered a loss as a result of the United States' 
violations of Paragraphs 12 and 13,538 and that will be a difficult 
showing to make. To obtain damages, Iran presumably will have to 
show that, had the United States fulfilled its Paragraphs 12 and 13 
obligations, relevant assets would have been found and Iran would 
have prevailed in some or all of its lawsuits and would have obtained 
the return of some or all of the assets of the close relatives of the 
former Shah. 
One of Iran's suits against Shams Pahlavi was dismissed because 
Iran failed to comply with a court order compelling discovery, and 
another-to enforce Iranian judgments against her-was dismissed 
because the court concluded that she could not have obtained due 
process of law in the courts of Iran. The United States' failure to 
freeze and require reporting about Shams Pahlavi's assets would 
seem to have no connection to these dismissals and thus to have 
caused Iran no pecuniary harm.539 
Iran's four remaining cases were dismissed on grounds of forum 
non conveniens, and although Iran might argue that the United 
States' failure to freeze and require reporting about assets located in 
the forum caused or at least contributed to those dismissals, that 
argument is not well-supported by the language of the relevant court 
opinions. Those opinions emphasized, not the defendants' lack of 
assets in the forum, but that the events complained of occurred in 
Iran and would have to be analyzed under the laws of Iran, with the 
assistance of witnesses who would be Iranians beyond the subpoena 
power of the forum.s40 Indeed, the New York trial court noted that 
AGREEMENT 17 (Comm. Print 1981) (describing a General Accounting Office report 
criticizing OFAC's "inability to maintain control over blocked assets in carrying out a 
number of freezes involving countries other than Iran, as well as the most recent effort in 
Iran"). 
538. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 268, 275, 280, 291. 
539. Indeed, the suit to enforce Iranian judgments may not even fall under the purview 
of Point IV since the judgments in question were based on claims for breach of contract 
while Point IV covers litigation "'to recover' ... Pahlavi assets 'as belonging to Iran."' See 
id. para. 310 (the Tribunal noting that it is unable to decide that question on the current 
record). 
540. See, e.g., id. para. 38 (quoting the New York trial court's forum non conveniens 
dismissal of Iran's suit against the Shah and Farah Diba Pahlavi); Islamic Republic of Iran 
v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489-90 (App. Div. 1983); Iran's Hearing Memorial and 
Evidence on the Issue of Liability, Doc. 105, Ex. 5, Case No. All, supra note 412, (Los 
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the only connection between New York and the case against the Shah 
and Farah Diba was "the suggestion that the Shah deposited funds in 
banks located in" New York.541 Thus, the court acknowledged the 
possibility of property and assets in New York but by no means found 
it sufficient to prevent the forum non conveniens dismissal; therefore, 
a United States freeze which confirmed the existence of such assets 
would not likely have changed the result.542 
More importantly, any argument that the appropriate United 
States' freezing and reporting of assets would have averted Iran's 
forum non conveniens dismissals is undermined by the forum non 
conveniens dismissal that Iran suffered in its case against Ashraf 
Pahlavi. In May 1981, the United States did freeze and require 
reporting about approximately $4 million worth of real property in 
New York belonging to Ashraf Pahlavi.543 Despite that, the New 
York Appellate Division still dismissed Iran's case on grounds of 
forum non conveniens, concluding that the case did not bear a 
substantial nexus to New York but rather sought "to burden New 
York courts and taxpayers with an action involving billions of dollars 
in assets located throughout the world, with the gravamen of the 
lawsuit being allegations as to [a] foreign monarch's rule over the past 
several decades."544 The court did indicate that, in dismissing the suit, 
it relied on its earlier forum non conveniens dismissal of Iran's case 
against Farah Diba Pahlavi, whose United States assets, if any, had 
not been frozen or reported upon. However, the court took specific 
note of Ashraf's New York property and nonetheless concluded that 
"the actual causes of action do not truly differ from the ones 
Angeles Superior Court Memorandum decision, Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, No. 
WEC 070089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1984) dismissing Iran's suit on grounds of forum non 
conveniens) (on file with author). 
541. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 38. Similarly, the New York Appellate 
Division stated that "[a]lthough the list of assets does include some assets with a relation 
to New York, this is not a case of a dispute as to the ownership of specific property in this 
state." Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487,490 (App. Div. 1983). 
542. Likewise, in dismissing Iran's second suit against Shams Pahlavi, the Los Angeles 
Superior Court reviewed the "25 points" articulated in past cases to determine if the suit 
should be dismissed for forum non conveniens. Examination of virtually every point 
supported the forum non conveniens dismissal, Iran's Hearing Memorial and Evidence on 
the Issue of Liability, Doc. 105, Ex. 5, Case No. All, supra note 412, (Los Angeles 
Superior Court Memorandum decision, Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, No. WEC 
070089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1984) (on file with author); thus, it is unlikely that Iran would have 
secured a different result had it been able to make the court aware that Shams owned 
property or assets in the United States. 
543. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 47-48. 
544. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 473 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (App. Div. 1984). 
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presented in the [case against Farah Diba], upon which we concluded, 
'[t]his is not a case of a dispute as to the ownership of specific 
property in this state. "'545 
Further, even if Iran is able to convince the Tribunal that the 
United States' Paragraphs 12 and 13 violations led to Iran's forum 
non conveniens dismissals, Iran will still have to prove that it could 
have withstood additional procedural or jurisdictional challenges, and 
most importantly, that it would have prevailed on the merits of its 
claims and obtained a money judgment. And, even satisfying these 
hurdles will do Iran no good unless it can also show that the Pahlavis 
held assets in the United States at the time Iran pursued its claims. 
That showing may be particularly difficult given that the Algiers 
Declarations received substantial publicity prior to their conclusion, 
so that the Shah's close relatives would have had ample warning that 
their assets were not safe in the United States. 
Finally, in the remedies phase before the Tribunal, Iran will 
likely have to contend with accusations regarding its complete failure 
to mitigate damages.546 Iran could almost certainly have obtained, 
through ordinary discovery and attachment procedures, a freeze on 
the Pahlavi assets similar to that promised in Paragraph 12 and the 
information required by Paragraph 13, yet Iran did nothing. Indeed, 
Iran appeared to show what little value it placed on the United States' 
Paragraphs 12 and 13 obligations by its own substantial delays in 
seeking their fulfillment. For instance, after serving Fatemeh Pahlavi 
and her 59 co-defendants, Iran delayed six months before notifying 
OF AC that it had done so.547 It likewise delayed six months after 
effecting personal service on Shams Pahlavi before notifying 
OF AC.548 Iran either did not believe that the United States' 
obligations were crucial to the success of its claims or it recognized 
how dim were its prospects of ultimately prevailing on the merits of 
its claims regardless of those obligations; if Iran had cared about 
preventing the Pahlavi defendants from transferring assets out of the 
United States, it would have, at the least, sought Paragraph 12 freezes 
545. Id. (quoting Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (App. Div. 
1983)). 
546. See International Law Comm'n, Paragraph 2 of Draft Article 6 bis of the Draft on 
State Responsibility (Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur), reprinted in [1993] 2 
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 58, U.N. Doc. NCN.4/SER.N1993/Add. 1 (Part 2) ("In the 
determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the negligence or the willful act or 
omission of ... the injured State ... which contributed to the damage."). 
547. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 55-56. 
548. Id. paras. 65-66. 
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at the earliest opportunity and, when that effort failed, it would have 
pursued alternate means of accomplishing the same end. 
In summary, the Reagan Administration violated several 
provisions of the Algiers Declarations, as this article has detailed, but 
its violations of Paragraphs 12 and 13 can be considered its least 
justifiable. Under little political pressure and with even less to gain, 
the Reagan Administration adopted a highly implausible 
interpretation of the phrase "served as a defendant" and otherwise 
implemented the relevant provisions in a dilatory manner that was 
disdainful of the rights Iran had acquired in the Algiers Declarations. 
Be that as it may, the Reagan Administration's violations are not apt 
to cost the United States any monetary damages. The United States 
did not guarantee to Iran the return of the Pahlavi assets; rather, it 
promised to take certain, limited steps to facilitate Iran's efforts to 
obtain the return of those assets through litigation in United States 
courts. The United States failed to take some of those steps, but 
those failures did not likely cause Iran any pecuniary loss; Iran's suits 
almost certainly would have failed even if the United States had 
entirely and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations. 
Final Conclusions 
President Clinton left office amid a "blizzard" of last-minute 
domestic lawmaking,549 but lame-duck lawmaking in international 
affairs continues to be a rarity. In the summer before he left office, 
President Clinton did attempt to negotiate amendments to the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty,550 but his efforts, as a lame duck, did not 
generate great controversy because Republicans, by and large, favor 
amending or, better still, withdrawing from the treaty.551 Still, Clinton 
was urged, by Republicans and Democrats alike, to let his successor 
549. Raum, supra note 109. 
550. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435. See False Missile Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, at A26. 
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been described as "the 'cornerstone' of the United 
States and the Soviet Union's arms control policy." Edward Grogan, Power Play: Theater 
Ballistic Missile Defense, National Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39 VA. J. 
lNT'L L. 799, 803 (1999). 
551. See Missile Defenses: A Shield in Space, THE ECONOMIST, June. 3, 2000, at 19 
(noting that a United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty "would 
delight Republicans in Congress"); Steven Lee Myers, Choice of Rumsfeld Creates Solid 
Team for Missile Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2000. 
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decide whether to build a national missile defense system,552 advice 
President Clinton eventually took.553 
President Clinton also authorized the signing of the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court554 a few weeks before he 
left office,555 but Clinton could not defer making that decision 
because the treaty was open for signature without prior ratification 
only until December 31, 2001,556 the day that Clinton authorized the 
signature.557 In any event, Clinton's action was largely symbolic since 
the treaty must be ratified by a two-thirds' majority of the Senate to 
be binding on the United States.558 In addition, Clinton, who refused 
to endorse adoption of the treaty in 1998, reiterated his concerns 
about its "significant flaws" and stated that he would not submit the 
treaty to the Senate for ratification or recommend that President-
elect Bush do so.s59 The signing was nonetheless denounced by 
Republican Senator Jesse Helms, who called it "a blatant attempt by 
a lame-duck president to tie the hands of his successor."56o 
While Helms's overblown rhetoric is inaccurate, President 
Carter's adherence to the Algiers Declarations on the day before he 
left office did to some degree tie the hands of his successor, Ronald 
Reagan, but in implementing the Algiers Declarations, Reagan 
managed by and large to remain true to the principles he advanced on 
the campaign. President Reagan came to office promising a new, 
more aggressive approach to foreign affairs.56l Reagan believed that 
552. Elizbeth Becker & Eric Schmitt, Clinton Urged To Delay Missile Decision, INT'L 
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21, 2000, at 3; Helen Dewar, Clinton Urged To Defer Missile Shield to 
Successor, WASH. POST, July 14, 2000, at A18. 
553. Brian Knowlton, Clinton Postpones Decision on Building Missile Shield, INT'L 
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 2, 2000. 
554. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.183/9. 
555. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Approves War Crimes Court, INT'L HERALD TRIB., 
Jan. 2, 2001, at 1. 
556. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 125, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.183/9. 
557. Myers, supra note 555, at 1. 
558. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Under international law, however, a state that has signed 
a treaty subject to subsequent ratification is obliged "to refrain from acts which would 
defeat" its "object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 
1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336. 
559. Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Signs Treaty on War Crimes Tribunal, WASH. POST, Jan.1, 
2001, at Al. 
560. Myers, supra note 555, at 1. 
561. KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5 ("During his four-year qllest for the presidency, 
Reagan constantly advocated a foreign policy of strength and assertiveness."). 
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the United States had suffered a disastrous and unnecessary decline 
in international stature during the 1970s as a result of its timidity and 
weakness.562 Consequently, he believed that the United States 
needed to hold its ground, strengthen its defenses, and respond 
forcefully to challenges to its authority and stature.563 
These views were manifest in Reagan's positions as to a variety 
of foreign affairs issues,564 and, particularly to the Iranian hostage 
crisis and the resulting Algiers Declarations. As a candidate, Reagan 
pointed to the hostage crisis as exemplifying all that had gone wrong 
in American foreign policy, and he made clear that, as President, he 
would take a stronger stand against terrorists.565 Fortunately for him, 
he was not called upon to demonstrate the effectiveness of these 
more assertive tactics566 but rather had only the more mundane task 
of implementing the Algiers Declarations before him. 
President Reagan's belief in "a foreign policy of strength and 
assertiveness,"567 however, did inform the decisions that he was called 
upon to make in implementing the Declarations.568 Specifically, the 
562. !d. 
563. !d. at 4; Smist & Meiers, supra note 19, at 301 ("In 1980, candidate Ronald Reagan 
pledged to restore American resolve in foreign policy by being tough on the nation's 
international foes."). 
564. KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5 (noting, for example, that Reagan opposed the Panama 
Canal treaties as well as second strategic arms limitation treaty of the 1970s (SALT II), 
which he considered "a ratification of a 'decade of neglect' of American defenses and a 
further widening of the 'window of vulnerability"'); MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 224. 
565. KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5. In greeting the returning hostages, President Reagan 
vowed: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, 
our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution." Michael M. Gunter, Dealing with 
Terrorism: The Reagan Record, in PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE WORLD 167, 167 (Eric 
J. Schmertz et al. eds., 1997). 
566. The subsequent Iran-Contra debacle calls into question Reagan's commitment to 
his campaign rhetoric. See Smist & Meiers, supra note 19, at 301 (describing "the tough 
pledges against terrorism made by Ronald Reagan during his 1980 campaign and as 
president, and how Iran-Contra ... broke those pledges"). The Reagan Administration's 
actions also diverged from its campaign rhetoric with regard to the Panama Canal treaties 
and the SALT II treaty. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 225. 
567. KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5. 
568. And it certainly informed the rhetoric surrounding his implementation. For 
instance, he showed disdain for the restrictions imposed by international law by making 
abundantly clear that he chose to implement the Declarations at all, not because 
international law required the United States to do so, but because doing so proved to be in 
the best interest of the United States. Reagan Administration Statement Regarding the 
Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2048 at 17 (1981); Symposium, The 
Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 55 (1981). In a similar vein, the Reagan 
Administration's opinion of the United Nations might be summarized by a 1983 statement 
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Reagan Administration elected to interpret certain provisions of the 
Declarations in ways that were highly favorable to United States' 
interests but equally improbable as a matter of treaty interpretation. 
And, as a result, the Tribunal has repeatedly held the United States to 
have breached the Algiers Declarations. 
But although that is the end result, it is only the beginning of the 
analysis. First, to the Reagan Administration's credit, it did reject the 
most unreasonable of the interpretive positions put forward by 
United States claimants,569 and some of the positions that it did 
accept, while arguably not supported by a fair reading of the 
Declarations' text, were both compelling from the claimants' point of 
view and possessing of substantial equitable appeal. For instance, it 
was clear to all that Iran had made and would continue to make 
fraudulent calls on letters of credit. Given that fact, should the 
proceeds of such letters be considered "assets" required to be 
transferred pursuant to the Algiers Declarations? A fair reading of 
the Declarations suggests that they should, but such a transfer would 
have been greeted with such outrage from United States claimants 
who stood to lose hundreds of millions of dollars that even the most 
internationalist of administrations would have paused for thought. 
Similarly, an objective reading of the Declarations suggests that they 
do not permit United States claimants to bring counterclaims against 
Iran in United States courts, but again, the perceived inequity of 
permitting Iran to waltz into United States courts to bring claims 
against United States nationals while prohibiting United States 
nationals from responding with legitimate counterclaims could not 
made by the Administration's Deputy United States Representative at the United 
Nations: 
If in the judicious determination of the members of the United Nations, they feel 
that they are not welcome and that they are not being treated with the hostly 
consideration that is their due, ... then the United States strongly encourages 
such member states seriously to consider removing themselves and this 
organization from the soil of the United States. We will put no impediment in 
your way. . . . The members of the U.S. mission to the United Nations will be 
down at dockside waving you a fond farewell as you sail into the sunset. 
Richard Bernstein, U.S. Aide Suggests Members Take The U.N. Elsewhere if Dissatisfied, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,1983, at Al. 
569. For instance, the Reagan Administration did not permanently terminate letters of 
credit in favor of Iran, as some claimants advocated, Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, 
supra note 62, at 84 (prepared statement of Joseph R. Creighton, Vice President-General 
Counsel, Harris Corp.), and, over some claimants' objections, it nullified the attachments 
that claimants had obtained against Iran even though the Tribunal would ultimately find 
some of the underlying claims to fall outside its jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying 
note354. 
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help but motivate the Reagan Administration to "rectify" this 
inequity in its implementation. 
Not all of the Reagan Administration's interpretive decisions can 
be justified by compelling equitable considerations, however. For 
instance, with respect to standby letters of credit, once the Reagan 
Administration permitted United States account parties to establish 
substituted blocked accounts on their books, it did not need also to 
authorize litigation seeking to enjoin banks from making payment.570 
Further, as noted above, the Reagan Administration's refusal to 
freeze and require reporting about certain Pahlavi assets is virtually 
impossible to justify in any way; fulfilling its obligations would have 
placed very little burden on the United States and failing to do so 
advanced no obvious or important United States' interests. 
So, some of the Reagan Administration's decisions were 
supported by good reasons, others by less good reasons, but all of 
them were complicated by the immense uncertainty surrounding the 
Tribunal-the body that would eventually pass on the Reagan 
Administration's implementation. If Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
subsequent legal realists were correct that interpreting legal texts 
consists of nothing more than predicting a court's subsequent 
decisions,571 then the Reagan Administration had before it a very 
difficult task, for it must have been nearly impossible to predict the 
decisions of the Tribunal.572 
570. Of course, the Reagan Administration could have authorized the litigation while 
eliminating the possibility of substituted blocked accounts, but this would have provided 
United States account parties with less protection. The substituted blocked accounts 
provided United States account parties with inexpensive and certain protection whereas 
claimants seeking injunctions in United States courts must incur litigation costs and may 
be unsuccessful. 
571. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 
991-92 (1997); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND 
ITS STUDY 3 (1951); Felix Cohen, The Problem of a Functional Jurisprudence, MOD. L. 
REV. 1,16 (1937) (opining that "any ... legal question may be broken up into a number of 
subordinate questions, each of which refers to the actual behavior of courts .... The law, 
as the realistic lawyer uses the term, is the body of answers to such questions."). 
572. The U.S. Iranian Hostage Settlement, Remarks by Roberts Owen, 75 AM. SOC'Y 
INT'L L. PROC. 236, 236 (1981) (noting that "in drafting the clauses, the negotiators asked 
themselves how these clauses would be interpreted by the parties, by the U.S. courts, and 
most importantly, by the International Arbitral Tribunal which would be established" 
pursuant to the Algiers Declarations.); James H. Carter, The Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal: Observations on the First Year, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1076, 1077 (1982) (noting 
that after a year in operation, it is still "far too early to predict whether the procedures 
ultimately established will be in all respects fair to all parties, what answers might be given 
by the Tribunal to the many complex substantive legal issues, whether all claimants with 
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Indeed, it was open to question in 1981 whether the Tribunal 
would render any decisions at all, let alone any decisions as to the 
United States' implementation of the Declarations. The history of 
international claims arbitration contains many examples, going back 
to the Jay Treaty commissions, of tribunals that broke up after 
completing only a small fraction of the task set before them,s73 and 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal faced particularly worrisome 
obstacles as a result of the hostility that characterized Iran-United 
States relations. The United States and Iran have had no diplomatic 
relations during the entire period of the Tribunal's operation, and, in 
addition, actual hostilities have occasionally erupted between the 
countries over the years.574 Such hostility spilled over into the 
Tribunal itself in 1984 when two Iranian arbitrators physically 
attacked Judge Mangard, one of the third-country arbitrators.s7s The 
Iranian arbitrators perpetrated the attack as a means of putting 
pressure on their government to withdraw from the Tribunal.576 
Normal Tribunal proceedings were halted for some months, but 
fortunately, Iran recalled the two Iranian arbitrators after the United 
States challenged them, and the Tribunal resumed its business with 
two new Iranian arbitrators.577 Thus, although the Reagan 
Administration could not have foreseen the particular events that 
ensued, it could easily have predicted that the Tribunal would occupy 
a precarious position, and that recognition must have encouraged it to 
"insure" against the Tribunal's failure by adopting pro-United States' 
interpretations of Algiers Declarations' provisions. 
Doing so also enabled the Reagan Administration to foist 
responsibility for the unpopular obligations the United States had 
assumed onto the Tribunal. States often seek to shift responsibility 
meritorious claims will have them satisfied out of the security fund or otherwise, or how 
long the entire procedure may take). 
573. Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Remarks by Ted L. Stein, 78 
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 221, 230 (1984). See generally J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL FOX, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 1-24 (1959). 
574. See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 657 (1998) (listing "military confrontation between the two countries 
in the Gulf in the late 1980s, [which] resulted in the sinking of the Iran Ajar, an attack on 
offshore Iranian oil platforms, ... the downing of an Iranian Airbus [and] the persistent 
American belief that Iranian authorities were responsible at least in part for the prolonged 
detention of American hostages in Lebanon, and the Iran-Contra debacle"). 
575. See ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 24-27 (providing eye-witness description of the 
attack); Magraw, supra note 37, at 19-20. 
576. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 27. 
577. !d. at 26. 
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for unpopular decisions to external bodies,578 and the Algiers 
Declarations allowed the Reagan Administration to take credit for 
looking out for United States' interests while postponing any 
unfavorable consequences and laying the blame for them, when they 
finally came, at the feet of an international organization.579 
Further facilitating the Reagan Administration's nationalistic 
tendencies was the Algiers Declarations' vague and skeletal text. The 
Carter Administration negotiators began by drafting lengthy, detailed 
legal documents but had to abandon those efforts when it became 
clear that they could not survive translation into French and Persian 
and be understood by the Iranian negotiators, many of whom had 
little or no training in the law.580 So, the Carter Administration 
negotiators drafted what Roberts Owen, the Carter Administration's 
Legal Adviser, called "the world's simplest papers."581 These 
succeeded in securing the release of the hostages and setting forth the 
bare bones of the agreement reached by the two states, but their 
necessary ambiguity582 also allowed the Reagan Administration to 
take positions that were highly implausible but not expressly 
foreclosed by the text. 
Indeed, this article has at several points contrasted the Carter 
Administration's contemporaneous understanding of certain Algiers 
Declarations' terms with the Reagan Administration's subsequent 
more pro-United States' interpretation; however, it is not at all clear 
how the Carter Administration would have proceeded on any of these 
issues had it remained in office and faced head-on the pressures that 
instead were brought to bear on the Reagan Administration. 
Although the norms of international law are understood to stand 
578. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal 
International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 22-23 (1998) (noting that binding 
international arbitration often proves more acceptable to states because neither state can 
be accused of yielding to the other). 
579. Of course, the Reagan Administration also shifted the costs of the unpopular 
obligations from the relatively small number of United States nationals, who had had 
business dealings with Iran and who benefited from the Reagan Administration's 
interpretations, to United States taxpayers, whose tax dollars fund the damages that the 
United States must pay to Iran for its treaty violations. 
580. Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 
61 (comments of Roberts Owen). For instance, Iran's lead negotiator was an electrical 
engineer. See Testimony of Behzad Nabavi, Transcript at 73 (Sept. 13, 1995), Case No. 
A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328 (on file with author). 
581. Owen, supra note 47, at 312. 
582. See THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 1981-1983 vii (Richard B. 
Lillich ed., 1984). 
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isolated from and above those of national law and domestic politics, 
the officials who make the decisions implementing international law 
are elected by, and accountable to, a domestic constituency; 
consequently, we cannot be surprised when those elected officials 
take into account the impact, both real and perceived, of the 
implementation on that constituency.s83 Further, even if the Carter 
Administration had been able to maintain what appeared to be its 
more balanced interpretation of the Declarations, that interpretation 
itself did not fully accord with the Tribunal's subsequent conclusions. 
For instance, the Carter Administration believed General Principles 
A and B to impose no obligations independent of those set forth in 
the specific provisions of the Algiers Declarations. The Tribunal 
disagreed, determining that the General Principles embody "broad 
legal commitments."584 Consequently, when the United States was 
held to have breached General Principle A in Case No. AlS(I:C) 
involving letters of credit, it was held to have breached a provision 
that the drafters of the document intended to embody no legal 
obligation.585 
Finally, if one puts aside any theoretical objections to the Reagan 
Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations and 
considers only its ultimate consequences, one finds little to complain 
about. First, although the Reagan Administration's positions resulted 
in several findings of United States' treaty violations, those positions 
provided certain United States claimants with much-needed 
protection and have not yet and probably will not result in the 
imposition of substantial damages. The Tribunal significantly 
reduced the United States' damages for standby letters of credit by 
holding moot a large portion of the standby-letter-of-credit 
disputes.5B6 The Tribunal's finding of a breach in Case No. A24 was 
largely symbolic since the Foremost case was seemingly dormant 
during the period of potential United States' liability. And, the 
Reagan Administration's least justifiable breach-that occurring in 
583. See MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 22. 
584. Case No. A15(I:G), supra note 245, 12 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 46-47 para. 17. 
585. Of course, even if the Tribunal had agreed with the United States that the General 
Principles contain no independent obligations, it might still have found the Reagan 
Administration's authorization of substituted blocked accounts to violate one of the 
General Declarations' specific provisions concerning asset transfer. 
586. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 262 para. 36; see 
5 No. 20 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 3 (1990) ("Iran's victory on the letter of credit issue 
was somewhat hollow" as a result of the Tribunal's conclusion that most of the letter-of-
credit claims were moot). 
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relation to the Pahlavi assets-will probably not cost it a dime. The 
United States' potential liability in Case No. A15(II:A), involving 
tangible property that the United States failed to order transferred, is 
still unclear, but its overall monetary loss for all of these cases is 
arguably slight in comparison with the domestic political damage that 
it would have incurred by interpreting the Declarations in the way the 
Tribunal ultimately determined that it should have. 
Second, the Tribunal, which has had many changes of arbitrators, 
has not been altogether consistent in its decision-making587 and in 
particular has been accused of excessive compromise,588 or what 
might be called "splitting the baby." Some commentators have 
suggested that this tendency might result in part from the fact that 
virtually all of the claims the Tribunal has been called upon to decide 
were filed by United States claimants against Iran, which might create 
in the third-country arbitrators a desire "to 'say yes' to Iran from time 
to time."589 Ironically, then, if such views are accurate, the Reagan 
Administration's treaty breaches allowed the Tribunal justifiably to 
say "yes" to Iran, thereby providing it a much-needed balancing 
effect, at relatively little cost to the United States and at considerable 
gain to certain vulnerable United States claimants. 
Finally, while in many situations, a self-serving treaty 
implementation will cost a state party the trust and goodwill of the 
other state party to the treaty, the United States had little to lose in 
that regard from Iran. Iran signalled its clear desire to terminate 
relations between the two countries when it held United States 
hostages for more than fourteen months.590 Iran's enmity for the 
United States remained undiminished through the negotiations of the 
587. See, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 43 (noting that the Ebrahimi Award's grant 
of full compensation without reference to the Treaty of Amity does not "square with 
Tribunal precedent"); Mark B. Feldman, Book Review, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & 
ECON. 451,455 (1992) (reviewing JOHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 
AND CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED 
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1991)) (noting that Tribunal "decisions are uneven and 
difficult to evaluate objectively"). 
588. Magraw, supra note 37, at 29 (noting that some commentators have asked 
"whether the Tribunal, in its efforts to keep the countries from walking away from the 
process, has compromised its decisionmaking-not in the sense of trying to reach a 
reasonable accommodation of different policy or legal concerns, but rather in the sense of 
engaging in horse trading"). 
589. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 574, at 661. 
590. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. 
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 553 (holding Iran in violation of international 
law). 
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Algiers Declarations, during which Iran refused to negotiate directly 
with the United States, insisting instead on the Algerian 
intermediaries.s91 Iran also refused to sign a treaty with the United 
States, thus necessitating the invention of Declarations that "would 
be issued by the government of Algeria and to which each of the two 
antagonists would then 'adhere."'592 Under these circumstances, the 
Reagan Administration had little to gain in terms of goodwill by a 
more balanced implementation of the Algiers Declarations. 
Indeed, one wonders whether Iran would even have noticed had 
the Reagan Administration effected a more balanced implementation 
given how hell-bent Iran appeared to be on finding fault with 
everything the United States did or did not do in implementing the 
Algiers Declarations. Iran brought claims before the Tribunal 
challenging virtually every aspect of the United States' 
implementation, and most of its claims were patently frivolous. Thus, 
the United States not only lost no goodwill by virtue of the Reagan 
Administration's implementation, it also incurred no unnecessary 
litigation costs since Iran appeared determined to haul it repeatedly 
before the Tribunal regardless of the choices it made. 
Other instances of bad-faith behavior on the part of Iran and its 
arbitrators also help to contextualize and put into perspective the 
Reagan Administration's record of implementation. Although the 
physical attack on Judge Mangard was perpetrated by two Iranian 
arbitrators who, by all accounts, were acting without the 
authorization of their government,593 the government of Iran has 
repeatedly challenged and sought the removal of third-country 
arbitrators on frivolous grounds.S94 Iran's most recent challenges 
targeted the Tribunal's current President, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 
and these were especially malicious and meritless.595 All of Iran's 
591. Owen, supra note 47, at 307. 
592 !d. at 311. 
593. ALI::iRICH, supra note 33, at 26. 
594. !d. at 9-11, 38-39 (describing Iran's challenges to Judge Mangard and Judge 
Arangio-Ruiz and to President Briner). 
595. See Challenge to Judge Krzysztof Skubiszewski, President and Chamber Two 
Chairman of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. May 20, 1999); Statement 
on the Second Challenge to Judge Skubiszewski (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 15, 1999). In its 
first challenge to President Skubiszewski, Iran maintained that there existed doubts about 
President Skubiszewski's impartiality and independence as a result of an inquiry that the 
Deputy Secretary General, who also serves as Skubiszewski's legal adviser, made of the 
N.V. Settlement Bank of the Netherlands. In particular, the Deputy Secretary General 
inquired into the balance of the Security Account in order to prepare an up-to-date bench 
memorandum for the President in a case involving Iran's obligation to replenish the 
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challenges have been soundly rejected,596 but the threat of them may 
nonetheless subtlely influence the Tribunal's decision-making. The 
Iranian arbitrators, while arguably placed in a difficult position by 
their government, have also been accused of employing tactics of 
intimidation597 and engaging in other inappropriate behavior.598 At 
the very least, their nearly universal refusal to vote for a position 
Security Account. Iran claimed that the President had authorized this inquiry and that the 
inquiry constituted improper collection of evidence. The Tribunal's Appointing 
Authority, Sir Robert Jennings, summarily rejected Iran's claim, holding that the balance 
in the Security Account was not an issue in the case; rather, it was a simple question of fact 
as to which there was no dispute between the parties. The Appointing Authority 
concluded: 
The notion that any interest of the President in the state of the balance could be 
evidence of a lack of "impartiality and independence" is not free from absurdity. 
One cannot be partial, or impartial, about a Bank's statement of the amount of 
the balance of an account. A point of view does not arise. In fact the whole 
construction of the First Challenge is artificial and fragile and it simply does not 
withstand examination. 
Decision of the Appointing Authority on the Challenge to Judge Skubiszewski (Iran-U.S. 
Cl. Trib. Aug. 25, 1999). 
Iran's second challenge to President Skubiszewski was related to its first challenge; in 
its second challenge, Iran contended that the President either lied or caused the Deputy 
Secretary General to lie about the inquiry of the Bank. Again, the Appointing Authority 
summarily rejected Iran's claim. He concluded that there was "no ground whatsoever for 
any justifiable belief that the President told a lie or that [the Deputy Secretary General] 
was told to tell a lie." /d. Indeed, according to the Appointing Authority, "the allegation 
that the President lied about this routine and normal matter is not only unjustifiable but 
smacks of absurdity." !d. 
596. ReJudge N. Mangilrd, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 111 (Jan. 15, 1982) (rejecting 
challenge to Judge Mangilrd); Decision of the Appointing Authority on the Challenge to 
Judge Briner, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 384 (Sept. 19, 1989) (rejecting challenge to Judge 
Briner); Decision of the Appointing Authority on the Challenge to Judge Briner, 21 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 396 (Sept. 25, 1989) (rejecting challenge to Judge Briner); Decision of 
the Appointing Authority on the Challenge to Judge Arangio-Ruiz, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 328 (Sept. 24, 1991) (rejecting challenge to Judge Arangio-Ruiz); Decision of the 
Appointing Authority on the Challenge to Judge Skubiszewski (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 25 
Aug. 1999) (rejecting challenge to Judge Skubiszewski). 
The Iranian parties to Case No. 55 sought to remove Judge Briner in that case on the 
ground that, until 1987, he had been a member of the Board of Directors of a Swiss 
company, which was owned by a company that appeared before the Tribunal as an expert 
witness for the United States claimants. Although Judge Briner did not believe the 
challenge to be meritorious, he withdrew from further proceedings in that case. See 
Challenge Documents, 20 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 175-330; ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 38. 
597. Magraw, supra note 37, at 19. 
598. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 35-37 (describing delay tactics and leaking of 
confidential information to Iran); Arthur W. Rovine, The Role of the United States Agent 
to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 1981-1983, 3 AM. REV. lNT'L ARB. 223, 230 (1992) 
(describing leaking of confidential information to Iran). 
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advanced by an American claimant or respondent599 arguably has had 
a skewing effect on Tribunal deliberations since the American 
arbitrators do not resort to similar tactics.600 
To a great extent, the Reagan Administration treated the Algiers 
Declarations in the way that many incoming Presidents have treated 
the eleventh-hour products of their predecessors' administrations. 
The Reagan Administration approached the Algiers Declarations 
with a skeptical eye as the product of a weak and ultimately 
dangerous foreign policy philosophy. The Reagan Administration's 
ideological inclinations coincided with the intense lobbying of United 
States claimants and with widespread anti-Iranian public opinion and 
resulted in a somewhat self-serving implementation of the 
Declarations. However, a fair assessment of that implementation 
cannot be reached without an understanding of the more nuanced 
and contextual aspects of the contemporaneous and subsequent 
events. Although international lawyers might argue that any treaty 
breach disturbs the normative framework of international law, here 
the costs of the Reagan Administration's implementation proved 
relatively minimal for both state parties and the normative 
framework has survived passably well. No more can be expected 
from international law in a context so highly charged. 
599. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 43; Andreas Lowenfeld, The Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal: An Interim Appraisal, 38 ARB. J. 14, 23 (1983) ("[T]he Iranians nearly always 
[act] as a bloc and [refuse] to go along with any decision favorable to the American 
side .... "). 
600. See Correspondence to the Co-Editors in Chief (letter of Richard C. Allison, 92 
AM. J. INT'L L. 469, 488-89 (1998) (noting that the American arbitrators voted against the 
American party on all of its claims in more than 30% of contested Tribunal cases and 
voted against the American party on at least one of its claims in more than 60% of 
contested Tribunal cases). 
